

# SNV Bulletin #29

Historijski revizionizam,  
govor mržnje, diskriminacija  
i nasilje prema Srbima u 2025.



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Bulletin #29: Historijski revizionizam, govor mržnje, diskriminacija i nasilje prema Srbima u 2025.

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## Uvod

Srpsko narodno vijeće od 2013. godine objavljuje godišnju publikaciju "Historijski revizionizam, govor mržnje i nasilje nad Srbima" u kojoj prati slučajeve antisrpske retorike, javnog govora mržnje usmjerenog protiv Srba, historijskog negacionizma i revizionizma te nasilnih djela počinjenih protiv osoba i imovine pripadnika srpske zajednice u Hrvatskoj ili ljudi čija je pripadnost toj zajednici pretpostavljena. Ovaj bilten prvenstveno je politički izvještaj čija je svrha pružanje manjinske perspektive na dnevopolitičke događaje u prethodnoj godini i počiva na bazi podataka prikupljenih iz medijskih izvještaja, izvještaja organizacija građanskoga društva te pravne službe Srpskog narodnog vijeća. Bilten ne predstavlja pravni dokument i činjenica da je neki od postupaka u ovom biltenu istaknut kao govor mržnje ne znači njegovu pravnu kvalifikaciju kao takvog. Iako su u izradi biltena i prezentiranju informacija korištene metode znanstvene analize diskursa i analize okvira (*frame analysis*), on također ne predstavlja ni znanstvenu analizu javnoga diskursa u Hrvatskoj u prethodnoj godini, već je njegova primarna svrha informiranje domaće i inozemne javnosti o nekim problematičnim pojavama u hrvatskom društvu. Primjeri u ovom biltenu izvučeni su iz baze podataka od preko 1500 dokumentiranih novinskih članaka i izvještaja, dok je analiza okvira govora mržnje izrađena na drugoj bazi od 2000 članaka s internetskih portala. Bilten je tematski organiziran oko nekoliko ključnih događaja koji su pobudili medijski interes i interes javnosti, a koji su ilustrativni za trenutačnu društvenu klimu. Slijede neki sažeti zaključci temeljeni na bazi podataka i navedenim primjerima:

- /1 Zabilježena su 22 slučaja prijetnji i etnički motiviranog fizičkog nasilja. To predstavlja značajan porast u odnosu na prošlu godinu kad je fizičko nasilje ili prijetnje pretrpjelo 11 osoba. Broj osoba koje su žrtve fizičkog nasilja i prijetnji veći je od broja slučajeva jer je nasilje često bilo usmjereno prema grupama ljudi i manjinskim organizacijama u cjelini. Prijetnje smrću primili su politički zastupnici srpske nacionalne manjine, a u tri slučaja napadani su novinari manjinskih medija.
- /2 Zabilježen je 51 slučaj vandalizma, što je 12 više nego prošle godine. Većina slučajeva odnosi se na uvredljive grafite, a zabilježen je i jedan slučaj uništavanja imovine, dok su u 20 slučajeva vandalizirani spomenici posvećeni antifašističkoj borbi i žrtvama genocida u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Poneki spomenici vandalizirani su i više puta uzastopce.

- /3 Govor mržnje ove godine bio je naročito vezan uz rehabilitaciju fašističkog režima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH), pozdrava "Za dom spremni!" (zds) te ostalih simbola i ličnosti tog zločinačkog režima. Poduzeti su brojni napori usmjereni prema negiranju ustaških zločina i fašističke prirode ustaškog režima.
- /4 Organiziranim napadima bile su izložene kulturne manifestacije često prozivane kao "antihrvatske", što je kulminiralo napadima za vrijeme Dana srpske kulture u studenom. Napadači su prijetnjama i nasiljem htjeli spriječiti održavanja kulturnih manifestacija. Osim toga, često su napadani i pojedinačni kulturni radnici i pisci.
- /5 Paralelno s napadima na srpsku nacionalnu manjinu, žestokim napadima i osporavanjima izloženo je antifašističko nasljeđe u Hrvatskoj. Ti su se napadi očitovali u nazivanju antifašista "teroristima" te negiranju antifašističke prirode Narodnooslobodilačke borbe (NOB).
- /6 Akteri napada često su bili članovi navijačkih skupina i ljudi koji su se predstavljali kao predstavnici veterana Domovinskog rata. Nažalost, političari desnih političkih stranaka često su podržavali navedene incidente i karakterizirali ih kao legitimne izraze narodnog nezadovoljstva navodno privilegiranim položajem srpske nacionalne manjine. Istovremeno je porastao broj poziva na institucionalnu diskriminaciju srpske nacionalne manjine, a pojedinci su prozivali Srbe za "provociranje", čime su opravdavali i umanjivali nasilje protiv njih. Takav trend pokazuje da je antisrpska retorika postala normaliziranim dijelom političkog programa desnih i konzervativnih stranaka. Isto vrijedi i za negiranje antifašističkog nasljeđa Drugog svjetskog rata i u Ustavu imenovanih antifašističkih temelja hrvatske državnosti.
- /7 Govor mržnje nije bio usmjeren isključivo prema srpskoj nacionalnoj manjini, već je zabilježen i povećan broj nasilnih incidenata i govora mržnje usmjerenih prema aktivistima civilnoga društva, lijevo orijentiranim političarima, stranim radnicima, Romima, ženama i pripadnicima LGBTQIAP+ populacije. To pokazuje kako nacionalistička retorika nije usmjerena samo prema pripadnicima ciljane etničke skupine, već zahvaća brojne druge ranjive populacije te isključuje i stigmatizira svakoga tko se ne uklapa u dominantan etnocentrički i patrijarhalni ideološki okvir.
- /8 Bilježi se porast broja i povećanje intenziteta primjera govora mržnje i etničkog nasilja nakon koncerata Marka Perkovića Thompsona u Zagrebu i Sinju te u kolovozu i studenom kao mjesecima kad se obilježavaju Dan pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti i Dan sjećanja na žrtvu Vukovara i Škabrnje.

- /9 Provedena analiza izvještavanja o pozdravu “Za dom spremni!” na hrvatskim portalima pokazuje da je središnji događaj povezan s naglim porastom medijskog interesa koncert pjevača Marka Perkovića Thompsona održan 5. srpnja u Zagrebu. Taj se događaj profilira kao ključna točka nakon koje se ZDS učestalije afirmira u javnom prostoru, a mediji kontinuirano prate reakcije i daljnje pojave njegova korištenja. Iako se argumentacija vezana uz korištenje ili zabranu korištenja pozdrava nerijetko razvija i kroz prenošenje priopćenja organizacija ili izjava pojedinaca, kao ključan prostor tenzije ističu se rasprave u Hrvatskom saboru. Raspodjela pojedinaca i skupina uključenih u rasprave o toleriranju korištenja ZDS-a, kao i rješenja koja se u tim raspravama predlažu, upućuje na središnju ulogu političkih aktera i formalnih institucija u oblikovanju medijskoga diskursa o ZDS-u. Pritom se na uočene rizike i incidente reagira brže i vidljivije nego što se sustavno radi na prevenciji. Iako su u medijskom prostoru tijekom prva tri kvartala prisutniji negativni stavovi prema ZDS-u, čija je argumentacija i temeljitije razrađena, analiza upućuje na važan pozadinski problem — poklič “Za dom spremni!” nije marginalna pojava u široj javnosti jednoznačno osuđena kao govor mržnje i kao rehabilitacija simbola fašističkog režima, nego se sve više predstavlja kao legitiman predmet političkih rasprava.

## *Govor mržnje i historijski negacionizam*

U presudi koju je Ferdinandu Nahimani i Jean-Boscu Barayagwizi zbog poticanja na genocid izrekao Međunarodni krivični tribunal za Ruandu stoji da su se međunarodni standardi koji kažnjavaju i ograničavaju govor mržnje razvili kako bi suzbili opasnost i štetu nastalu zbog različitih oblika komunikacije koja potiče predrasude. U istoj je presudi, prvoj u kojoj je jedan međunarodni tribunal osudio počinitelje za izvršavanje zločina protiv čovječnosti putem masovnih medija, sudsko vijeće istaknulo kako je paralelno sa zaštitom slobode govora i političkih nazora nužno pažljivo obratiti pozornost na svaki etnički obilježen govor u javnom prostoru da bi se osiguralo da isti ne ugrožava manjinske skupine u društvu. Govor mržnje suci Međunarodnog tribunala definirali su kao “diskriminatorni oblik agresije koji uništava dostojanstvo napadane skupine. Govor mržnje ne proizvodi samo doživljaj manje društvene vrijednosti kod pripadnika targetirane skupine, već i kod ostalih koji ih mogu početi percipirati i tretirati na neljudski način. Dehumaniziranje ljudi na temelju njihovog etničkog identiteta ili pripadnosti nekoj drugoj skupini tako može rezultirati nepopravljivom povredom.” Tu sudsku definiciju govora mržnje slijedio je i Odbor ministara Vijeća Europe u svojoj preporuci iz 2022. godine u kojoj govor mržnje definira kao “poticanje, promicanje, širenje ili opravdavanje nasilja, mržnje ili diskriminacije protiv osobe ili skupine osoba, ili omalovažavanje osoba zbog njihovih stvarnih ili pripisanih osobnih karakteristika ili statusa, kao što su ‘rasa’, boja kože, jezik, vjera, nacionalnost, nacionalno ili etničko podrijetlo, dob, invaliditet, spol, rodni identitet i seksualna orijentacija”. Od nedavnih akademskih definicija istaknut ćemo jednostavnu definiciju Martinsa, Gomesa i drugih koji kažu da je govor mržnje “svaki emotivni izraz koji prenosi subjektivne stavove publici s namjerom diskriminacije neke skupine. Može biti iskazan na raznovrsne načine — pismom, neverbalno, vizualno ili umjetnički — i promican putem bilo kojeg medija, uključujući internet, tisak, radio ili televiziju”.

Ove formulacije potvrdila su brojna istraživanja iz područja antropologije, komunikologije, sociologije i političkih znanosti, koja su jasno ukazala na postojanje uzročno-posljedičnih veza između govora mržnje i vidljivih oblika nasilja. U posljednje vrijeme naročito se često spominje stohastičko nasilje, oblik političkog nasilja potaknut neprijateljskom javnom retorikom usmjerenom protiv neke ranjive društvene skupine. Za stohastičko nasilje potrebna je prisutnost triju elemenata. Prvi je zapaljiv govor, često formuliran u crno-bijelim pojmovima koji jednu stranu predstavljaju kao žrtvu, a drugu kao agresora te sadrži “zrcalno

optužbu” u kojoj se mržnja prema ranjivoj skupini pripisuje samoj toj skupini od onih koji se predstavljaju kao zaštitnici dominantne skupine. Manjine tako bivaju prozivane da mrze ili žele uništiti tradicionalni način života, destabilizirati društvo ili na razne načine “pokoriti” dominantnu zajednicu. Takav govor često ne treba biti eksplicitan, već je nerijetko neizravan ili čak kodiran (u literaturi na engleskom jeziku taj oblik komunikacije poznat je kao *dog whistling*). Drugi je element sâm govornik, koji se koristi vlastitom medijskom eksponiranošću kako bi takav govor plasirao u javni prostor, a treći je sâm počinitelj, koji pribjegava prijetnjama ili činovima izravnog nasilja, potaknut ili ohrabren govornikovim korištenjem zapaljivog diskursa. Činjenica da između govornika i direktnog počinitelja ne postoji jasna povezanost omogućava govorniku da se odrekne vlastite odgovornosti za sâm čin nasilja. Tako se počinitelji govora mržnje, osobito oni iz političke, medijske i kulturne sfere, mogu i dalje pozivati na slobodu govora i odricati štetne posljedice vlastitoga djelovanja na kojima često politički i financijski profitiraju.

## /1 Izjave političara i institucionalna diskriminacija

Analiza govora mržnje autorâ ovoga i prethodnih biltena Srpskog narodnog vijeća unatrag posljednjih nekoliko godina pokazala je kako su politički procesi zapravo izvorišna točka poticanja i raspirivanja međuetničkih napetosti u Hrvatskoj. U ovoj publikaciji politički govor mržnje podijeljen je na govorne akte diskriminacije, odnosno govor mržnje za koji su se političari koristili platformom koju im osiguravaju njihov položaj u društvu, socijalni kapital i pristup masovnim medijima koji iz njega proizlaze te na konkretne čine koji su rezultirali institucionalnom diskriminacijom Srba u Hrvatskoj.

### /1. 1. Javne izjave političara

Nakon prošlogodišnjih parlamentarnih izbora krajnje desna stranka Domovinski pokret, koja je u predizbornoj kampanji isticala vlastite antisrpske i antiimigrantske stavove, postala je dijelom vladajuće koalicije. Jedna od posljedica takvog razvoja političke situacije bila je, nažalost, sve veća normalizacija isključujućeg i diskriminatornog govora u političkom diskursu. Tako se i ove godine dio zastupnika koristio Hrvatskim saborom kao platformom za napade na srpsku nacionalnu manjinu i njezine političke predstavnike. Neki od tih napada izlazili su iz okvira uobičajenih političkih obračuna jer su bili bazirani na etničkim stereotipima i plasirali su u javnost sliku hrvatskih Srba kao prijetnje državnom poretku. Neki primjeri nisu čak bili ni dio konkretne rasprave o pravima i položaju manjina, već je za iste upotrebljivan institut slobodnih govora zastupnika. Tijekom aktualnog prijedpodeva u Hrvatskom saboru 15.

siječnja zastupnik krajnje desne stranke Domovinski pokret, Stipo Mlinarić tako je upotrijebio taj institut kako bi iznio teške i neutemeljene optužbe na račun SDSS-ove zastupnice Dragane Jeckov, ustvrdivši da je znala za zločin u Negoslavcima, dok je njegov stranački kolega Ivica Kukavica usput izjavio da mu smeta što se u Saboru upotrebljava riječ “hiljada”, što je Milorad Pupovac označio kao “povod za mržnju i netoleranciju i dokaz da ovdje postoje ekstremističke stranke”. Takvim izjavama nastojalo se — na osobito bezobziran način — diskvalificirati zastupnike srpske nacionalne manjine, dovodeći ih u vezu s ratnim zločinima te s nacionalističkih pozicija osuditi korištenje određenih riječi koje se upotrebljavaju i u hrvatskom i u srpskom jeziku, time zapravo podvrgavajući javni prostor politici jezične čistoće i stigmatizirajući etnički i jezični identitet pojedinih zastupnika. Implikacija toga, naravno, želja je za uklanjanjem iz javnog i političkog prostora svih izjava i sadržaja koji se mogu smatrati “nedovoljno hrvatskim”.<sup>1</sup>

Stipo Mlinarić Ćipe nastavio je u istome tonu i tijekom rasprave o odlasku svog stranačkog kolege Josipa Dabre s mjesta ministra poljoprivrede, nakon što je u javnost procurila snimka na kojoj potonji puca u zrak iz pištolja kroz prozor automobila. Prvo je na svom profilu na *Facebooku* objavio status u kojem optužuje Srbe za gomilanje oružja po selima: “Hrvatima ne treba neprijatelj izvana. Dovoljni smo mi sami. Evo nas opet. Kad Hrvat napravi i najmanji prijestup, odmah skaćemo. Raspnimo ga, razapnimo, linčujmo! A što je s onima koji godinama divljaju, prijete i pucaju kao da je rat još jučer stao? Njih puštamo na miru”, napisao je Mlinarić. “Hoću li živ dočekati dan kad će se netko iz medija usuditi javno zapitati — što će Srbima u tim selima automatsko oružje? Odakle im? Koliko ga ima? Nije teško pogoditi. Nekad su imali pet puta više oružja nego Hrvati, danas je taj omjer sigurno još i gori. Repetirke su zamijenile strojnice, a rijetko koja kuća nema arsenal. I što onda? Ništa. Šuti se. Godinama po srpskim selima odjekuju rafali iz automatskog oružja — za svatove, Božić, Vaskrs. Pred crkvama, po ulicama, javno, pred kamerama! I nikome ništa. Zakoni, izgleda, ne vrijede za njih. Ali kad Hrvat izvan naseljenog mjesta ispali iz pištolja metak — odmah je to udar na nacionalnu sigurnost. Licemjerje je očito. Hrvat s pištoljem — prijetnja. Naoružani četnici — tabu tema. Kao da je cilj da Hrvati budu bespomoćni, da budemo uvijek spremni za novi masakr. Sami sebi radimo štetu. Sami sebe gazimo. Ne treba nam neprijatelj izvana — dovoljni smo mi sami. Dokle ćemo šutjeti? Koliko dugo ćemo gledati ovu nepravdu i okretati glavu? Vrijeme je za pitanja, odgovore i pravdu — za sve. Očekujem da ova moja Vlada na tom području napravi zaokret.”<sup>2</sup>

Mlinarić je ovom izjavom opravdavao nezakonite i opasne radnje svoga stranačkog kolege, zrcalnom porukom u kojoj se isti krimen, bez ikakvih

dokaza, pripisuje Srbima u Hrvatskoj, usto još implicirajući kako su isti nasilni te “divljaju, prijete i pucaju” i nazivajući ih “naoružanim četnicima”, što ih izravno apostrofira kao neprijatelje Hrvata i opasnost za društvo te se implicira da Srbi pripremaju “novi masakr” Hrvata. Umjesto osude potencijalnog ugrožavanja ljudskih života Dabrinim neodgovornim i opasnim ponašanjem, Čipe je jedan od najvećih skandala u kojem se našao ovaj sastav Vlade Republike Hrvatske odlučio iskoristiti za huškanje protiv Srba.

Kasnije je sličnom izjavom svoj postupak branio i Josip Dabro koji je Dragani Jeckov odgovorio kako, parafraziramo, on možda puca po njivama, ali ne puca po centru sela na svakoj svadbi kao njezini sumještani te je dodao da su sumještani Dragane Jeckov “abolirani ljudi koji su digli oružje na Hrvatsku”. Riječ je bila o mještanima sela Negoslavci, u kojem većinu stanovništva čine Srbi. Dabro je time čitavu jednu srpsku zajednicu povezo s oružanom pobunom, dalje perpetuirajući sliku o njima kao naoružanim i opasnim pojedincima. Naravno, za razliku od Dabrinog pucanja po njivama i cestama, navodno naoružavanje i pucnjava Srba iz Negoslavaca nije potvrđeno niti dokazano.<sup>3</sup>

Lokalni izbori koji su se održavali u svibnju prošle godine pojedincima su pružili dodatan povod za prozivanje srpske nacionalne manjine u negativnom kontekstu. Nakon izbora u Vukovaru, na kojima je Domagoj Bilić, kandidat Domovinskog pokreta, teško poražen od kandidata Hrvatskih suverenista Marijana Pavličeka, Stipo Mlinarić Čipe održao je konferenciju za medije na kojoj je rekao kako ima dokaze da je Pavliček izbore dobio uz pomoć Srba te da je “mali lutak” Dragane Jeckov. Na istoj konferenciji pohvalio se i kako je njegova stranka “izbacila SDSS iz Vlade” i donijela zakon o rušenju “četničkih spomenika”. Diskvalifikacija političkih oponenta zato što za njih navodno “glasaju Srbi”<sup>4</sup> i isticanje odsutnosti zastupnika srpske nacionalne manjine iz vlasti — kao političkog postignuća kojim se treba hvaliti — bila je kontinuirana retorika zastupnika Domovinskog pokreta, čime su pretvorili isključivanje Srba iz političkog života Hrvatske u politički program na kojem kontinuirano rade.

Nije onda neobično da su i drugi akteri političke scene počeli preuzimati tu retoriku; odjednom je biti “protiv Srba”, a osobito protiv sudjelovanja Srba u politici, postala poželjna politička pozicija na desnici i desnom centru, a poruke koje etniciziraju i kroatiziraju politički prostor, oslobađajući ga od “srpske opasnosti”, sasvim su legitimirane pa su se njima počeli koristiti i pojedinci iz političkih opcija unutar kojih bi takve izjave do jučer bile nezamislive. Primjerice, Kruno Raguž, SDP-ov kandidat na izborima, nezadovoljan ostvarenim rezultatom, u svom je statusu na *Facebooku* tako prosipao niz uvreda i homofobnih izjava, od

kojih su se neke dotakle i vukovarskih Srba. Između ostaloga, vukovarske je Srbe pogrdno nazvao “Srbadijom”, Srđana Kolara, predsjednika gradskog SDSS-a, “ugojenom srpskom seljačinom” i “ćakom” (referenca na pogrdni izraz “ćaci” kojim prosvjednici u Srbiji zovu podržavatelje predsjednika Aleksandra Vučića) te je rekao kako su Srbi “kupljeni” pa ga zbog toga navodno nisu podržali na izborima.<sup>5</sup> Još je više zabrinjavajuće da je Raguž tu objavu napisao s profila službene stranice SDP-a Vukovar. Istu je objavu kasnije objavio u izmijenjenom obliku bez spomenutih uvreda na nacionalnoj osnovi.

Govora mržnje bilo je i tijekom kampanje za izbore u Splitu, doduše ne od samih kandidata, već od pojedinaca koji su promovirali određene kandidate. Diana Mataković, profesorica biologije u V. gimnaziji “Vladimir Nazor” u Splitu, putem društvenih mreža nagovarala je roditelje učenika kojima je razrednica, kao i svoje bivše učenike, da u drugom krugu izbora glasaju za HDZ-ovog kandidata Tomislava Šutu. Nakon što je upozorena da grupe za komunikaciju roditelja i nastavnika ne bi trebale služiti za političko agitiranje, demonstrativno je napustila grupu uz riječi da “ne voli Srbe i Jugoslavene”. Tomislav Šuta i V. gimnazija, nakon što su poruke izašle u medije, ogradili su se od Diane Matković i njezinih postupaka.<sup>6</sup>

Jedna od optužbi koju je desni dio političke scene često potencirao bila je teorija zavjere o Srbima u Hrvatskoj i njihovim organizacijama kao instrumentima širenja takozvanog “srpskog sveta”. Ta teorija zavjere bila je vezana prvenstveno uz otvaranje srpskih kulturnih centara, inače zamišljenih kao mjesta zajedništva i kulturne razmjene. U zavjeraškim idejama dijela desnih političara već se godinu dana održava narativ o istima kao “špijunskim centrima” koji pripremaju neku vrstu invazije na Hrvatsku. Tu je tezu u svojim govorima i javnim istupima, između ostaloga, ponovio i nezavisni zastupnik i povjesničar Josip Jurčević. Na primjer, u govoru na slobodnu temu u Hrvatskom saboru 14. ožujka Jurčević je rekao kako su srpski kulturni centri “neprijateljske, identitetske utvrde koje će destabilizirati sigurnost u Hrvatskoj i biti uporišta ako dođe do sigurnosne ili vojne destabilizacije” te da ih “predvode okupacijske vlasti koje su vezano za Erdutski sporazum preselile svoju strukturu u Hrvatskoj, s vrlo jasnim ciljevima”. Jurčević je također najavio da je “sve izvjesnije da će doći do sigurnosne, pa i oružane destabilizacije u hrvatskom okruženju”.<sup>7</sup> Dio desnih portala prenio je Jurčevićev govor kojim je zapravo napadnuto pravo srpske manjine na njegovanje vlastite kulture te je kritizirana i mirna reintegracija istočne Slavonije i hrvatskog Podunavlja, kao i Erdutski sporazum, čiju je provedbu garantirala međunarodna zajednica. Erdutski sporazum i samu ideju pomirbe napao je i zastupnik Domovinskog pokreta, Predrag Mišić. On je 20. studenog odgovorio SDSS-ovoj zastupnici Anji Šimpragi na društvenoj

mreži *Facebook* i nazvao Erdutski sporazum “suludom, pokvarenom idejom”.<sup>8</sup>

Mišić je i uoči lokalnih izbora u Slavonskom Brodu poticao strah od srpskih kulturnih centara. Na konferenciji za medije 25. travnja Predrag Mišić, Nikola Barišić i Ivan Stipić osudili su podršku nezavisnog brodske gradonačelnika Mirka Duspore radu Srpskog kulturnog centra “Branko Radičević”. Za Barišića su sporne bile aktivnosti navedenog kulturnog centra, a Ivan Stipić otvoreno je optužio gradonačelnika da podupire “velikosrpski projekt Svetosavlja”. Mišić je pak rekao da se “danas otvaraju centri koji veličaju ideologiju zbog koje su djeca ginula”, implicirajući nedugo potom da otvaranje srpskog kulturnog centra predstavlja neku vrstu opasnosti za Hrvatsku: “Za koga se grade srpski kulturni centri? Je li to sljedba nekih prošlih, mračnih vremena? Srpski pravoslavni centri niču nam kao gljive po cijeloj Hrvatskoj. Bojim se da ćemo to platiti u nadolazećim vremenima”.<sup>9</sup>

Takvim se izjavama život, političko i kulturno djelovanje Srba u Hrvatskoj otvoreno apostrofira kao moguća prijetnja javnoj sigurnosti, čime se neuvijeno legitimira bilo koji vid institucionalne i izvaninstitucionalne represije i napada prema njima.

Za provođenje “velikosrpske politike” optužena je i stranka Možemo!. Zastupnik Domovinskog pokreta, Ivica Kukavica, nakon izjave zagrebačkog gradonačelnika Tomislava Tomaševića kako u Zagrebu neće više biti koncerta kakav je Thompsonov, rekao je kako je poistovjećivanje simbola postrojbi NOS-a s ustaštvom “velikosrpska politika”. Time je otvoren put temi o kojoj će u ovom biltenu biti više riječi kasnije, a to je poistovjećivanje svake osude simbola pozdrava koji porijeklo vuku iz fašističke Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH) s velikosrpstvom, a sâm pojam “velikosrpski” postaje, zapravo, na desnoj političkoj sceni legitiman način diskreditacije političara. Time je zavjeraški diskurs o nekoj navodno ponovnoj uspostavi “Velike Srbije” proširen izvan konkretnog prozivanja srpskih političkih organizacija te je postao sredstvom difamacije svake politike koja se zalaže za drukčije poglede na ratove devedesetih.<sup>10</sup>

Pored političkih stranaka i kulturnih centara, za širenje velikosrpske ideje optužena je i Srpska pravoslavna crkva. Tijekom domjenka koji je u Dicmu organizirala udruga Hrvatski pravoslavni centar, Predrag Mišić izrazio je namjeru da ponovno osnuje Hrvatsku pravoslavnu crkvu, vjersku organizaciju oformljenu od ustaških vlasti za vrijeme Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH), rekavši pritom kako je Srpska pravoslavna crkva “parapolitička organizacija koja provodi velikosrpsku politiku”.<sup>11</sup>

## /1. 2. Smanjivanje sredstava *Novostima*

Jedno od često isticanih programskih načela desnih stranaka poput Domovinskog pokreta i Mosta tijekom prethodne godine bilo je ukidanje ili smanjivanje sredstava *Novostima*, tjedniku srpske nacionalne manjine. Stoga je u javnosti snažno odjeknulo izglasavanje Prijedloga odluka o raspodjeli sredstava za programe kulturne autonomije Savjeta za nacionalne manjine 24. travnja 2025. godine kojim je *Novostima* dodijeljeno 200.000 eura manje nego prethodne godine, čime su sredstva ovog lista umanjena za 35 %. Predsjednik Savjeta za nacionalne manjine, Tibor Varga porekao je da je riječ bila o političkoj odluci, no ipak je ustvrdio da "Savjet ima mandat financirati samo programe koji se tiču kulturne autonomije", implicirajući tako da su *Novostima* sredstva smanjena jer pišu o političkim temama. Pritom je ostao nejasan kriterij razdvajanja kulturnih tema od političkih, a Varga je odbio pojasniti što se u uređivačkoj politici tjednika *Novosti* promijenilo u posljednjih godinu dana, a da bi opravdalo tako drastično smanjenje sredstava. Zastupnik talijanske nacionalne manjine, Furio Radin smanjenje sredstava *Novostima* nazvao je političkim činom, a zastupnik srpske nacionalne manjine Milorad Pupovac rekao je sljedeće: "Vi ćete vjerojatno vrlo brzo čuti jednu političku stranku koja će reći da su njezini ciljevi ispunjeni nakon što je Savjet donio odluku da se samostalnom srpskom tjedniku smanje sredstva za više od trideset posto. To bi vam trebalo biti dovoljno".<sup>12</sup>

Time je aludirao na ciljeve Domovinskog pokreta proklamirane u kampanji 2024. godine. Te aluzije ubrzo je potvrdio Stipo Mlinarić Čipe u gostovanju na televiziji N1, gdje je rekao da je njegova stranka u pregovorima s HDZ-om inzistirala da se tjedniku *Novosti* smanji financiranje te da je to bio njihov uvjet za suradnju s HDZ-om.<sup>13</sup> Mlinarić je svojom izjavom eksplicitno priznao kako su zahtjevi za institucionalnom diskriminacijom srpske nacionalne manjine bili predmetom pregovora o koaliciji Domovinskog pokreta i Hrvatske demokratske zajednice, no još je više zabrinjavajuće što je time priznao da je izravno prekršen zakon i da su članovi Savjeta za nacionalne manjine, koji pod materijalnom i kaznenom odgovornošću jamče vlastitu nepristranost, bili izloženi političkim pritiscima.<sup>14</sup> Čipine izjave neizravno je potvrdio i nekadašnji saborski zastupnik Domovinskog pokreta Igor Peternel, koji je u međuvremenu prešao u stranku Dom i nacionalno okupljanje (DOMINO). Peternel je na temu smanjenja proračunskih sredstava *Novostima* održao konferenciju za medije u Hrvatskom saboru na kojoj je rekao da je u programu Domovinskog pokreta stajalo ukidanje proračunskih sredstava *Novostima*, što za njega ne predstavlja napad na medije nacionalnih manjina, već govori o opravdanoj kritici uređivačke politike koja ne ispunjava zakonske i profesionalne standarde manjinskoga glasila. Međutim, naglasio je kako smanjenje sredstava ne smatra uspjehom jer je financiranje tje-

nika *Novosti* potrebno u potpunosti ukinuti. Peternelova izjava osobito je zabrinjavajuća jer opravdava prestanak financiranja neimenovanim i nedefiniranim zakonskim i profesionalnim kriterijima te implicira da bi predstavnici većinske etničke skupine trebali imati pravo propisivati kriterije uređivačke politike manjinskih glasila, što bi ozbiljno ograničilo kulturnu autonomiju manjina. Također, čini se da bi Peternel primjenjivao te stroge profesionalne kriterije samo na manjinska glasila, a ne i na ostale medije u većoj ili manjoj mjeri financirane novcem poreznih obveznika. Osim toga, Ustavni zakon o pravima nacionalnih manjina nema nikakvih propisa niti odredbi koje bi propisivale sadržaj medija, a pisanje o političkim i društvenim temama se ne podupire. Ono što je očito sporno Mlinariću i Peternelu jest način pisanja o tim temama koji odstupa od etno-nacionalističke matrice, što je na neki način potvrdio i sâm Peternel kad ga je okrstio “nastavkom feralovskog diskursa”.<sup>15</sup>

Ministrica kulture, Nina Obuljen Koržinek negirala je navode da je smanjenje sredstava *Novostima* motivirano političkim pritiscima. Naglasila je da je riječ o isključivo kriterijima Savjeta te nadodala da motiv smanjenja sredstava vidi u činjenici da se *Novosti* ne obraćaju isključivo Srbima već i “široj publici”.<sup>16</sup>

Na smanjenje sredstava tjedniku *Novosti* reagiralo je i Hrvatsko novinarsko društvo (HND), krovno strukovno udruženje novinara u Hrvatskoj. Predsjednik HND-a, Hrvoje Zovko rekao je da je tu riječ o “udarcu na već krhku slobodu medija u zemlji”, istaknuvši na konferenciji za medije sljedeće: “Eskadroni povijesnog revizionizma i cenzure nadiru sa svih strana. Ovo je udarac ne samo prema jednoj redakciji, nego prema cijeloj novinarskoj zajednici i onima koji misle drukčije. Ako ne dignemo svoj glas i ne suprotstavimo se o tome, pokucat će i na druga vrata”. Obrazloženje predsjednika Savjeta za nacionalne manjine Tibora Varge da se ne mogu financirati politički sadržaji, već jedino programi kulturne autonomije ocijenio je skandaloznim jer bi ispunjavanje tih uvjeta značilo “pristajanje na getoizaciju”. Na sličan način odluku je komentirala i urednica *Novosti*, Andrea Radan koja je istaknula kako se od prethodne godine uređivačka politika tjednika nije nimalo promijenila, ali da je ono što se promijenilo “to što je stigao zahtjev Domovinskog pokreta da se *Novostima* uskrate sredstva pa su sredstva uskraćena”.<sup>17</sup>

Izjave političara koji su potvrdili da su kod prestanka financiranja *Novosti* bili presudni politički pritisci za portal *direktno.hr* potvrdio je i novinar Gordan Malić. On je jasno rekao da je za njega uzrok smanjivanja financiranja bila specifična ideološka pozicija *Novosti*. Malić je tako rekao: “Iz tog se časopisa dâ jasno očitati kako je riječ o srpsko-jugoslavensko-komunjarskom konceptu budući da se predstavnici Srba u Hrvatskoj ne žele odreći tekovina zajednice u kojoj su barem bili konstitutivni.

Njihov izbor mogao je biti i građansko-liberalni ili umjereno socijalistički, ali oni su odabrali ovo... Osobno nemam ništa protiv da nastave promovirati te ideje na tržištu, ali oni očito drže ta pitanja neodvojivim: manjinsko i ideološko”.

Malić, kao i Peternel, smatra da je financiranje manjinskih glasila povezano s propisivanjem toga kakav će biti ideološki okvir unutar kojeg pojedini mediji komentiraju dnevno-politička događanja, a za opisivanje koncepta *Novosti* odabrao je ideološki nabijenu etiketu “srpsko-jugoslavensko-komunjarski”, time zapravo izjednačivši srpsku perspektivu sa, za desnicu nepoželjnim, ideološkim pojmovima jugoslavenstva i komunizma. Nadalje, u primjeru “zrcalnog diskursa” Malić je obrnuo tezu i optužio Srbe za diskriminaciju drugih nacionalnih manjina sljedećim riječima: “Taj stav kod dijela političkih Srba ‘da zaslužuju više’, koji je sâm po sebi diskriminatoran u odnosu na druge, proizveo je dosta trauma u prošlosti. Sada ispada da im država oduzima novac, iako im ga daje, i da im se uskraćuju prava koja nemaju ni drugi jer se ne radi o pravu nego o reketu. Ako su *Novosti* toliko važne srpskoj zajednici u RH, neka nešto od nekretnina kojima ih je nagradila ova Vlada iznajme Pevexu i riješena stvar. Politički i računovodstveno.”<sup>18</sup>

Malić stavove srpskih predstavnika i novinarskih udruženja da financiranje njihova tjednika bude vođeno istim zakonskim kriterijima koji važe za sve manjinske medije naziva “diskriminatornim” i “reketarenjem”. Usto još naziva povratak oduzete imovine srpskim organizacijama “nagradom”, a ne zakonskim pravom, dok kritike odluke opisuje “izazivanjem trauma”, što opet asocira na ratnu traumu i stavlja artikulaciju zahtjeva srpske nacionalne manjine u kontekst traumatične prošlosti.


### /1. 3. Ostali oblici diskriminacije


Smanjenje financiranja tjedniku *Novosti* nije bio jedini primjer i pokušaj diskriminacije kojem su Srbi bili izloženi prošle godine. Pojedine državne institucije, privatna poduzeća te institucije lokalne samouprave povlačili su poteze i donosili odluke koje se na problematičan način odnose prema pripadnicima srpske nacionalne manjine, njihovoj povijesti, kulturi i političkom djelovanju. Te odluke, za razliku od medijski popraćenijih slučajeva etnički motiviranog nasilja, najčešće nisu bile medijski vidljive, ali svejedno odaju kako u Hrvatskoj dio institucija drukčije tretira ili nastoji drukčije tretirati Srbe u odnosu na ostale nacionalne manjine ili pripadnike većinskoga naroda.

U veljači ove godine bivši zamjenik gradonačelnika Vukovara iz redova srpske nacionalne manjine, Srđan Milanković, i zamjenik gradonačelnika, Srđan Kolar istaknuli su kako vukovarski Srbi teško dolaze do posla u

gradskoj upravi te da su u gradskim službama podzastupljeni u odnosu na broj stanovnika, što krši odredbe Ustavnog zakona o proporcionalnosti. U Gradu Vukovaru zaposleno je tek 16 % Srba, što je daleko manje od 29,73 %, koliko bi ih, kako Ustavni zakon precizira, trebalo biti zaposleno na radnim mjestima u Gradu.<sup>19</sup> Također, nijedan od gradskih pročelnika nije srpske nacionalnosti, što u gradu u kojem Srbi čine gotovo trećinu stanovništva upada u oči. Prema izjavi Srđana Kolara za portal *Srbi.hr*, dogodilo se i da pojedini natječaji budu poništeni ako je posao dobio netko “nepodoban”.<sup>20</sup> Sada već bivši gradonačelnik Vukovara, Ivan Penava, zaniijekao je da je riječ o sustavnoj diskriminaciji te je izjavio da se sva zapošljavanja provode u skladu sa zakonom.

Primjer otkazivanja ugovora vrataru kluba HNK Vukovar 1991 pokazuje kako diskriminacija Srba utječe na sudbine pojedinaca koji sami nisu politički aktivni, ali ih svejedno zahvaća nacionalistička politička klima. Klub je mladom vrataru poništio ugovor nakon što je na *Facebook* grupi navijača Dinama naziva “Dinamo najveći hrvatski klub” izišla objava u kojoj se njegovo igranje za klub dovodi u pitanje jer “simpatizira stranice Zvezdaša i Partizana” i jer je na društvenoj mreži *Instagram* zapratio korisnički račun pod imenom “cetnici\_1941”.<sup>21</sup> Klub Vukovar 1991 ubrzo je reagirao vlastitom objavom u kojoj se ispričava svim svojim “navijačima, partnerima i javnosti” što u ovom slučaju nije na vrijeme poduzeo sve potrebne korake u zaštiti dostojanstva i ugleda kluba, obavještavajući javnost da je ugovor s Nedićem raskinut. Tajming objave i način na koji je klub obavijestio pratitelje o raskidanju ugovora implicira da je isti dijelom bio motiviran upravo pritiscima koji su dolazili od navijačkih skupina. Nakon te objave Srđan Nedić javno se ispričao te je rekao da je navedenu stranicu — koja već šest godina nije aktivna — zapratio kao dvanaestogodišnjak<sup>22</sup> i istaknuo je kako vjeruje da sport treba spajati ljude. Usprkos ispriči, Nediću nije dozvoljeno da nastavi igrati za Vukovar 1991., a na internetu su osvanuli brojni mrzilački komentari koji su prozivali na njegovo protjerivanje iz Hrvatske i zazivali “reakciju” navijačkih skupina BVB i Torcide. Takve objave bile su pisane čak i ispod obavijesti o prekidu ugovora sa Srđanom Nedićem na *Facebook* stranici “Prva Hrvatska liga”<sup>23</sup>. Na objavi na kojoj je administrator stranice označio i HNK Vukovar 1991 neki komentatori između ostaloga napisali su sljedeće:





/ Mrzilački komentari s društvenih mreža upućeni Srđanu Nediću

Nedić je, na kraju, postao vratar kluba Radnik iz Bijeljine,<sup>24</sup> a ovaj slučaj ilustrira kako se Srbi iz Hrvatske mogu lako naći na meti onih koji sami sebe predstavljaju zaštitnicima “domoljubnih vrijednosti” te kako ih institucije u tom slučaju neće zaštititi od potencijalnog gubitka posla. Iako šovinističkim porukama nije mjesto u sportu, nije poznato da se na sličan način skrutinizira prošlost sportaša hrvatskoga podrijetla kako bi im se našle određene politički nepodobne poruke koje su na društvenim mrežama lajkali kao djeca.<sup>25</sup>

Prošle je godine zabilježen i slučaj izuzetno revnog postupanja hvarske policije prema srpskom državljaninu koji se za društvene mreže slikao s podignuta tri prsta. Policija je, naime, utvrdila da je tako počinio prekršaj iz čl. 5. Zakona o prekršajima protiv javnog reda i mira. Zbog toga je kažnjen sa 700 eura, a sud mu je, pored toga, izrekao kaznu protjerivanja iz Hrvatske.<sup>26</sup> Kao što ćemo opisati u narednim poglavljima ovoga biltena, policija je u mnogim slučajevima tijekom prethodne godine, pa i tijekom javnih događaja, koncerata i prosvjeda, propustila reagirati na puno eksplicitnije iskazivanje etničke mržnje od onoga o kojem je bila riječ u ovom slučaju. Policijski službenici tako su promatrali pozdravljanje fašističkim pozdravom, vrijeđanje pa i nasilničko ponašanje, poput bacanja pirotehničkih sredstava prema okupljenim prosvjednicima na antifašističkom maršu u Rijeci. U svim tim slučajevima postupalo se samo prema nekima od počinitelja i nije učinjeno ništa da bi se takvo ponašanje odmah prekinulo. Stoga se postavlja pitanje zbog čega je u ovom slučaju došlo do brze reakcije represivnog aparata i pravosudnog sustava. Ovakav postupak svakako nameće tezu da je riječ o različitom tumačenju Prekršajnog zakona te njegovoj selektivnoj primjeni prema

manifestacijama navodnog srpskog nacionalizma, dok se veličanje ustaštva u nekim opasnijim situacijama prešutno tolerira.<sup>27</sup>

Poseban oblik diskriminacije predstavljaju teorije zavjere koje su širili pojedini predstavnici zakonodavne i izvršne vlasti tijekom epidemije afričke svinjske kuge u rujnu prošle godine. Tada je kao jedan od epicentara širenja zaraze identificirano selo Jagodnjak u Osječko-baranjskoj županiji, koje je većinom naseljeno Srbima. Iako su srpski svinjogojci također pretrpjeli veliku štetu od navedene bolesti, zbog koje su svinje trebale biti usmrćene, čelnik Domovinskog pokreta Ivan Penava prvo je iznio tezu da je riječ o “specijalnom ratu” protiv Hrvatske. Puno ozbiljnija od ove izjave i, nažalost, za tu stranku već uobičajene retorike, bila je ona ministra poljoprivrede Davida Vlačića koji je rekao da “specijalni rat ne može isključiti”.<sup>28</sup> Porazno je da se i ministar resora nadležnoga za saniranje navedene gospodarske katastrofe poveo za govorom koji je za istu okrivio one pogođene tom katastrofom. Ta izjava ohrabrila je i druge članove Domovinskog pokreta, poput Stipe Mlinarića Ćipe, koji je rekao kako se afrička svinjska kuga pojavila prvo u Jagodnjaku, “selu koje pamtim otprije 30 godina, u kojem je bila prva četnička pobuna”,<sup>29</sup> time stavivši pojavu zaraze u kontekst ratnih događaja od prije trideset godina i implicirajući da je opet riječ o svjetskom djelovanju Srba protiv Hrvata. Nacionalističke izjave u povodu izbijanja svinjske kuge imao je i Ivica Kukavica koji je koristio imena ulica u Jagodnjaku kao argument za navodnu nelojalnost tamošnjeg stanovništva. “Zanimljivo to što u Jagodnjaku ulice nose imena Vladimira Nazora, Vuka Karadžića, Borisa Kidriča, Svetozara Miletića, Žarka Zrenjanina i Save Kovačevića.”<sup>30</sup> Također je izjavio da “imamo pravo reći da sumnjamo u sve, ovoga trenutka jedna od vrsta rata je nauditi našoj državi kroz specijalni, ekonomski rat”. Predsjednik Vlade Republike Hrvatske, Andrej Plenković porekao je izjave svojih koalicijskih partnera iz Domovinskog pokreta, pa i čovjeka kojem je ukazao povjerenje da vodi pogođeni resor, rekavši da nema dokaza da je epidemija afričke svinjske kuge posljedica bilo kakvog “specijalnog rata”. Usprkos tome, nije bilo nikakvih sankcija za javno širenje takvih glasina, koje u već napetoj atmosferi mogu uzrokovati daljnje podjele u društvu.<sup>31</sup>

## /2. Mediji i internetski govor mržnje

### /2.1. Vijesti i reportaže

Posebnu kategoriju nekorektnog novinskog izvještavanja čine vijesti objavljene u masovnim medijima koje na određeni način etiketiraju ili prozivaju Srbe, dovodeći ih u vezu s negativnim pojavama ili djelima. Kao što je bio slučaj i prethodne godine, i ove je list *Hrvatski tjednik*

u gotovo svakom broju donio barem jedan članak o Srbima sročeni u izrazito nacionalističkom tonu. Šestog veljače tako je Andrea Černivec iskoristila vijest o nominaciji filma "Čovjek koji nije mogao šutjeti" Nebojše Slijepčevića za nagradu *Oscar* za napade na film i sustav financiranja filmskih ostvarenja. Tako je napisala da "dok drugima spočitavaju financiranje raznih udruga, vladajući i dalje bezrezervno novčano podržavaju i propagiraju velikosrpske uratke".<sup>32</sup> Treba istaknuti da se spomenuti film bavi zločinom koji su u mjestu Štrpci, za vrijeme rata u Bosni i Hercegovini, počinili pripadnici paravojne postrojbe iz Srbije, tako da optužbe za "velikosrpsvo" teško da imaju veze sa samom radnjom filma. Na osobito uvredljiv način *Hrvatski tjednik* donio je vijest o smrti pape Franje I. Na naslovnici je slika nedavno preminulog poglavara Rimokatoličke crkve uz naslov "Zbogom Papi: Nije vrijedan ni jedne hrvatske suze jer je više volio zločinačku Srpsku pravoslavnu crkvu nego hrvatske katolike i Stepinca!". Osim vrijeđanja pokojnoga pape i njegova duhovna nasljeđa, u članku autorica Andrea Černivec vrijeđa i Srpsku pravoslavnu crkvu nazivajući je "četničkom".<sup>33</sup>

Internetskom portalu *direktno.hr* bili su sporni nastupi srpskih kulturnih društava. Pozivajući se na "anoniman izvor" koji je poslao snimku čiju autentičnost je navodno potvrdio, ni manje ni više nego voditelj nacionalističke emisije *Bujica*, Velimir Bujanec, *direktno.hr* u članku potpisanom samo inicijalima "d. m." tvrdi da je ženski zbor tijekom proslave Uskrsa u manastiru Krka kod Kistanja izveo "pesmu" "Ne damo te zemljo Dušanova", koja — prije svega, vrijeđa Albance s Kosova, ali i Crnogorce te već standardno — Hrvate." Povrh toga, članak proziva pokrovitelje i organizatore proslave: Prosvjetu, SPC te SDF, koji prema navodima iz članka u Dalmaciji i Lici "vodi izvjesni Jovica Krstanović, lik s popriličnim stažom i u SNV-u, posebice kada je u pitanju stambeno zbrinjavanje velikosrpskog okupatora i etnobiznis sa soss-om..." Proslava se tako posve neopravdano i bez dokaza stavlja u kontekst povezanosti s "velikosrpskim okupatorom", a podrugljivo se koristi i ekavski oblik "pesma" stavljen u navodnike.<sup>34</sup>

Četiri dana nakon te vijesti na portalu je, također anonimno, pod inicijalima "a. v." uslijedila i druga vijest o navedenoj proslavi, potaknuta zajedničkom fotografijom sastava "Fenečki biseri" koji je nastupio na manifestaciji. Pritom je naglašeno da je jedna od članica "Fenečkih Bisera" na jednoj od fotografija na kojoj sastav pozira u prirodi "podignula tri prsta, što se smatra srpskim nacionalističkim pozdravom". Osim toga, članak je običnu grupnu fotografiju nastojao pretvoriti u skandal, istaknuvši naslov "Nakon srpske proslave koju je financirala Hrvatska provocirali fotografijama: 'Do sljedećeg puta'".<sup>35</sup>

Portal *direktno.hr* povremeno je izbacivao i naslove koji dovode Srbe u kontekst neke opasnosti ili ugroze po Hrvate, iako sâm naslov nema očite veze s ostatkom teksta. Primjer takvog teksta bio je članak “Umjetna inteligencija misli da su Hrvati Srbi: ‘Treba nam ministarstvo digitalne obrane’”,<sup>36</sup> objavljen 4. siječnja s dramatično intoniranim nadnaslovom “Stručnjaci upozoravaju”. Članak zapravo prenosi razgovor s dvojicom navodnih stručnjaka za umjetnu inteligenciju i pogreškama koje veliki jezični modeli često čine, uključujući i pogreške u identificiranju jezika, ali naslov stvara puno zlokobniju sliku utjecaja umjetne inteligencije i koristi se govorom koji priziva militarizaciju problema. Takav primjer ilustrativan je za praksu nacionalistički intoniranog *clickbaita*, pri kojem se pojmovi vezani uz Srbiju i Srbe koriste da privuku pažnju na sadržaj senzacionalističkim profitiranjem na predrasudama.

Čak i sadržaj naoko pozitivno intoniran prema nacionalnim manjinama na nekim portalima iskorišten je za govor mržnje. Regionalni riječki portal *Lokalpatrioti-rijeka.com* objavio je 13. siječnja vijest o dvojezičnom kalendaru o povijesti Rijeke koji je objavila Zajednica Talijana Rijeka. Članak pohvalno govori o lokalnoj talijanskoj zajednici i njezinom doprinosu kulturnom životu Rijeke, no anonimni autor iskoristio je događaj da se obruši na lokalnu srpsku zajednicu riječima: “Zajednica Talijana Rijeka (*Comunità degli Italiani di Fiume*) još jednom je pokazala nepresušnu ljubav prema svojem voljenom gradu u kojem žive i čija ljubav nije upitna. Jedno vrijeme bili su i jedini NOSITELJ LOKALPATRIOTIZMA i identiteta u Rijeci. Danas s manje ili više uspjeha kao sad. To se polako ovim portalom mijenja pa preuzimamo najveći teret na sebe. Za razliku od najbrojnije srpske zajednice u Rijeci koja je po pitanju lokalpatriotizma napravila jedno veliko NULA u ovih 30 godina! Pitanje da li uopće zaslužuju Srpski kulturni dom? Zbog čega bi im Rijeka to trebala izgraditi? Zbog kakvih točno zasluga? Zato što glasaju za riječki SDP? Neka se osjećaju prozvani i trebaju, kad ne osjećaju svoj grad kao svojim.”<sup>37</sup>

Prozivanje članova srpske zajednice u Rijeci da “ne osjećaju svoj grad kao svojim” i pitanje o tome zaslužuju li riječki Srbi kulturni centar predstavljaju nedvojbeno etiketiranje čitave jedne nacionalne manjine kao nelojalne prema vlastitoj lokalnoj zajednici, poziv da im se ukine pravo na prakticiranje vlastite kulture, ali i svojevrsnu provokaciju u vrijeme kad su srpski kulturni centri u Hrvatskoj klevetani kao “špijunski centri” od pojedinih političara. Kao i većina vijesti objavljenih na portalima, autori se anonimiziraju, čime daju do znanja da je njima i urednicima jasno kako je takav sadržaj neprihvatljiv.

## /2.2. Kolumne i pisma čitatelja

Osim izvještaja i vijesti, pojedini tiskani mediji i portali davali su prostor i kolumnistima koji pribjegavaju govoru mržnje prema Srbima. Kolumne pružaju daleko veći prostor osobnim stavovima kolumnista, a proklamirana pravila “objektivnog” medijskog izvještavanja u njima su puno labavija te stoga omogućavaju eksplicitniju artikulaciju konkretnih političkih stavova. Kao takve se koriste za jasnije prenošenje eksplicitnijih poziva na mržnju i diskriminaciju te isticanje revizionističkih i negacionističkih ideja. Neke od osobito značajnih kolumni koje ćemo spomenuti one su Zvonimira Hodaka s portala *direktno.hr*, Marcela Holjevca iz lista *7dnevno*, čije kolumne prenosi i portal *dnevno.hr*, te Zlatka Kramarića, nekadašnjeg liberalnog političara i gradonačelnika Osijeka. Marcel Holjevac u svojim kolumnama komentira aktualne političke događaje, često kritizirajući politike lijevih i liberalnih političara te aktivista. Pritom se Holjevac ponekad koristi izrazito nacionalistički nabijenim jezikom. Na primjer, u kolumni od 2. studenog dovodi u pitanje antifašizam kao političku poziciju te piše sljedeće: “Prema iskustvima moje generacije, antifašizam je rezervna pozicija četništva”. Dovođenje u pitanje anti-fašizma, koji nije samo ideologija, već jedna od civilizacijskih tekovina suvremene Europe Holjevcu nije bilo dovoljno, nego je morao implicirati da se iza istog skriva upravo “četništvo”.<sup>38</sup>

Kasnije je Holjevac za mrzilačke incidente na Danima srpske kulture također okrivio Milorada Pupovca, tvrdeći da je ovaj “isprovocirao” nasilne incidente o kojima ćemo još pisati kasnije. Pritom je otišao korak dalje, negirajući genocid i ratne zločine koje izraelska vojska čini nad civilnim stanovništvom Palestine. “Pa, gledajte, jasno je svima da je izložba u čast nekog lika za kojeg nitko nikad nije čuo, a koji je ‘slučajno’, što je Pupovcu promaknulo, zanimljiv jedino kao jedan od autora Memoranduma SANU-a, provokacija. A kad Vlada ne reagira na takve jeftine i prozirne provokacije, reagira ulica. Doduše, možda je i u pravu, neke je stvari ponekad najpametnije ignorirati. No u svakom slučaju na provokacije, kakve god bile, ne treba nasjedati niti reagirati nasilno. Pa pogledajte što su hamasovci postigli napadom na Izrael, koji je također zapravo bio provokacija — s ciljem da se prisili Izrael da krene na Gazu (po taoce!) pa da onda izigravaju žrtvu.”

Pored toga, ponovio je mantru koja je u posljednje vrijeme gotovo postala općim mjestom antisrpskog diskursa desnice u Hrvatskoj — tezu da su kulturni događaji srpske nacionalne manjine uvod u provođenje nekih zavjeraških, pa i ratnih politika: “Domovinski rat u stvarnosti je počeo srpskim kulturnim okupljanjima u režiji Jovana Raškovića, preteče Milorada Pupovca. Nemojmo to zaboraviti! Ne treba biti naivan — kultura nije uvijek samo kultura, kultura je i politika. ‘Srpski svet’, koji je

politika, širi se putem srpske kulture. Pupovac to vrlo dobro zna i zna da Srbi 'umeju od svega da prave politiku'".<sup>39</sup>

Tezu o "provokaciji" ponovio je i veleposlanik Hrvatske u Albaniji Zlatko Kramarić. U svojoj kolumni koja izlazi na albanskom portalu *argumentum.al*, a koju je u Hrvatskoj 1. prosinca prenio *maxportal.hr*, Kramarić je pisao o prosvjedima "Ujedinjeni protiv fašizma", koji su se 30. studenog održali u Zagrebu, Zadru i Rijeci. Ambasadoru su na prosvjedima, između ostaloga, zasmetali pojedini transparenti koji su se uz latinicu koristili i ćirilicnim pismo te je napisao sljedeće: "Ćirilica je u Hrvatskoj legitimno i ustavno zaštićeno pismo. Ali kada se upotrebljava kao politički rekvizit, a ne kao kulturni simbol, jasno je da joj se daje funkcija provokacije, a ne dijaloga. Ako se želi štititi prava Srba u Hrvatskoj, to je dobro i potrebno. No korištenje pisma kao poluge političke provokacije ne doprinosi civilnom razgovoru." Kramarić se time ponovno postavio u ulogu nekoga tko, kao pripadnik većinske nacije, proizvoljno razgraničava što je prihvatljiva, a što neprihvatljiva uporaba manjinskoga pisma u javnom prostoru. Osim toga, Kramarić je zanijekao kako postoji bilo kakva ugroza nacionalnih manjina u Hrvatskoj, usprkos primjerima govora mržnje kao svakodnevnog dijela političke kulture u Hrvatskoj i nasilnim incidentima. Obrat teza plasiran u kolumni implicira da je prosvjed potaknut nizom nasilnih incidenata koji su se dogodili upravo tijekom kulturnih manifestacija zapravo usmjeren protiv Hrvatske. "Tvrdnja da su Srbi ili bilo koja druga manjina u Hrvatskoj sustavno ugroženi jednostavno ne stoji. Pravna zaštita manjina u Hrvatskoj među najvišima je u Europi, od političke zastupljenosti do kulturne autonomije. Postoje incidenti, ponekad i govor mržnje, ali to nisu obrasci državne politike, nego marginalni ispadi koje institucije načelno sankcioniraju. Stoga ostaje ključno pitanje: protiv čega su danas prosvjedovali? Protiv fašizma ili protiv Hrvatske kao političke zajednice?"<sup>40</sup>

Na portalu *direktno.hr* odvjetnik koji se prometnuo u kolumnista — Zvonimir Hodak — redovito piše kolumnu "Lijevom našom", u kojoj također kritizira lijevu i liberalnu oporbu, ali često iznosi nacionalističke teze i optužbe usmjerene prema hrvatskim Srbima. Tako je svoju kolumnu od 20. siječnja završio dosjetkom na račun genocida nad Srbima u Drugom svjetskom ratu: "Pokušali su nas zakopati, ali su zaboravili da smo mi sjeme. I dok se mi hvalimo kako smo sjeme, Srbi su bolji. Nakon pokolja u NDH bilo ih je skoro milion više nego prije pokolja".<sup>41</sup>

U kolumni od 29. rujna Hodak je nastavio ponavljati poznate negacionističke fraze o "Jasenovačkom mitu", osvrnuvši se na intervju s Bojanom Arbutinom u tjedniku *Novosti*. Hodak piše: "Bit će love i za jasenovačke mitomane koji su radišni i marljivi kao pčelice. Mit o ustaškom logoru Jasenovac paradigma je lijeve laži u 'Lijevoj' našoj!".<sup>42</sup> Za navodnu

“mitomaniju” oko Jasenovca (koja je za Hodaka sadržana u tome da se logor smrti Jasenovac u članku historijski točno naziva “sustavom logora Jasenovac”) kolumnist će naravno optužiti Srbe koji su nam ga “nametnuli u Jugoslaviji”.

Povjesničarima sukoba u bivšoj Jugoslaviji dobro je poznata mračna uloga kakvu su rubrike s pismima čitatelja u dnevnom i tjednom tisku imale u raspirivanju etničke mržnje i progonu političkih neistomišljenika devedesetih godina prošloga stoljeća. Takve rubrike mogu biti savršeni propagandni alat kojim se mrzilački stavovi bliski uredništvu medija maskiraju kao “mišljenje naroda”, čime se govor mržnje zapravo predstavlja kao “glas većine”. U *Hrvatskom tjedniku* rubrika pisama čitatelja redovito služi za prezentiranje netrpeljivih i šovinističkih stavova i poruka. U broju od 18. lipnja objavljeno je pismo koje potpisuje Mira Ivanišević. Autorica izražava nadu da će “potomke ratnih zločinaca gradnja srpskih kulturnih centara diljem Hrvatske bar malo civilizirati pa će nam pokazati gdje su naši nestali”,<sup>43</sup> čime se opet priziva kolektivna krivnja te se implicira kako su Srbi potomci ratnih zločinaca koje treba civilizirati i koji smišljeno skrivaju lokaciju osoba nestalih u posljednjem ratu.

### */2.3. Mržnja kao dio uređivačke politike medija*

Kao i prethodnih godina, pojedini mediji stavljaju govor mržnje i sija- nje nacionalizma u temelje svoje uređivačke politike. Ono što oni čine odmaknuto je od novinskog izvještavanja i zapravo predstavlja desničarsku i nacionalističku propagandu najgorega oblika. U prethodnim poglavljima ekstenzivno je spominjan *Hrvatski tjednik* kao primjer lista koji popriličan prostor u svakom broju posvećuje napadima na Srbe i ostale ranjive skupine te na antifašističke vrijednosti, a od ove godine na meti su mu oporbene političarke — etiketirane na već kritiziranoj naslovnici koja evocira seksistički progon “vještica iz Rija” s početka devedesetih — pa čak i sâm Papa. Sličnu politiku slijedi i emisija *Bujica* Velimira Bujanca, koja se uživo emitira na nizu lokalnih televizija, a ima i prilično posjećen kanal na platformi *YouTube*. Bujanec je u svojoj emisiji opetovano ugošćivao političare desnih stranaka i aktiviste nacionalnih pokreta, a već sâm pogled na naslove emisija odaje činjenicu da su one veoma često usmjerene protiv drugih etničkih skupina, s osobitim naglaskom na srpsku nacionalnu manjinu. Emisija objavljena 21. svibnja tako nosi naslov: “Lejak i grof Tolstoj protiv zabrane Bleiburga! Jurčević o Pupovčevim zločinima”, dok je emisija od 13. lipnja, u kojoj je gostovao Ante Prkačin, naslovljena: “Bošnjaci su počeli lagat k'o Srbi — Paraga planirao atentat na Tutu”. Gostovanje bivšeg ministra kulture Zlatka Hasanbegovića 12. prosinca najavljeno je novom najavom oduzimanja

novca manjinskim medijima: “Dr. Zlatko Hasanbegović: Desna platforma uzima kulturu i gasi Pupovčeve *Novosti!*”.<sup>44</sup>

Nastavio se i rad *Podcasta Velebit*, čije su epizode tijekom prošle godine sadržavale još više senzacionalističkih napada na Srbe od već spomenute *Bujice*. U *Velebitu* je 29. travnja gostovao novinar i publicist Davor Dijanović u epizodi pod naslovom “Neki novinari u Hrvatskoj rade za srpsku tajnu službu”. U toj epizodi Dijanović je ponovno govorio o “jasenovačkom mitu” kao “biču za Hrvate” te je isticao da proračunsko financiranje manjinskih medija znači “financiranje srpskog sveta”. U *podcastu* je prošle godine nekoliko puta gost bio i povjesničar književnosti Slobodan Prosperov Novak. U emisiji objavljenoj 15. listopada naslovljenoj “Srpski jezik ne postoji — Srbi govore hrvatskim jezikom” rekao je da je “konceptija srpskog jezika kakvu je stvorio Vuk Karadžić čista krađa hrvatskog jezika”. Prosperov Novak gostovao je u *podcastu* i nakon prosvjeda “Ujedinjeni protiv fašizma” u epizodi pod naslovom: “Za natpis na ćirilici u Zagrebu treba barem globu naplatiti”, gdje je dovodio simboliku prosvjeda u kontekst četništva, a novinara Borisa Dežulovića nazvao “‘splitskim orjunašem’ koji je na skalinama u Puli govorio ćirilicom”, dok je dvojezične transparente pak nazvao kršenjem zakona o jeziku koje treba globiti.<sup>45</sup>

I ove godine s radom su nastavljali i portali poput *narod.hr*, *Portal Hrvatskog kulturnog vijeća*, portal *Kamenjar* i portal *Dragovoljac*, čije teme redovito uključuju napade na Srbe i LGBTQAI+ populaciju, kao i negacionistički stav prema antifašističkom naslijeđu.

#### /2.4. Komentari i objave na društvenim mrežama

Paralelno sa sve većom prisutnošću internetskih platformi u svakodnevnom životu i korištenjem društvenih mreža ne samo kao sredstva interpersonalne komunikacije, već i kao prostora diseminacije korisnički generiranog sadržaja koji za korisnike mogu imati i informativnu ulogu, raste i potreba za praćenjem govora mržnje na tim platformama. Govor mržnje ovdje će biti podijeljen na govor mržnje prisutan na društvenim mrežama te na komentare ispod članaka na internetskim portalima. Ta vrsta govora mržnje zaslužuje našu pozornost jer ima dvije izuzetno specifične karakteristike koje ga čine naročito opasnim. Prva proizlazi iz često anonimne prirode komunikacije na društvenim mrežama koja omogućava da ljudi pišu ozbiljne pozive na mržnju često podložne i kaznenom progonu, a da se zbog lakoće skrivanja vlastitoga identiteta ne moraju bojati društvenih ni pravnih posljedica. Druga proizlazi iz činjenice da se lažne vijesti i pozivi na mržnju preko društvenih mreža lako mogu širiti izrazito brzo, potaknuti tehničkom prirodom njihovih algoritama koji potiču angažman korisnika, a koji raste što je

sadržaj koji se dijeli kontroverzniji, provokativniji i emotivno nabijeniji. Ovdje ćemo prikazati neke od najčešćih primjera mržnje u internetskim objavama usmjerenim protiv Srba.

Velik broj mrzilačkih komentara pojavio se nakon incidenata na Danima srpske kulture u studenom te uoči prosvjeda koji je nakon toga u Splitu organizirala navijačka skupina Torcida.

J1

**Jesam 123** prije 2 mjeseca

Kakvi dani srpske kulture, pa Vi 12jeseci tučete vlastitu djecu, avlast Vam je fašistička, o čemu pričate, o ubojstvu Đinđića, ili Maradžorđevića, o skrivanju Ratka Mladića 20 god u Srbiji, o podršci Rusiji a prodaji oružija Ukrajini. O uništenju Vukovara, ili Škabrnje te cijele BiH gdje nisu Srbi. Vaša kultura nam netreba, i nemojte govoriti o njoj jer ju nemate. Narod ste pohlepan, i ratoboran kad ste 10 na jednog...Ono malo pravih Srba dolje iz Niš nemože od Vas progovoriti, ostali sve Cigani...

RM

**Renato Mihoci** prije 2 mjeseca

Štakore smrdljivi izdajnički, koga su slavili tvoji frendovi? Večeras se slavilo četništvo, okrećeš teze, dok ovi provociraju. Jel za to Jean Michel Nicolier poginuo?

EC

**enter calc** prije 2 mjeseca


pokušaj jednon napisat komentar koji nije čitav paragraf ispraznica. ponavljan, nema ko za vas provodit silu. svi vi koji ste borbu za teritorij protiv talijanskih okupatora pomišali s nekakvin ideološkin principima antifazišizma imate priko 60 godina. postojite samo na internetu. nemate vi ni drugog izbora nego tolerirat. izletit ćete iz države zajedno s onih 3% u dogledno vrime, samo gledaj i kukaj.

DS

**Dragan Skukan** prije 2 mjeseca

Imaju pravo ovi ljudi. Dok cihjela Hrvatska tuguje sjećajući se svojih žrtava i nestalih, agresori i zločinci orgijaju i vesele se po Hrvatskoj a Plenković ih nagrađuje sa našim novcima. To treba spriječiti. Mi Imamo svoj dignitet i ponos, gdje je njihovo poštivanje, ne može nitko gaziti naše žrtve i plesati na njihov spomen.

Osim komentara na člancima, poruke mržnje širile su se i na društvenim mrežama, često na objavama politički eksponiranih pojedinaca. Krešimir Rotim, član predsjedništva stranke most tako je nasilne incidente na Danima srpske kulture nazvao "poslom":

 **Krešimir Rotim**  
Novembarr 4 · 🌐

"Od Kruševca, Prizrena, Cetinja, Dubrovnika, Knina, Nevesinja Sa Avale, Lovčena i Šare, kliče Srpstvo, ustani, Lazare"

Sa ovogodišnjeg "uskršnjeg" koncerta u manastiru Krka u organizaciji Srpskog kulturnog društva Prosvjeta.

Malo bi se svojatali tuđi krajevi i evocirale patnje koje je ovaj narod prolazio zbog "kninskog srpstva" Đujićevih četnika?

Ne moram vam ni objašnjavati kakva je simbolika Dubrovnika u velikosrpskoj ideji.

Na stranu očekivana predstava na relaciji Pupovac- mediji-ljevica, ostatak ekipe se zgraža nad čime?

Nad time što su ljudi reagirala na nastup Prosvjete u njihovom gradu? Prosvjete koja danas simbolički širi ono što smo ratno porazili 5. kolovoza 1995. godine nakon valjda stoljeća i pol umne, diplomatske i golo-životne borbe za opstojanje našeg naroda?

Odnosno ostao nam je još mali dio posla.

Tek kada institucije ove države počnu obavljati posao spriječavanja i financiranja "kulturne ustanove" koja svojata Dubrovnik i Knin moći ćemo posao privoditi kraju.


Bio bi red nakon tolike muke koju su branitelji prošli da bi se vijorila zastava na Srđu i kninskoj tvrđavi.

Posao koji su momci jučer odradili.

Ovo su neki od komentara ispod njegove objave:



**Stjepan Smeh**

Bilo bi dobro prosvjedima okružiti ( centre,zgrade,kuće,...) ta mjesta gdje god izvode predstave, perfoanse,festivale,"kulturna "događanja,.....sa plakatima na kojima su slike njihovih zločina ( masakra,razaranja,izjavama,porukama,prijetnjama popova i SPC i velikosrpskih političara i četnikara ,raznim dokumentima koji dokazuju njihovu agresiju u ratu i miru i njihove zle i opasne namjere;memorandum SANU 1 i 2 i širenje "srpskog sveta",.....) uz zvukove eksplozija,granatiranja,krikove mučenih i time prikazati kakva je to njihova "kultura" i kaj ona donosi,..... pod nazivom " žedni Hrvatske krvi i gladni Hrvatske zemlje" od 1918 pa do danas !.....Bog i Hrvati ZDS

 **Goran Cakarić**

To je kulturno okupljanje srpske zajednice i svega sto se kultura zove uzas uzas i svi su nacionalisti samo Vucic Cernik i ubica nije.Pupovac mozes da udes odma za Srbiju ako nastavite tako jadna ti majka cedo.

Slični mrzilački komentari javljali su se tijekom cijele godine — naročito ispod članaka u kojima se spominje srpska nacionalna manjina i njezini čelnici — ili se komentiraju slučajevi diskriminacije. Česte poruke mržnje pojavljuju se i na stranicama sportskih klubova. Ovo je primjer poruka ispod objava Nogometnog kluba Sindelić iz Trpinje:



Platforma *Faktograf* objavila je 29. prosinca vlastiti izvještaj pod naslovom “Mržnja na *TikToku* u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji: Bajom i Thompsonom protiv ‘blokadera’ i ‘antifašista’”. U tom izvještaju novinari *Faktografa* ističu lakoću kojom mrzilačke poruke i dezinformacije putem korisničkih računa i profila na društvenoj mreži *TikTok* stižu do velikog broja ljudi, pogonjeni algoritmima. Kao primjere antisrpskog diskursa na *TikToku* u Hrvatskoj izvještaj spominje Krešimira Čabaja iz stranke DOMINO, koji je podijelio videozapis u kojem navodi da se u srpskim kulturnim centrima “promoviraju protuhrvatski sadržaji”, Zvonimir Troškot iz stranke MOST, koji je izjavio da Srpsko narodno vijeće milijune iz proračuna koristi “za promociju Velike Srbije, četništva i srpskog sveta” i *TikTok* račun naziva “Narodni reporteri”, koji vode desničarski aktivisti Dominik Alpeza i Ivo Šošić, a koji ima 145.000 pratitelja i na kojemu su prisutni brojni videozapisi koji potiču na mržnju — poput onoga u kojem se Dane srpske kulture naziva “četničkim dernekom usred Splita”.<sup>46</sup>

### */2.5. Medijski i politički pritisci na intelektualnu zajednicu: Napad na Dejana Jovića*

Od listopada prošle godine dio političke i medijske scene odlučio je, u najboljoj autoritarnoj maniri, izvršiti napad na akademske slobode. Pritisci na akademske institucije i znanstvenu zajednicu negacija su vrijednosti demokratskog i otvorenog društva te predstavljaju grub nasrtaj politike na znanost. Kao meta poslužio je politolog svjetske reputacije i viđen član srpske zajednice, sveučilišni profesor Dejan Jović. Napadi na Jovića krenuli su iz saborskih klupa, iz redova Domovinskog pokreta. Saborski zastupnik Domovinskog pokreta Predrag Mišić tijekom slobodnog govora u Saboru zbog navodne izjave da je “Oluja bila genocid” zatražio je da profesor Dejan Jović dobije otkaz na fakultetu. Ispod

videozapisa tog govora, objavljenog na profilu Domovinskog pokreta na društvenoj mreži *Facebook* objavljeni su i brojni komentari koji su, između ostaloga, pozivali i na protjerivanje profesora Jovića iz Hrvatske, a upućen je bio i poziv institucijama da Jovića kazneno gone.<sup>47</sup> Anto Đapić, bivši predsjednik Hrvatske stranke prava potom je na svom profilu na *Facebooku* napisao:

“Dejan Jović, profesor na Fakultetu političkih znanosti u Zagrebu, u mandatu predsjednika Republike Hrvatske Ive Josipovića vrlo utjecajni savjetnik više puta ‘isticao’ se svojim političkim analizama i osvrtima koji su izazivali oštre reakcije u hrvatskoj javnosti, a to mu je uostalom i bila namjera! Kao politički Srbin kontinuirano provocira javnost i to na način koji dovodi u pitanje, odnosno poništava temeljni sustav vrijednosti na kojima počiva moderna, suverena Hrvatska! Nema potrebe naširoko elaborirati i kontraargumentirati njegove teze, ali posljednji istup kojim je okarakterizirao VRO OLUJA kao genocid ne može proći bez reakcije! Sloboda izražavanja i sloboda govora ima svoj limit u trenutku kada ugrožava slobode drugih, a to je ovdje slučaj! Dvije institucije u Hrvatskoj bi trebale promptno reagirati: jedna je DORH, a druga SENAT Sveučilišta u Zagrebu! Posebno SENAT jer autonomija Sveučilišta svako ne znači obavezu države da obilato financira njegov rad, a profesori na perfidan i neometan način šire obmane i neistine o samom bitku hrvatske države! Naravno, reakcije DORH-a i SENATA potaknuti će priče o ‘ugroženosti srpskih intelektualaca’ u Hrvatskoj, ali ove su institucije obvezne reagirati, upravo radi jednakosti svih pred zakonom! UPRAVO RADI MENTALNE HIGIJENE! Nereagiranje na ovaj ispad kao vrhunac njegovog testiranja dokle može ići (usput na plaći hrvatskih poreznih obveznika) bila bi ozbiljna sramota i za DORH i za SENAT! ČEKAMO!”<sup>48</sup>

I Mišić i Đapić pozivali su na državnu represiju protiv sveučilišnog profesora, time zadirući u autonomiju sveučilišta i autonomiju znanstvenoga rada. Pritom je Đapić još izmislio novu kategoriju “političkog Srbina”, čime se daljnje perpetuirala teorija zavjere o navodnoj političkom utjecaju Srba i širenju nekakve “srpske ideologije” u Republici Hrvatskoj. Zabrinjavajuća je i upotreba sintagme “mentalna higijena” koja je zapravo nimalo suptilan poziv na institucionalno pročišćavanje javnog prostora od onih ideja koje desničarski političari smatraju nepoćudnima.

Potaknuta tom i drugim sličnim vijestima o navodnom nazivanju Oluje genocidom, neparlamentarna Autohtona — Hrvatska stranka prava održala je prosvjed ispred Fakulteta političkih znanosti u Zagrebu na kojem je čelnik te stranke, Dražen Keleminec prozvao profesora Jovića za “promoviranje ideologije Velike Srbije i Jugoslavije” te ga je etiketirao kao “neprijatelja hrvatske države”, perpetuirajući pritom motiv koji su

često ponavljali i neki zastupnici vladajuće koalicije o hrvatskim Srbima kao potencijalnim neprijateljima i širiteljima “velikosrpskih” ideja. Tijekom svoga govora napao je i studente koji su išli na predavanja, optužujući ih da “nose petokrake, simbol zla pod kojim se ubijalo devedesetih godina”.<sup>49</sup>

Uvid u Privrednikovu tribinu na kojoj je Dejan Jović navodno izrekao inkriminiranu izjavu dokazuje da je riječ o širenju lažnih vijesti — nitko od sudionika, voditelja ni gostiju tribine nije nazvao Oluju genocidnom akcijom, što razotkriva izjave političara kao običnu difamaciju usmjerenu protiv društveno angažiranih intelektualaca koji dovode u pitanje densičarske političke mitove o devedesetim godinama prošloga stoljeća.

Nakon političara štafetu su preuzeli pojedini kolumnisti *Večernjeg lista*. Prvi je krenuo Žarko Ivković u članku “Kako je Fakultet političkih znanosti postao lijevi politički akter”. Članak zapravo brani profesora Fakulteta političkih znanosti Borisa Havela, kojega je Etičko povjerenstvo kaznilo opomenom pred otkaz zbog vrijeđanja novinarke Maje Sever. Ivković je tu odluku Etičkog povjerenstva predstavio kao političku — fakultet je kaznio govor predstavljen kao “desni eksces” jer bi takva odluka bila u skladu s “dominantnim sentimentom dijela medijske i studentske javnosti”. Kako bi potkrijepio svoj zaključak, Ivković je spomenuo navodnu objavu Dejana Jovića na društvenoj mreži *Twitter* iz 2020. godine u kojoj se tvrdi da je “Hrvatska propali projekt” i da je “sama zamisao bila retardirana i nakaradna”, za koju je rekao da je “svojevremeno vulgarnom političkom agitatoru, a ne politologu s titulom doktora znanosti.”<sup>50</sup>

Dan poslije oglosio se i sâm Jović u članku “Kako je Žarko Ivković difimirajući mene napao novine u kojima piše”. U tekstu, Jović je predočio dokaze da izjava koju mu Ivković pripisuje nije njegova, već citat iz intervjua koji je pisac Pero Kvesić dao Nedžadu Haznadaru, a koji je 15. studenog 2020. objavljen upravo u *Večernjem listu*.<sup>51</sup> Nakon toga slijedila su tri daljnja napada na Jovića u *Večernjem listu*. Prvi je napravio Ivković u članku “Kako je Dejan Jović napadajući mene potvrdio dvostruke kriterije fakulteta na kojem predaje” u kojem je nastavio kritizirati Dejana Jovića. Iako je priznao da inkriminirane riječi nisu Jovićeve, već Kvesićeve, zamjerio je Joviću što se od izjave koju citira nije ogradio ni distancirao, što implicira da se s izjavom zapravo slaže pa je samim time nevažno je li izjava njegova ili nije. Na kraju, zaključio je da Jovićeve afirmacije Kvesićeve izjave predstavljaju kontinuitet njegovih stavova.<sup>52</sup>

Drugi je članak Ivana Hrstića pod naslovom “Zašto Jović ne prizna da misli da je RH nakaradni projekt, već se skriva iza Kvesića?”, objavljen

na portalu *Večernjeg lista*. Hrštić u članku postavlja pitanje: “Zašto Dejan Jović glumata i ne prizna da misli da je Hrvatska propali projekt, već se skriva iza Kvesića? Postoji li možda mogućnost da on to ne misli te da mu je bio izvrstan i poticajan taj intervju, a ne sama izjava? Bit će da ipak postoji. Samo što nije osjetio potrebu na takav način ograditi se od te izjave.”<sup>53</sup>

Budući da autorima nije uspjelo prikazati Jovića kao autora sporne izjave, njihove su optužbe krenule u smjeru toga da mora da Jović tako misli jer bi inače izjavu prenio drukčije. Primijenjeno na izvorni Ivkovićev argument, autori se zapravo pitaju zašto se FPZG ne ograđuje od nikad transparentno iznesenih misli Dejana Jovića o Kvesićevim izjavama.

Treći članak objavio je 26. prosinca profesor Hrvatskog katoličkog sveučilišta, Ivica Miškulin pod naslovom: “Nije šija nego vrat, ili kako profesor Dejan Jović gazi kanon akademskog integriteta”. Miškulin ponavlja optužbe da Jović zapravo misli ono što je Kvesić izrekao. Autor je za Jovića također implicirao da je loš znanstvenik jer “ne citira djela suvremene hrvatske historiografije”.<sup>54</sup>

Ispod Hrastićevog teksta na portalu omogućen je prostor komentarima koji su vrijeđali i otvoreno prijetili Joviću, zapravo ponovno potvrđujući tezu da je ponekad između uvijene stigmatizacije i prijetnji nasiljem linija izuzetno tanka.



**Zarko Antic** · 13 h

Jeli to taj sa opuštenim vijcima na kotašima automobila?

Odgovor



**Tihomir Lelas** · 13 h

Ako je Josipovićev savjetnik svaki komentar je suvišan.....samo treba proširiti Jakuševac.


Odgovor



**Josip Pleskina** · 13 h

Smće koje nikad nije učilo samo budi podoban i diploma ako treba i pet komada.

Odgovor



**Josip Ikić** · 14 h

Cisti cetnik i glasnogovornik SANU 2

### /3. Navijački incidenti

Govor mržnje, isticanje simbola NDH te vrijeđanje nacionalnih manjina i ostalih ranjivih skupina bili su — nažalost — čestim dijelom sportskih događanja. Njihova prisutnost na događajima koji naoko ne bi trebali imati veze s dnevnom politikom svjedoče koliko su neki oblici šovinizma u hrvatskom društvu normalizirani kao dio folklor. Također, oni odaju organiziranu nacionalističku mobilizaciju pojedinaca i grupacija iz navijačke supkulture čije simboličko nasilje često prerasta u fizičko nasilje, ako se u društvu stvori atmosfera u kojoj se govor mržnje počinje ignorirati ili tolerirati. Često izvikivanje ustaškog pozdrava i nacionalističkih parola ove je godine bilo popraćeno koreografiranim i organiziranim reakcijama na pojedine aktualne događaje, čime su uobičajene navijačke provokacije poprimile element uplitanja tribina u dnevnu politiku.

U nedjelju 26. siječnja skupina od oko stotinu navijača uoči nogometne utakmice Hajduka i Slaven Belupa formirala je povorku koja je zatim krenula prema stadionu na Poljudu. Navijač na početku kolone nekoliko je puta u megafon uzviknuo “Za dom!” na što su ostali navijači odgovorili sa “Spremni!”, tako intonirajući ustaški pozdrav. Putem do Poljuda, skupina je skandirala “Ajmo, ajmo ustaše!”, paleći pritom bengalke. Incident se desio samo dan prije godišnjice oslobođanja iz logora smrti Auschwitz. Policija je javila kako je o incidentu provela kriminalističko istraživanje, no do ovoga trenutka autori nemaju informaciju o tome koliko je ljudi prijavljeno i jesu li izrečene neke presude.<sup>55</sup>

Već sljedeći mjesec navijači su ponovili incident na utakmici prvenstva Eurobasketa između Hrvatske i Francuske u Zadru. Skupina navijača pjevala je ustaške pjesme poput “Boj se bije, bije, ustaški se barjak vije za slobodu i za dom”, uz skandiranje pozdrava “Za dom spremni!”.<sup>56</sup>

Incidenata nisu bile pošteđene ni utakmice nižih hrvatskih nogometnih liga. Na utakmici Mladosti iz Cerića i Nogometnog kluba Sindelić iz Trpinje u Prvoj županijskoj nogometnoj ligi Vukovarsko-srijemske županije u Ceriću navijači domaćeg kluba, poznati kao “Veprovi”, skandirali su: “Ajmo, ajmo ustaše” i pjevali: “Večeras je naša fešta, večeras se Srbin peče. Nek' se peče i okreće, “ko ga jebe nije im'o sreće”.<sup>57</sup> Isti navijači bacali su pirotehnička sredstva prema travnjaku, čime su doveli do prekida utakmice. Incident su osudili predsjednik Demokratskog saveza Srba (DSS), Srđan Milaković i predsjednik Srpskog narodnog vijeća (SNV), Boris Milošević.<sup>58</sup>

Tijekom utakmice Jadranskog derbija između Hajduka i Rijeke 18. svibnja podignut je transparent u čast žrtvama Bleiburga s natpisom

“Hrvatska krv rijekama je tekla, novo sjeme je ipak proklijalo. Bleiburg '45.”, a podizanje transparenta bilo je popraćeno skandiranjem povika “Za dom spremni!”.<sup>59</sup>

Navijači Hajduka na sličan su način obilježili i obljetnicu vojno redarstvene akcije “Oluja” 10. kolovoza. Na utakmici protiv Gorice na Poljudu su zapalili srpsku zastavu i istaknuli transparente na ćirilici, navodno ukradene od srpskih navijača, te pjevali : “Kiša pada, Srbija propada” i skandirali “Za dom spremni!”<sup>60</sup> Incident je osudila saborska zastupnica Dalija Orešković, koju su zbog toga napadali brojni komentatori. Te napadačke komentare prenio je portal *direktno.hr*, koji je koreografiju Torcide u članku potpisanom inicijalima “kkž” nazvao “sjajnom”.<sup>61</sup>

Premda se u komentarima na internetskim portalima navijačke incidente pokušava opravdavati postupcima navijača iz Srbije, na kvalifikacijskim utakmicama za Europsko prvenstvo u nogometu dogodio se incident u kojem su hrvatski navijači sramotnom porukom odgovorili na pomirljivu gestu navijača reprezentacije Crne Gore. Crnogorski su navijači tijekom prve utakmice na stadionu Maksimir u Zagrebu istakli transparent isprike za ulogu crnogorskih postrojbi pri napadu na Dubrovnik s natpisom: “S Lovćena vila kliče, oprosti nam Dubrovniče”. Tijekom uzvratne utakmice u Podgorici 18. studenog grupa hrvatskih ultrasa počela je skandirati pozdrav “Za dom spremni!”. Na tu provokaciju, domaći su navijači odgovorili zvižducima i skandiranjem “Ustaše, četnici, zajedno ste bježali!”. Hrvatski navijači potom su podigli transparent kojim su odgovorili na ispriku crnogorskih navijača: “Iz Dubrovnika čuju se vici, pušite nam kurac četnici. Oprosta nema!”.<sup>62</sup>

U subotu 20. prosinca pripadnici navijačke skupine Bad Blue Boys (BBB) transparentom na kojem je ispisan ustaški pozdrav odlučili su odgovoriti na zaključak Gradske skupštine Grada Zagreba kojim se gradonačelnika Tomislava Tomaševića poziva da poduzme mjere u svrhu sprječavanja korištenja fašističkih i ustaških simbola na svim površinama i prostorima kojima upravlja Grad Zagreb. Na sjevernoj tribini Maksimirskog stadiona istaknut je jedan transparent s velikim natpisom “Za dom spremni!” te drugi upućen Tomislavu Tomaševiću “I kaj ćemo sad, gradonačelniče?”. Upitan o tom incidentu, premijer Andrej Plenković rekao je kako je poruka Bad Blue Boysa “logična s obzirom na Tomaševićevu potpunu nekonzistentnost”.<sup>63</sup> Zagrebačka policija u vezi s incidentom otvorila je istragu, a premijerova reakcija našla se na udaru kritike oporbenih političara pa je tako saborska zastupnica Dalija Orešković rekla da je HDZ-ova vlast “stala uz ustaštvo kako bi parazitirala na mržnji i prijetnjama koje se šire pod crnim insignijama.”<sup>64</sup>

#### /4. Koncerti Marka Perkovića Thompsona

Događaji koji su u najvećoj mjeri doveli govor mržnje u javnom prostoru u fokus javnosti te izazvali niz reakcija političara sa svih strana ideološkog spektra, eksperata te domaćih i stranih medija bili su koncerti pjevača Marka Perkovića Thompsona koji su se održali u Zagrebu 5. srpnja i u Sinju 4. kolovoza, kao i kasnija dvoranska turneja u prosincu. Koncert u Zagrebu, prema izvještajima Thompsonovog menadžera Zdravka Barišića, okupio je 504.000 ljudi i predstavlja najveći koncert za koji su se naplaćivale ulaznice u povijesti.<sup>65</sup> Neke kasnije, nezavisne analize, poput one BBC-ja, iznijele su podatke koji opovrgavaju taj broj.<sup>66</sup>

Brojni kritičari i oporbeni političari smatraju Thompsonov koncert trenutkom kada je duh neoustaštva, nacionalizma i historijskog negacionizma “pušten iz boce”.<sup>67,68,69</sup>

U ovom dijelu biltena donijet ćemo pregled događaja vezanih uz Marka Perkovića Thompsona i njegove koncerte, kao i pregled reakcija javnosti i političara na te iste događaje. Valja istaknuti da ovaj pregled nipošto nije iscrpan — analiza koju su autori ovog izvještaja proveli pokazuje da je samo učestalost članaka na novinskim portalima vezanih za pozdrav “Za dom spremni!” višestruko porasla u mjesecima u kojima su se održali koncerti te da se najveći broj rasprava o korištenju toga pozdrava ticao upravo tih koncerata i Thompsonovog opusa.

Marko Perković Thompson karijeru je započeo na samom početku rata, uspješnicom *Bojna Čavoglave*, koja je počinjala pozdravom “Za dom spremni!”, a koja se tijekom prvih ratnih godina prometnula u jednu od često izvođenih pjesama kojom se poticao “borbeni moral”. Tijekom devedesetih godina njegova se karijera uglavnom vezivala uz krajnje desnu Hrvatsku stranku prava, a nakon izbora 2000. njegovi su koncerti postali mjesta otpora tadašnjoj liberalnoj koaliciji.<sup>70</sup> Tih godina Thompson i njegova publika počinju privlačiti pažnju korištenjem ustaške ikonografije, zbog čega su mu često zabranjivani koncerti u inozemstvu. Naročitu kontroverzu izazvalo je objavljivanje snimke na portalu *Index.hr* na kojoj Thompson izvodi pjesmu *Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara*, u kojoj se slave pokolji nad Srbima u logorima smrti NDH i ustaški zločinci Maks Luburić, Jure Francetić i Ante Pavelić. Thompson je prvo potvrdio autentičnost snimke, da bi je kasnije poricao.<sup>71</sup>

Prošle godine Thompson je pažnju javnosti počeo privlačiti već krajem siječnja, kad se počelo govoriti o njegovom nastupu na dočeku rukometne reprezentacije u Zagrebu, nakon što je ista osvojila srebro na Svjetskom rukometnom prvenstvu u Oslu. Prema izjavi ministra turizma i sporta, Tončija Glavine Thompsonov nastup bio je “želja igrača,

rukometnog saveza i Vlade”.<sup>72</sup> Čelnik antifašističke lige i aktivist Zoran Pusić poslao je otvoreno pismo premijeru Andreju Plenkoviću u kojem traži od njega da zaustavi koncert zbog toga što je Thompson u današnjoj Hrvatskoj, posebno među mladima, simbol ustaštva bar koliko i pozdrav “Za Dom spremni!”.<sup>73</sup>

Pusića je kritizirao zastupnik Domovinskog pokreta Stipe Mlinarić Čipe, koji ga je okrstio “klevetnikom države u kojoj živi” te je aludirao na to da je on “izdajnik i mrzitelj vlastite države”.<sup>74</sup>

Andrej Plenković na Pusićevo je pismo odgovorio obrazloženjem da se “prigodom organizacije dočeka prvenstveno uzimaju u obzir želje sportaša i sportskih saveza jer su upravo njihovi uspjesi povod okupljanja građana i navijača” te je nadodao kako “izolirani postupci pojedinaca ne mogu biti razlog za dovođenje u pitanje dočeka kojem će prisustvovati deseci tisuća naših sugrađana okupljenih s iskrenom željom da u veličanstvenom ozračju pozdrave naše rukometaše i odaju im priznanje za osvajanje nove svjetske medalje.”<sup>75</sup>

Thompson je na dočeku rukometaša na Trgu pjevao pred više od 30.000 ljudi, a reportaža snimljena na dočeku prikazuje skupinu ljudi kako skandira “Za dom spremni!” i transparent na kojem su ispisane uvrede Zoranu Pusiću. Također, snimljeno je nekoliko nos-ovih zastava koje sadrže pozdrav “Za dom spremni!”.<sup>76</sup>

Ubrzo nakon toga Thompsonova pjesma *Ako ne znaš što je bilo* ušla je u top 20 pjesama u konkurenciji za nagradu Porin u kategoriji “Pjesma godine”. Pjevačica grupe Elemental, Mirela Priselac Remi izrazila je nezadovoljstvo uvrštavanjem te pjesme i pozvala kolege na bojkot glasanja.<sup>77</sup> To je izazvalo brojne reakcije usmjerene protiv Priselac — radiostanica NU iz Imotskog najavila je kako više neće emitirati njezine pjesme (pomalo paradoksalno, objasnivši da to čine jer zagovaraju “glazbenu slobodu izbora, a ne cenzuru i ideološke podjele”)<sup>78</sup>, predvodnik Daleke Obale, Jakša Kriletić Jordes napao je pjevačicu na svom profilu na *Facebooku*, poručivši joj sljedeće: “Vidi Remi... Moram... Stvarno mi ideš na k... (mislim uistinu na onu stvar) naravno i to apsolutno jako virtualno ne fizički”.<sup>79</sup> Jedan muškarac prijetio joj je smrću te je verbalno napadnuta na ulici pred trogodišnjim djetetom. Tim događajima poslana je jasna poruka javnim ličnostima da je otvoreno kritiziranje Thompsona nepoželjno i da će se na njega reagirati prijetnjama fizičkim nasiljem. Muškarac koji je prijetio Mireli Priselac uhićen je 12. veljače.<sup>80</sup>

Nakon Thompsonovog uspjeha na dočeku rukometaša počelo se govoriti o mogućem koncertu na Hipodromu Zagreb. Već šest sati nakon što su ulaznice puštene u prodaju mediji su objavili da je riječ o koncertu s

najviše prodanih ulaznica u povijesti. Svih 281.774 prodano je u manje od 24 sata. Time se Thompsonov koncert u medijima počelo percipirati kao najveći koncertni spektakl u zemlji, a istovremeno i kao najveće okupljanje klerikalne i nacionalističke desnice na ovim prostorima.<sup>81</sup>

Na kraju se u medijima počelo izlaziti s brojkom od pola milijuna posjetitelja na koncertu. Desni dio medijske scene nije ostavio prostora sumnji da je koncert zapravo politički događaj. U broju lista *Hrvatski tjednik* od 10. travnja Josip Jović objavio je članak pod naslovom: "Kako je Thompson postao junakom nejunačkom vremenu usprkos". Članak je koncert predstavio kao reakciju na političko stanje u kojem se Hrvatska nalazi i u kojem se "predstavnicima jedne agresorske manjine, koji zauzimaju važne pozicije u institucijama sustava, predstavljaju kao moralni arbitri," nadodavši da su na djelu "stalne optužbe za genocid, potraga za ustaškim znakovljem, promicanje jugoslavenstva u kulturi, športu, informiranju".<sup>82</sup> Ministar branitelja, Tomo Medved koncert je nazvao "pravim domoljubnim spektaklom"<sup>83</sup> i najavio je da će učiniti sve što je u njegovoj moći da pomogne hrvatskim braniteljima i obiteljima poginulih hrvatskih branitelja da dođu do ulaznica, što svakako predstavlja dosad neviđen angažman jednog ministarstva oko promoviranja glazbenog događaja. Uključili su se i neki predstavnici klera: imotski franjevac fra Ivo Rastočić prozvao je one koji su isticali moguće sigurnosne i logističke probleme, kao i širenje mržnje na koncertu. "Kad je melos s istoka, to je onda 'brend'; kad je Ultra, to je onda 'turizam'; kad je vraćanje starih jugo bendova, to je 'popularnost'; kad je Marko Perković Thompson, to je onda i peticija i panika! Al' je Soko za njih previsoko".<sup>84</sup>

Činjenica da Thompsonov koncert ima podršku sa samog državnog vrha dokazana je dolaskom premijera Andreja Plenkovića na generalnu probu. Premijer se ondje fotografirao s Thompsonom.<sup>85</sup> Već tim činom legitimirane su sve poruke koje mogu pratiti taj koncert. Nažalost, oni koji su se nadali da će održavanje koncerta proteći u dostojanstvenoj i mirnoj atmosferi bili su u zabludi. Već dan prije koncerta u Bogovićevoj ulici u Zagrebu skupljale su se grupe u crno odjevenih Thompsonovih obožavatelja. Okupljeni su pjevali ustaške budnice, između ostalog i pjesmu *Evo zore, evo dana*,<sup>86</sup> kojom se slave ustaški zapovjednici Jure Francetić i Rafael Boban. Kod zagrebačke Nacionalne sveučilišne knjižnice u blizini Hipodroma grupe obožavatelja pozdravljale su pak uzdignutom desnicom i pozdravom "Za dom spremni!".<sup>87</sup> Na samom koncertu bili su prisutni brojni političari i osobe iz javnog života, između ostalih predsjednik Sabora Gordan Jandroković, ministar obrane Ivan Anušić,<sup>88</sup> saborski zastupnik Mosta Marin Miletić, zastupnik Domo-vinskog pokreta Ivica Kukavica te konzervativna aktivistica Željka

Markić.<sup>89</sup> Na koncertu pjesmu *Bojna Čavoglave* Thompson je započeo pozdravom “Za dom spremni!”.<sup>90</sup>

Ministar unutarnjih poslova Davor Božinović koncert je nazvao “spektaklom kakav se rijetko viđa” te je nadodao: “Ovo nije bio samo koncert, ovo je bilo slavlje zajedništva, ljubavi prema domovini i vrijednostima koje nas povezuju bez podjela s jasnom porukom: Hrvatska je demokratska, europska i organizirana zemlja u kojoj svatko ima pravo na svoju glazbu, identitet i mirno okupljanje”. Također je rekao kako će policija procesuirati pojedine slučajeve pjevanja neprimjerenih pjesama i isticanja ustaške ikonografije.<sup>91</sup>

U kontekstu onoga svega što povijesno predstavlja pozdrav “Za dom spremni!”, kao i pjesme koje su se pjevale prije koncerta, a koje slave počinitelje svirepih pokolja nad Srbima i hrvatskim antifašistima, ministrova izjava može biti shvaćena kao cinična definicija — “slavlje zajedništva”, jedno etnocentrično zajedništvo koje isključuje sve koji se ne slažu s političkom vizijom koju promoviraju Thompson i posjetitelji njegova koncerta. Takvo je mišljenje prenio i dio inozemnog tiska koji se osvrnuo na ovaj događaj. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, najveći njemački nadregionalni list, objavio je kako je koncert “dio državno odobrene kulturne politike”, što dokazuje dolazak premijera Plenkovića na generalnu probu i njegovo fotografiranje s Thompsonom. Pozdrav “Za dom spremni!” usporedio je s njemačkim nacističkim pozdravom “Heil Hitler”. Na kraju je osporio teze o “zajedništvu” iskazom kako je Thompsonov koncert još više pridonio podijeli hrvatskog društva: “U Hrvatskoj se stotinama tisuća Thompsonovih poklonika suprotstavlja sličan broj onih koji odlučno odbacuju njegovu mješavinu kiča, ratne romantike, katoličanstva i rehabilitacije fašizma. Rasprava oko Perkovićevog zagrebačkog koncerta zato će još neko vrijeme zaokupljati Hrvatsku”<sup>92</sup>, zaključuje se u tekstu.

Teze lista *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* potvrdilo je i istraživanje Promocije plus za RTL televiziju. Prema rezultatu tog istraživanja, 39,2 % anketiranih ljudi smatralo je Thompsonov koncert u Zagrebu “veličanstvenim događajem”, a 34,7 % “veličanjem ustaškog režima”. Ta razlika nalazi se u razini statističke pogreške za takav tip istraživanja i odaje kako je stvarni učinak koncerta više daljnja politička polarizacija, nego priča o zajedništvu.<sup>93</sup>

Premijer Andrej Plenković 7. srpnja, nakon sjednice Predsjedništva Hrvatske demokratske zajednice (HDZ), nazvao je kritike koje dolaze od dijela lijeve oporbe pretjeranima, a osvrnuo se i na korištenje pozdrava “Za dom spremni!” u pjesmi *Bojna Čavoglave*, rekavši sljedeće: “To je dio njegovog integralnog repertoara na svakom njegovom koncertu, tako je

bilo i sada. Thompson jedini može dovesti pola milijuna ljudi i ne znam tko više plaće, ovi s desnice jer nemaju privilegij na njega ili ovi s ljevice. Što smo trebali reći? Zabraniti ga? Pa bi nas optužili da ga cenzuriramo.”<sup>94</sup>

Pozdrav je ubrzo, nažalost, postao i integralnim dijelom repertoara ljetne saborske sjednice održane 8. srpnja. Na govor Milorada Pupovca, koji se zapitao: “Zašto nije bilo moguće zaštititi ustavne vrijednosti i vrijednosti EU-a od simbola, poruka, pjesama i pokliča kojima se za vrijeme, tijekom i nakon koncerta veličalo pripadnike ustaškog pokreta i pozdravljalo sa službenim pozdravom NDH ‘Za dom spremni!’?” reagirao je zastupnik stranke Dom i nacionalno okupljanje (DOMINO) Damir Biloglav: “Te mlade ljude koji su bili na koncertu briga za partizane, ustaše i četnike. Oni su došli iskazati radost, veselje, domoljublje. Oni poručuju s tih skupova svima nama starima — ‘briga nas za vaše priče, stereotipe. Mi nismo nositelji ičijih hipoteka, ne pristajemo na ucjene, nećemo dopustiti da nam navučete luđačke košulje. Mi smo rođeni u slobodnoj Hrvatskoj, živjet ćemo kako mi hoćemo, pjevat ćemo pjesme koje mi hoćemo, pozdravljat ćemo se pozdravima kojima mi hoćemo i baš nas briga za vaše gluposti’. Uime svih tih mladih, ja ovu gospodu pozdravljam s pozdravom koji bi oni željeli uputiti svima vama — Za dom spremni!”

Na ovaj Biloglavov istup reagirali su zastupnici oporbe, tražeći od predsjednika Sabora Gordana Jandrokovića da ga sankcionira. No Jandroković je to odbio učiniti, argumentirajući: “Čuli smo razno-razne stavove i građani će onda prosuđivati tko i kako govori. Mnogi će se s nečim složiti, mnogi će biti isključivi, kao što smo vidjeli nakon koncerta. Puno je neistina izrečeno, puno laži, puno poluistina i svatko odgovara za ono što govori i što zagovara. Neću biti arbitar, govorite što želite, a građani će onda prosuditi.”<sup>95</sup> Takva odluka i obrazloženje predstavljaju odmak od dotadašnje prakse predsjednika Sabora koji je uvijek do sada sankcionirao korištenje ustaškog pozdrava u Saboru.

Nakon uspješnog koncerta na zagrebačkom Hipodromu, gradonačelnik Sinja i saborski zastupnik stranke MOST, Miro Bulj najavio je koncert Marka Perkovića Thompsona u Sinju u povodu obilježavanja Dana pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti. Koncert se trebao održati na sinjskom Hipodromu, a u prodaju je pušteno 150.000 ulaznica. Bulj se hvalio kako će Thompsonov koncert biti “nikada veći skup u povijesti Sinja i cijele Cetinske krajine.” Također je pozvao mlade da slobodno dođu s oznakama nos-a i pozdravom “Za dom spremni!”.<sup>96</sup> Na koncertu u Sinju ponovili su se incidenti iz Zagreba — na štandovima su se prodavale majice s oznakama nos-a i natpisom “Za dom spremni!”, a centrom Sinja orila se pjesma *Jasenovac i Gradiška Stara*, koju je netko pustio na razglas iz

kafića.<sup>97</sup> Policija je ovoga puta promptno reagirala i uhapsila petoro ljudi zbog pjevanja ove pjesme, kao i radnicu ugostiteljskog objekta koja ju je pustila na razglas.<sup>98</sup>

Normalizacija korištenja ustaškoga pozdrava ubrzo je imala vidljive posljedice. Nedugo nakon koncerata na portalu *Index.hr* procurila je snimka na kojoj se skupina djece igra plastičnim i/ili drvenim puškama i u igri se pozdravlja sa “Za dom spremni!”, što pokazuje utjecaj političke klime na najmlađu i najranjiviju populaciju.<sup>99</sup> Uz sam ustaški pozdrav, normalizirana je i izrazito agresivna retorika prema svima koji su kritizirali val nacionalizma. Sinjski gvardijan Marinko Vukman iskoristio je propovijed za vrijeme katoličkog praznika Velike Gospe kako bi poželio patnju i smrt kritičarima Thompsonovog koncerta: “Neka pate i neka u toj patnji umru oni kojima smeta vaše zajedništvo, vaš dolazak u crkvu, vaša pjesma i ljubav prema Bogu, Crkvi i svom hrvatskom narodu, vaša radost i zajedništvo koje je posebno zablistalo na koncertima našega Thompsona u Zagrebu i Sinju”.<sup>100</sup> Desnici je vjetar u jedra dala i presuda Općinskog prekršajnog suda u Zagrebu u predmetu protiv jednog od mladića koji su prije koncerta u kameru uzviknuli ustaški pozdrav “Za dom spremni!”, a kojem je suđeno zbog prekršaja iz čl. 5. Zakona o prekršajima protiv javnog reda i mira. Sutkinja Mirela Prstec Batarelo izrekla je oslobađajuću presudu u kojoj je navela kako se nos koristio tim poklicem za vrijeme Domovinskog rata. Naročito je zapanjujuć emotivan ton kojim je Prstec Batarelo u obrazloženju oslobađajuće presude komentirala Thompsonov koncert: “U radosnom iščekivanju koncerta Thompsona, gdje su svirane i pjevane njegove pjesme na ulicama Zagreba, između ostalog, izrečene su riječi ‘Za dom spremni!’ u eter prilikom javljanja uživo. Nije narušen javni red i mir građana, niti bi isti kao takav predstavljao manifestaciju rasističke ideologije, prezir prema drugim ljudima zbog njihove vjerske etničke pripadnosti te trivijalnost žrtava zločina protiv čovječnosti.”

Uzvikivanje ustaškoga pozdrava u eter također je opravdavano činjenicom da je predsjednik Sabora Gordan Jandroković odbio sankcionirati zastupnike koji su izvikivali taj pozdrav u Hrvatskom saboru, kao i činjenicom da je za vrijeme koncerta taj pozdrav “uzvikivalo pola milijuna ljudi”.<sup>101</sup>

Koncert je naišao na brojne osude s lijeve strane političke scene. Antifašistička liga Republike Hrvatske, udruga Documenta — Centar za suočavanje s prošlošću te braniteljska udruga VeDRA — Veterani Domovinskog rata i antifašisti, uz podršku troje građana koji su preživjeli ustaške i nacističke zločine, podnijeli su 10. kolovoza prekršajnu prijavu protiv Marka Perkovića zbog izvikivanja ustaškog pozdrava na koncertima u Zagrebu i Sinju Ministarstvu unutarnjih poslova (MUP). Istaknuli

su da pozdrav vrijeđa žrtve i narušava ustavni identitet.<sup>102</sup> Zagrebački gradonačelnik Tomislav Tomašević također je reagirao na incidente objavivši da neće odobriti drugi od dvaju Thompsonovih koncerata u Areni Zagreb, najavljenih za 27. i 28. prosinca ako na prvom koncertu bude upotrijebljen ustaški pozdrav.<sup>103</sup> Skupština Grada Zagreba 11. studenog izglasala je prijedlog zaključka kojim se “zabranjuje korištenje obilježja, slogana ili poruka kojima se veliča, potiče ili odobrava nacionalna, rasna ili vjerska mržnja, uključujući poklič ‘Za dom spremni!’ na površinama i u prostorima kojima upravlja Grad Zagreb”. Ubrzo je najavljeno da se Thompsonov koncert 28. prosinca neće održati. Na zabranu održavanja drugog koncerta Thompson je reagirao prijetnjom da će, ako Tomašević “ne odustane od zabrane koncerta, povući ‘puno radikalnije poteze’.”<sup>104,105</sup>

Na koncertu 28. prosinca Thompson je prije izvođenja pjesme *Bojna Čavoglave* pozvao na rušenje zagrebačke gradske vlasti na “izborima koji mogu biti redovni ili izvanredni”. Nakon toga pozdravio je sve prisutne pozdravom “Za dom spremni!”. Nakon koncerta ispred Arene Zagreb snimljene su skupine obožavatelja kako skandiraju: “Ubij, ubij Srbina”.<sup>106</sup> Dan nakon koncerta skupina prosvjednika predvođena liderom A-HSP-a, Draženom Kelemincem organizirala je prosvjed ispred stana Tomislava Tomaševića. Govornici na skupu optužili su Srbe da su “1968. u Beogradu planirali Hrvatsko proljeće”. Pozdravljali su sa “Za dom spremni!”, nosili HOS-ove oznake i zastave s grbom s prvim bijelim poljem te najavili referendum za smjenu Tomislava Tomaševića u veljači.<sup>107</sup> Thompson je 29. prosinca najavio da će podnijeti kaznenu prijavu uskok-u protiv Tomaševića jer je otkazivanje koncerta nanijelo financijsku štetu Gradu.<sup>108</sup>

## /5. Incidenti na kulturnim festivalima

### /5.1. “Nosi se” i “FALIŠ”

Ljeto nakon Thompsonovih festivala rezultiralo je nizom incidenata na kulturnim događajima koje su izazivali pojedinci iz braniteljskih udruga i navijačke skupine. Navedeni incidenti često su bili na rubu toga da prijeđu u otvoreno nasilje. Najozbiljniji incident dogodio se prije antiratne predstave koja se trebala održati u sklopu festivala “Nosi se” u Benkovcu. Skupina branitelja okupila se na prostoru iza Gradske knjižnice gdje se predstava trebala održati, pozdravljali su sa “Za dom spremni!”, a dio okupljenih vrijeđao je novinarku Melitu Vrsaljko te joj je prijetio da je “treba baciti pod auto jer je provokatorica”.<sup>109</sup> Napadnuta je i glumica Maruška Aras, kojoj su okupljeni dovikivali da je “ku\*vetina i greška prirode”.<sup>110</sup> Policija nije reagirala, a prema nekim izvještajima pojedini

policajci grlili su se s izgređnicima te su rekli novinarki Vrsaljko da ne mogu garantirati njezinu sigurnost. Predstava je odgođena, a organizatori su ubrzo odgodili i sâm festival zbog sigurnosnih razloga. Policija je podnijela prekršajne prijave protiv dijela prosvjednika, a njih petero, među kojima je i predsjednik benkovačkog ogranka Udruge hrvatskih dragovoljaca Domovinskog rata, Nediljko Genda, dobilo je zabranu približavanja Meliti Vrsaljko na manje od 30 metara.<sup>111</sup>

Dok je dio političara osudio napad na organizatore festivala, zabrinjavajući su bili postupci onih političara koji su se s benkovačkim “zabraniteljima”, kako su ubrzo prozvani u medijima, solidarizirali. HDZ-ov zastupnik u Europskom parlamentu (EP) Tomislav Sokol na N1 televiziji na pitanje novinarku vidi li “crnilo i duh iz boce koji je izašao” odgovorio je implicitnom osudom organizatora festivala: “Možda je izašao duh iz boce da je jednostavno došao kraj detuđmanizaciji i svih procesa ljevičarske kulturne borbe koje smo gledali nakon 3. siječnja 2000. godine. To je pokušaj nametanja ljevičarskog anacionalnog narativa sprdanja s Domovinskim ratom i to očito više ne prolazi”.<sup>112</sup>

Napad na organizatore festivala politički je legitimizirao i potpredsjednik vlade i ministar branitelja Tomislav Medved koji je 28. kolovoza sazvao sastanak s predstavnicima branitelja iz Benkovca, Zadarske i Šibensko-kninske županije. Prema priopćenju nadležnog ministarstva, ministar Medved izrazio je razumijevanje prema zabrinutosti branitelja. Sudionici sastanka izjavili su da “sadržaji koji se propagiraju kao miroljubivi i antiratni u svojoj izvedbi ponižavaju hrvatske branitelje i relativiziraju žrtvu. Posebno je bolno što se sve to čini u gradovima koji su pretrpjeli razaranja i strahote u Domovinskom ratu.”<sup>113</sup>

Na meti “zabranitelja” uskoro se našao i šibenski Festival alternative i ljevice (“FALIŠ”). Dio šibenskih branitelja pozvao je na ukidanje financiranja tog festivala,<sup>114</sup> a novinar Tihomir Dujmović na svom profilu na Facebooku žestoko se okomio na “FALIŠ”. Za Dujmovića je prvenstveno bilo sporno to što se navedeni festival, pored sredstava iz državnog i gradskog proračuna, financira i iz sredstava Srpske pravoslavne crkve i SNV-a.

“ZAŠTO PORFIRIJE I PUPOVČEV SNV FINANCIRAJU FESTIVAL ‘FALIŠ’? Postoji li jedan jedini projekt u kojem zajedno sudjeluju Srpska pravoslavna crkva, Srpsko narodno vijeće, HND i hrvatska država? Recite mi jedan hrvatski nacionalni, politički i društveni, interes u kojem za taj interes novac daju SPC, SNV i hrvatska država? Nema ga, nažalost, niti ga je bilo. Osim festivala ‘Fališ’, koji već godinama hrvatska država financira, ponižavajući brojnim provokacijama na tom festivalu vlastite građane grada Šibenika”.<sup>115</sup>

Kolumnist Marcel Holjevac otišao je korak dalje u antisrpskoj retorici usmjerenoj prema festivalu “Nosi se”, rekavši kako je navedeni festival bio “nastavak balvan revolucije drugim sredstvima”.<sup>116</sup>

Nakon otkazivanja festivala “Nosi se” i prijetnji prosvjedima na “FALIŠ-u”, odgođeno je i premijerno prikazivanje filma *Mirotvorac* posvećenog Josipu Reihl-Kiru u Zadru. Redatelj filma Ivan Ramljak naveo je kako se ne osjeća sigurno nakon događaja u Benkovcu te je tražio da se zadarska premijera *Mirotvorca* odgodi za jesen. Povod odgađanju bio je strah da bi pripadnici navijačkih skupina mogli prekinuti projekciju filma.<sup>117</sup> Odgađanja ovih kulturnih događaja pokazuju da su incidenti rezultirali stvaranjem atmosfere straha među kulturnim radnicima, a mlaka i često afirmativna reakcija Vlade da je prekidanje kulturnih manifestacija na kojima se nudi drukčija perspektiva na ratove u Jugoslaviji devedesetih i koje su na neki način povezane s institucijama Srba u Hrvatskoj legitiman način političkog djelovanja.

Koordinacija braniteljskih udruga proizašlih iz Domovinskog rata Šibensko-kninske županije organizirala je u Šibeniku 7. rujna prosvjed protiv održavanja “FALIŠ-a”. Prosvjed su svojim prisustvom podržali zastupnici Domovinskog Pokreta, Damir Biloglav i Ivica Kukavica, a s druge strane festival je svojim prisustvom podržao predsjednik Republike Hrvatske Zoran Milanović. Prosvjednici su i ovdje pozdravljali pozdravom “Za dom Spretni!” te su mahali HOS-ovim zastavama koje sadrže navedeni pozdrav.<sup>118</sup>

### /5.2. Dani srpske kulture

Studenj je protekao u znaku nasilnih upada na Dane srpske kulture, manifestaciju koja se dosad redovito i bez značajnijih incidenata održavala od 2006. godine u organizaciji Srpskog kulturnog društva “Prosvjeta”. Srpski kulturni centri u protekle dvije godine stigmatizirani su i klevetani kao centri navodne špijunske aktivnosti i produžetak takozvanog “srpskog sveta”, a prošle su godine postali mete napada maskiranih uličnih hordi koje su — uz uvrede, uzvikivanje ustaških parola i izravnu prijetnju nasiljem — nastojali prekinuti, a negdje i uspješno prekinuli program manifestacije posvećene kulturnoj razmjeni između dvaju naroda. Napadi su počeli u prostorijama Gradskog kotara Blatine u Splitu, gdje je skupina od pedesetak muškaraca odjevenih u crnu odjeću i s kapuljačama na glavama upala u prostor gdje se trebalo održati gostovanje Kulturno umjetničkog društva iz Novog Sada.<sup>119</sup> Uz povike “Za dom spremni!”, “Hrvatska, Hrvatska” i “Smeća srpska”, huligani su prisutnim članovima “Prosvjete” poručili “da ondje ne mogu održati nastup i da takvom programu nema mjesta u mjesecu kada se obilježava pad Vukovara”.<sup>120</sup> Predsjednik Vlade Republike Hrvatske, Andrej Plenković i gradonačelnik

Splita, Tomislav Šuta najoštrije su osudili incident, ali splitski ogranak stranke Domovinski pokret, Plenkovićevih koalicijskih partnera u Vladi, na svojem je profilu na *Facebooku* pohvalio napad, cinično nazvavši skandiranje ustaškog pozdrava i vrijeđanje okupljenih “pristojnim i dostojanstvenim”: “DP Split i DP Splitsko-dalmatinske županije jasno poručuju: Hrvatska je slobodna zemlja, ali sloboda podrazumijeva i poštovanje prema žrtvi. Onaj tko to ignorira, svjesno vrijeđa osjećaje hrvatskih građana. Također, ovom prilikom izražavamo punu podršku hrabrim mladim ljudima koji su na pristojan i dostojanstven način izrazili svoje građansko neslaganje s provokativnim skupom i prekinuli ga. Njihova poruka je jasna: U Splitu se ne pljuje po Vukovaru i Hrvatskoj! Split živi i diše žrtvu Vukovara — grada heroja i prijatelja Splita. Tko to ne razumije, neka uči i ne provocira”, zaključuju iz DP-a u objavi na društvenoj mreži *Facebook*.<sup>121</sup>

Navedenu objavu “lajkao” je i ministar poljoprivrede iz redova Domovinskog pokreta, David Vlajčić. Nasilno prekidanje programa podržali su i splitski HSP te HDZ-ova dopredsjednica Gradskog kotara Blatine Julija Budimir Bekan, koja je izjavila sljedeće: “Momci su se spontano okupili. Nije bilo nikakvih grupnih vrijeđanja ni naguravanja. Ničeg lošeg nije bilo. Takve se stvari, posebno u mjesecu pijeteta prema Vukovaru, ne bi trebale događati”.<sup>122</sup>

Policija je identificirala i uhitila devetoricu napadača, a iako im je prvo određen pritvor, izvanraspravno vijeće Županijskog suda u Splitu ukinulo je odluku o pritvoru.<sup>123</sup>

Nakon napada u Splitu, otkazano je gostovanje Ansambla narodnih igara i plesova “Veselin Masleša” u Ogulinu, koje je planirano u sklopu iste manifestacije. Članovi ansambla s bogatom tradicijom javili su da neće doći u Ogulin jer se u svjetlu napada u Splitu ne osjećaju sigurno. Na otvorenju izložbe “Efemeris — legat Dejana Medakovića” u Zagrebu, pedesetak maskiranih muškaraca okupilo se preko puta Srpskog kulturnog centra u Preradovićevoj ulici uz skandiranje “Za dom spremni!”, “Zovi, samo zovi” i “Hrvatska, nezavisna država”.<sup>124</sup> Po dolasku policije, muškarci su se razbježali, ali ne prije nego što su uputili uvrede prisutnoj novinarki Vide TV i pljunuli je.<sup>125</sup> Paralelno s osudama nasilja, dio političara opet je iskazao potporu maskiranim huliganima. Tako je sinjski gradonačelnik iz redova stranke MOST, Miro Bulj tražio opravdanje za huligane, napisavši na svom profilu na *Facebooku* sljedeće: “Svi mediji danas pišu o ‘huliganima’ koji su se okupili ispred Srpskog kulturnog centra u Zagrebu. Ali nitko ne piše zbog čega su se okupili. Nitko ne spominje čija se ostavština u sklopu izložbe ondje trebala predstaviti. Izložba je to ostavštine Dejana Medakovića, jednog od 16 članova radne grupe Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti koja je 1986. izradila

zloglasni Memorandum SANU, idejni temelj velikosrpske politike koja je pokrenula agresiju na Hrvatsku.”

Iako se izložba nikako nije bavila političkim radom Dejana Medakovića, nije afirmirala, ni promicala njegove stavove, Bulj je incident iskoristio kao opravdanje da optuži Milorada Pupovca za “slavljenje ostavštine onih koji su autori monstruoznih zločinačkih dokumenata”.<sup>126</sup>

Paralelno s događajima u Zagrebu, navijačka skupina Torcida organizirala je prosvjed na splitskoj Rivi na kojem su članovi te skupine tražili da se iz zatvora puste mladići optuženi za nasilno prekidanje Dana srpske kulture u Splitu. Na prosvjedu se okupilo između 1000 i 2000 prosvjednika koji su ponovno skandirali “Za dom spremni!” i “Hrvatska, nezavisna država”. Osim puštanja optuženih iz pritvora, govornici na prosvjedu tražili su da “svatko tko dobije javni novac potpiše kako će poštovati Deklaraciju o Domovinskom ratu” te su od predstavnika hrvatskih Srba tražili da se “javno ograde od velikosrpske svetosavske ideologije i genocida nad hrvatskim narodom”.<sup>127</sup> Gradonačelnik Splita, Tomislav Šuta, upitan o ustaškim pozdravima na prosvjedu rekao je sljedeće: “Nije mi drago da se to događa, ali svakako ono što moram kazati jest da svatko ima pravo na svoje mišljenje, da ima pravo kazati u duhu demokracije ono što smatra da u ovom trenutku bitno i da živimo u demokratskoj državi.”<sup>128</sup>

Jedan od argumenata kojim se od početka opravdavalo napade na Dane srpske kulture bila je činjenica da se oni održavaju u studenom, koji je mjesec pada Vukovara. To se događalo iako nijedan od navedenih sadržaja nije tematizirao Vukovar ni ratove devedesetih. Implikacija tog argumenta — da Srbi u mjesecu vukovarske tragedije ne bi smjeli održavati nikakve kulturne manifestacije, to jest, da bi trebali biti nevidljivi — počiva na premisi pripisivanja kolektivne krivnje, a zapravo instrumentalizira i zlorabi žrtve Vukovara kako bi pravdala etničku diskriminaciju. Ipak, tom su se ciničnom izlikom povelili brojni političari kako bi opravdali zahtjev za odgađanjem izložbe “Srpkinja — heroína Velikog rata”, izložbe koja se bavi iskustvima srpskih ženama u Prvom svjetskom ratu u Vukovaru. Prvi je na otkazivanje izložbe pozvao gradonačelnik Vukovara, Marijan Pavliček koji je na svom profilu na *Facebooku* napisao da smatra održavanje “takvih” izložbi u danima žalosti neprimjerenim. Zamjenica “takvih” u ovom kontekstu mogla je podrazumijevati jedino upravo srpske izložbe, a kako čitav studeni nije nikad službeno proglašen mjesecom žalovanja, poruka vukovarskog gradonačelnika očito pretvara samu kulturu Srba u nešto skandalozno i uvredljivo što se može po volji uklanjati iz javnoga prostora. Pavliček je upozorio da se izložba odgodi kako ne bi došlo do “nepotrebne eskalacije”, očito evocirajući ranije primjere nasilnog prekidanja manifestacija

u sklopu Dana srpske kulture.<sup>129</sup> Pavličekovom zahtjevu pridružila se i ministrica kulture Nina Obuljen Koržinek, koja je izjavila da ta izložba u ovo vrijeme nije prihvatljiva “ne zbog sadržaja, nego zbog dojma”.<sup>130</sup> Time se zapravo potvrdila ranije artikulirana Pavličekova poruka o nepoželjnosti bilo kakvih sadržaja koji imaju veze sa Srbima u studenom — poruka koja je u najboljem slučaju neosjetljiva, a u najgorem otvoreno diskriminatorna, naročito kad dolazi s pozicije nekoga tko vrši izvršnu vlast.

I prije nego što su organizatori izložbe stigli otkazati izložbu došlo je do eskalacije kakvu je Pavliček najavljivao. Navijačka udruga BBB Vukovar oblijepila je zgradu Zajedničkog vijeća općina u Vukovaru u kojoj se izložba trebala održati fotografijama vojnika JNA i četničkih paravojski iz vremena pada Vukovara, a istaknuta su i dva uvredljiva transparenta: “Ko o čemu, Srbi o herojima” i “Vlada RH ili vlada RSK”.<sup>131</sup>

## */6. Rehabilitacija NDH i analiza uporabe pozdrava “Za dom spremni!” u hrvatskim elektroničkim medijima*

Rehabilitacija fašističkog režima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH), marionetske tvorevine koju su formirale Sile Osovine u Drugom svjetskom ratu u javnom je prostoru provođena uz pomoć dviju diskurzivnih i praktičnih metoda: historijskog negacionizma i rekontekstualizacije simbola povezanih s Nezavisnom Državom Hrvatskom. Akteri koji su provodili navedenu rehabilitaciju bili su prisutni na svim razinama hrvatskoga društva: od prosvjednika, navijača, marginalnih desnih političara, članova akademske zajednice i sudskih institucija pa sve do nositelja političkih funkcija. Historiografska struka definira “historijski negacionizam” kao zlonamjernu falsifikaciju i distorziju povijesnih izvora kako bi se dala “revidirana” slika prošlosti. Glavni cilj negacionista uglavnom je stjecanje političkog i ideološkog utjecaja i podvrgavanje historijskog znanja određenom ideološkom cilju. Najblatantniji povijesni primjeri historijskog negacionizma jesu ideologija “Lost Cause” u prvoj polovici dvadesetog stoljeća, korištena kako bi legitimirala rasiističke zakone “Jima Crowa” u nekadašnjim robovlasničkim državama američkoga Juga te poricanje Holokausta od profašistički orijentiranih političara i povjesničara koje je uzelo maha od sedamdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća nadalje. U 16 država Europske Unije (EU) i u Kanadi negacionističke politike i historiografije zabranjene su zakonom i postovječene su s govorom mržnje i diseminacijom šovinističkih ideologija. U Hrvatskoj od početka devedesetih godina bujaju primjeri historijskog negiranja genocida nad Srbima u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Drugi oblik rehabilitacije fašističkih režima koji se počeo javljati u hrvatskom javnom prostoru daleko je suptilniji — riječ je o reinterpretaciji i rekon-

tekstualizaciji pojedinih simbola kao simbola “otpora totalitarizmu” ili “otpora velikosrpskoj agresiji u Domovinskom ratu”. Time se simboliku s fašističkom i genocidnom poviješću želi etablirati kao domoljubnu. Naravno, konačna posljedica toga upravo je stvaranje simboličkog kontinuiteta između fašističkog režima NDH i suvremene nacionalne države te negiranje emancipatorne i državotvorne uloge antifašističke borbe, koja ima utemeljenje u Ustavu Republike Hrvatske.

Obljetnice vezane uz datum uspostave NDH i datum obilježavanja proboja logoraša iz Jasenovca pružile su, kao i lani, priliku novinarima lista *Hrvatski tjednik* da ponovno plasiraju negacionističke teze na svojim stranicama. Tako se u broju od 10. travnja NDH hvali u članku koji potpisuje Stipo Pilić pod naslovom: “10. travnja 1941. najznačajniji je nadnevak u povijesti suvremene hrvatske države”. U članku Pilić tvrdi kako je 10. travnja “utjelovljenje hrvatske nacionalne ideje bez obzira na to u kakvome je i kojemu odnosu ta država bila prema drugim državama jer sudbina našeg naroda kao malog naroda nije da diktiramo drugima, nego da u savezu s velikima budemo svoji i što više suvereni”. Članak dolazi uz izjave političara i povjesničara poput Blanke Matković, Zlatka Hasanbegovića i Tomislava Jonjića, koji se izjašnjavaju u prilog obilježavanja 10. travnja. Hasanbegović i Jonjić pritom su nazvali 22. lipnja, Dan antifašističke borbe, i 8. svibnja, Dan oslobođenja Zagreba, “izrazom jugoslavenstva i u protimbi s idejom hrvatske državne neovisnosti” te “nadnevcima jugoslavenske okupacije”. Članak i izjave nekih od citiranih povjesničara uspostavljaju semantičku opreku između fašističke NDH kao izraza želje za neovisnošću i antifašističkog nasljeđa kao “jugoslavenske okupacije”.<sup>132</sup>

Hrvatski tjednik 24. travnja, uoči Dana obilježavanja prodora logoraša, donosi nekoliko članaka posvećenih negiranju zločina u Jasenovcu. Članak Davora Dijanovića pod naslovom: “Jasenovac je antifašistički zločin” tvrdi da je “na znanstvenoj razini jasenovački mit potučen, ali moćne jugoslavenske i velikosrpske političke, medijske i akademske strukture u Hrvatskoj ne dopuštaju njegov konačni pokop”. U nastavku članka, pozivajući se na negacionističku literaturu, tvrdi se da čak “kod 88,6 % [jasenovačkih žrtava] ima podataka koji su lažni, pogrešni, proturječni i nepouzdana. Ili nedostaju podaci o izvorima pa se u tim slučajevima radi o fantomskim žrtvama”. Ovakva tvrdnja predstavlja često korišten “spin” kojim se služe poricatelji genocida i Holokausta, gdje se neke stvarne ili fiktivne nedorečenosti ili nepotpunosti u povijesnim izvorima smatraju dokazom da su imena žrtava fiktivna. Isti negacionistički ton ima članak Nikole Banića i M. Koića naslovljen: “Ništa nova: Građani ga s pravom bojkotiraju, otkrivaju se nove lažne žrtve, a jugosrpski šarlatan Klasić i dalje laže o broju žrtava i odbija predočiti dokaze”.<sup>133</sup> Već u naslovu radovi povjesničara koji priznaju genocid nazivaju se lažima, a

uz ime im se pridaje šovinistički neologizam “jugosrpski” koji, čini se, ima svrhu, kako političke, tako i etničke diskvalifikacije.

Jedan od primjera propagiranja negacionističkog narativa osvanuo je 14. srpnja na stranicama riječke podružnice stranke MOST. Naime, objavljena je snimka njihova člana (kasnije izabranog za potpredsjednika stranke) Krešimira Rotima. Snimka je zamišljena kao odgovor na drugu snimku koju je objavila mladež SDP-a povodom isticanja proustaških simbola na Thompsonovom koncertu. Na toj snimci Rotim rehabilitira ustaški pokret, tvrdeći da u načelima ustaškog pokreta nema “ni F od fašizma”, već “revolucionarna borba za svrgavanje Kraljevine Jugoslavije i velikosrpske ideje”. Rotim nadalje negira da su ustaše prodale Dalmaciju Italiji, a poriče i broj žrtava Jasenovca, navodeći kako je u Jasenovcu otkriveno oko 440 leševa, a s neslužbenim procjenama dolazimo do brojke od oko 600. “Kako je moguće na mjestu na kojem je ubijeno preko 83.000 ljudi da se na njemu ne nalaze barem natruhe takvog ogromnog zločina”, navodi Rotim.<sup>134</sup>

MOST je prvo izbrisao sporni videozapis, no njihov zastupnik Nikola Grmoja branio je Rotima. “Rotim je povjesničar, ima pravo na svoje stavove na čemu, uostalom, povijesna znanost počiva, na propitivanju” te je rekao da se Jasenovac “koristio za srpsku propagandu”.<sup>135</sup> Sâm Rotim na osude je odgovorio putem *TikToka*, nacionalistički napavši dosad objavljenu i etabliranu historiografiju o Jasenovcu i NDH. Rekao je: “Povijest Hrvatske pisat će Hrvati. Neće je pisati anglosaksonci, velikosrbi, komunisti i njihovi korisni idioti na hrvatskoj medijsko-političkoj sceni”. Rotim je u videu na *TikToku* branio i Darija Kordića, ratnog zločinca osuđenog zbog ubojstva 120 bošnjačkih civila u Ahmićima.<sup>136</sup>

Prijašnja poglavlja ovoga biltena već i odveć opširno dokumentiraju učestalost korištenja pozdrava “Za dom spremni!” na skupovima desničara u Hrvatskoj, kao i na sportskim tribinama i koncertima. Korištenje ovog pozdrava prethodnih godina bilo je tek povremeno, ali prošle je godine postalo gotovo stalnim i normaliziranim repertoarom političke desnice. Analiza koju su autori priredili, a koju ćemo prikazati na kraju ovoga poglavlja iznijet će neke od razloga i prijepora koji su pratili korištenje toga pozdrava, međutim, ovo što je u ovoj godini novost činjenica je da su čak i pojedine sudske presude rezultirale legitimacijom toga pozdrava. Osim presude Općinskog prekršajnog suda u Zagrebu, o kojoj je već bilo riječi u poglavlju o koncertima Marka Perkovića Thompsona, znakovita je bila i pravomoćna presuda Visokog prekršajnog suda protiv Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova, a u korist kontroverznog zapovjednika IX. bojne HOS-a “Rafael vitez Boban”, Marka Skeje. Presuda donesena u ožujku prošle godine, a objavljena u lipnju, tiče se postupka pokrenutog još prije četiri godine kad je Skejo, tijekom

proslave Dana domovinske zahvalnosti u Kninu, okupljene pristaše triput pozdravio pozdravom "Za dom!", na što su oni odgovorili "Spremni!", zbog čega je prijavljen po članku 5. Zakona o prekršajima protiv javnog reda i mira. Prekršajni sud u Šibeniku oslobodio je Skeju, a mup ga je potom prijavio Visokom prekršajnom sudu. U oslobađajućoj presudi Visoki prekršajni sud pozvao se na preporuke takozvanog Vijeća za suočavanje s prošlošću koje je zaslužno za zaključak o "dvostrukoј kono-taciji" pozdrava. Vijeće Visokog prekršajnog suda potvrdilo je presudu šibenskoga suda, obrazloživši da su pripadnici rasformirane IX. bojne "Rafael Boban" inkorporirani u 114. brigadu koja je sudjelovala u oslobađanju Knina pa se stoga sporni pozdrav može koristiti u čast njima. Tako je proslava Dana pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti zapravo pretvorena u događaj kojim se odaje poštovanje braniteljima poginulima pod nosovim insignijama, iako u operaciji "Oluja" nos-ove postrojbe uopće nisu sudjelovale. Neimenovani pravni stručnjak intervjuiran za tjednik *Express* nazvao je presudu "udarom na ustavni i demokratski poredak".<sup>137</sup> Skejo pak nije prestao dovoditi pozdrav "Za dom spremni!" u direktnu vezu s Nezavisnom Državom Hrvatskom (NDH). Ove godine, na istoj proslavi u Kninu, opet je pozdravio sa "Za dom spremni!" i na kasnije pitanje rekao kako "nikome ne treba smetati Nezavisna Država Hrvatska jer ona ima svoj temelj, svoje uporište i ne treba se toga sramiti."<sup>138</sup>

Najsramotniji primjer rehabilitacije fašističkog režima u prošloј godini bio je Okrugli stol "Znanstveni pristup istraživanju žrtava Jasenovca", koji je 28. listopada organizirao saborski Klub zastupnika stranake Dom i Nacionalno okupljanje (DOMINO) i Hrvatskih suverenista. Novinar i publicist Robert Bajruši nazvao je okrugli stol "najgrozomornijim revizionističkim događajem u povijesti Hrvatskog sabora".<sup>139</sup> Prije održavanja samoga skupa, čelnik SDP-a Siniša Hajdaš Dončić tražio je od predsjednika Sabora Gordana Jandrokovića da zabrani održavanje navedenog skupa jer će na njemu govoriti autori poznati kao negatori genocida u Jasenovcu, Nikola Banić i Igor Vukić. Na njegov zahtjev Jandroković je odgovorio sljedeće: "Ne postoji pravno uporište niti poslovnička mogućnost koja bi mi omogućila da zabranim navedeni skup. Iako to smatram bjelodanom činjenicom, želim naglasiti da kao predsjednik Hrvatskoga sabora nemam ulogu cenzora sadržaja rasprava koje organiziraju različiti saborski klubovi".<sup>140</sup>

Na samom okruglom stolu izrečen je niz negacionističkih tvrdnji. Igor Vukić rekao je kako je u Jasenovcu "bilo žrtava, ali ne velik broj" te je istaknuo kako "Jasenovac i Stara Gradiška nisu bili logori smrti, već radni logori u svrhu izolacije građana nepoćudnih tadašnjim vlastima". Prema Vukićevim tvrdnjama izrečenim na navedenom okruglom stolu, "ondje nije bilo masovnih ubojstava koja bi dovela do broja žrtava u razmjerima od nekoliko desetaka tisuća. Stvorila se fama da je gotovo

svatko tko je ušao u logor ondje i izgubio život.” Vukić je rekao kako su u logorima postojali “zdravstvena zaštita, glazbeni sastavi, mogućnost bavljenja sportom i dopisivanja s obitelji. Jasenovac nije bio lječilište, ali ni mučilište, no život se mogao izgubiti zbog bolesti, bijega ili odmazdi za diverzije partizana”. Nakon što je na taj ciničan način umanjio žrtve Jasenovca i patnje sadistički ubijenih i preživjelih logoraša, Vukić je izrazio želju da Nezavisna Država Hrvatska uđe u Ustav kao “izraz želje hrvatskog naroda za državnosti”, iako je ona formirana nakon okupacije Kraljevine Jugoslavije od Sila Osovine te kao takva nije imala nikakav legitimitet u hrvatskom narodu.


Nikola Banić na istom je skupu utvrdio kako je popis žrtava JUSP Jasenovac nevjerodostojan jer su u njemu “duplicirane i lažirane žrtve”. Na skupu je govorio i Pero Šoli, koji je rekao kako su najpouzdaniji izvor “matične knjige umrlih, u kojima je za 297 ljudi između 1941. i 1945. kao mjesto smrti upisan Jasenovac”.<sup>141</sup>

Ove skandalozne izjave potakle su Milorada Pupovca da najavi kako će protiv Igora Vukića i ostalih ispred snv-a podnijeti kaznenu prijavu zbog javnog odobravanja i umanjivanja zločina počinjenih u ustaškom logoru Jasenovac. Snimka negacionističkog okruglog stola uklonjena je sa stranica Hrvatskog sabora.<sup>142</sup>

### */6.1. Analiza uporabe pozdrava “Za dom spremni!” u hrvatskim elektroničkim medijima*

U 2025. godini ustaški pozdrav “Za dom spremni!” (ZDS) odjekivao je hipodromima i stadionima, izvikivao se i ispisivao ulicama gradova, a mogao se čuti i sa saborske govornice. Takvi su incidenti potaknuli niz rasprava u javnom i medijskom prostoru. Cilj ove analize utvrditi je koliko se, kada i kako o ZDS-u govorilo u dijelu hrvatskih medija, kada interes za temu raste, tko ga potiče, u kojim se kontekstima pojavljuje te koje se argumentacije i interpretacije pritom nude publici.


Mješovita (kvantitativna i kvalitativna) analiza<sup>143</sup> provedena je na člancima 22 hrvatska portala objavljenima između 1. siječnja i 30. rujna 2025. godine. Podaci o člancima prikupljeni su uz pomoć platforme TakeLab Retriever (Dukić i sur., 2024.).<sup>144</sup> Pretragom prema ključnim riječima zabilježeno je 2229 članaka u kojima se spominje sintagma “Za dom spremni!” ili kratica “ZDS” u odnosu na 785 članaka u istom razdoblju i na istim portalima 2024. godine. Nakon ručnog pregledavanja i uklanjanja članaka nedostupnih u trenutku pregledavanja te dupliciranih poveznica, preostala su ukupno 2032 članka na kojima je izvršen prvi dio analize. Prikaz 1. donosi broj članaka u kojima je na svakome od uključenih portala spomenut pozdrav “Za dom spremni!”



**Prikaz 1.** Broj članaka po portalu između 1. januara i 30. septembra 2025. godine

Što se tiče vremenske dinamike objavljivanja članaka, kao što je vidljivo iz Prikaza 2, do naglog porasta dolazi u srpnju, mjesecu u kojem je objavljen i najveći broj tekstova (816), a slijede kolovoz (598) i rujana (352). Najveća koncentracija članaka zabilježena je između 6. i 9. srpnja, neposredno nakon koncerta Marka Perkovića Thompsona na Hipodromu u Zagrebu. Uz te datume dolazi i do naglog skoka 14. srpnja, nakon što je zastupnik Miro Bulj svoj govor u Saboru završio pokličem

ZDS. U kolovozu je pojačano objavljivanje potaknuto nizom događaja: koncertom Marka Perkovića Thompsona u Sinju (4. 8.), reakcijom pučke pravobraniteljice na koncert (6. 8.), izvikivanjem pokliča ZDS na obljetnici "Oluje" (članci od 5. i 6. 8.), potom priopćenjima NOS-ovih udruga koje taj čin osuđuju (14. 8.), paljenjem zastave Republike Srbije i izvikivanjem pozdrava ZDS na Poljudu (članci od 11. 8.), jednim u nizu braniteljskih prosvjeda u Benkovcu (21. 8.) te oslobađajućom presudom za izvikivanje pokliča ZDS na Thompsonovom zagrebačkom koncertu (21. 8.). U rujnu je pojačani medijski interes ponajprije potaknut aktualnim prijedpnevom Hrvatskog sabora 15. 9., na kojem je poklič ZDS bio jedna od središnjih tema.



**Prikaz 2.** Dnevni broj članaka po mjesecima

Nastavak analize temelji se na pristupu uokvirivanja (*framing*), koji polazi od pretpostavke da se u medijskim sadržajima odabirom i isticanjem određenih aspekata stvarnosti konstruiraju *okviri* i narativi koji usmjeravaju način na koji čitatelji tumače događaje i razumiju društvena pitanja, što utječe i na oblikovanje javnoga mnijenja.<sup>145</sup> Na uzorku članaka u kojima se spominje pozdrav "Za dom spremni!" ili "ZDS" označeni su i analizirani sljedeći elementi medijskih okvira:

- /1 **Središnje pitanje** — u ovom istraživanju to je pitanje uporabe pozdrava "Za dom spremni!". Svi ostali elementi argumentacije promatrani su iz dviju perspektiva:
  - a) uporabu pozdrava treba dozvoliti/prihvatljivo ga je upotrebljavati;
  - b) pozdrav treba u potpunosti zabraniti i sankcionirati;
- /2 **Tema** — prevladavajuća tema pojedinog teksta u kojem se središnje pitanje spominje; teme nisu bile unaprijed određene;


- /3 **Evaluacija/sentiment članka** — prevladavajući vrijednosni sud ili afektivni ton teksta;
- /4 **Akter** — osoba, skupina ili institucija koja je povod za objavu članka ili se u tekstu najčešće citira;
- /5 **Rizici** — negativne posljedice dopuštanja i uporabe pozdrava u odnosu na zabrane i sankcioniranja pozdrava;
- /6 **Atribucija rizika** — pojedinci, skupine ili drugi čimbenici kojima se pripisuje odgovornost za rizike uporabe/dopuštanja u odnosu na zabrane/sankcioniranja;
- /7 **Koristi** — pozitivne posljedice uporabe/dopuštanja u odnosu na zabrane/sankcioniranja;
- /8 **Atribucija koristi** — pojedinci, skupine ili drugi čimbenici kojima se pripisuju pozitivne strane uporabe/dopuštanja u odnosu na zabrane/sankcioniranja;
- /9 **Rješenje** — predloženi odgovori na problem uporabe/dopuštanja u odnosu na zabrane/sankcioniranja;
- /10 **Proponent** — pojedinci, skupine ili institucije koje predlažu rješenja problema uporabe/dopuštanja u odnosu na zabrane/sankcioniranja;
- /11 **Antagonist** — pojedinci, skupine ili institucije koje se u tekstovima imenuje kao krivce za opće loše stanje u društvu, bez jasne identifikacije konkretnih rizika; razvrstani prema dvjema perspektivama.

Kako bi se dobio uzorak koji pokazuje što je u medijima bilo najzastupljenije, a time i potencijalno najutjecajnije, korpus za analizu okvira sastavljen je od članaka objavljenih onih dana kada je na pet analiziranih portala objavljeno više od 25 tekstova. Riječ je o portalima koji su u promatranom razdoblju od 1. siječnja do 30. rujna objavili najviše članaka u kojima se spominje poklič ZDS: *dnevno.hr*, *direktno.hr*, *Slobodnadalmacija.hr*, *Index.hr* i *24sata.hr*. Na taj je način izdvojen uzorak od 623 članka.

Kao daleko najzastupljenija tema, na koju otpada čak 55,2 % označenih članaka, ističe se Marko Perković Thompson — prije svega njegov koncert na zagrebačkom Hipodromu 5. srpnja, potom onaj u Sinju 4. kolovoza te nekoliko članaka o privatnom životu pjevača. Slijede je tema Sabora, odnosno saborskih rasprava (9,8 % članaka) te tema šireg

problematiziranja društvene situacije, ponajprije vezano uz skretanje društva udesno (8 % članaka).


U sljedećem koraku izrađen je korpus za analizu ostalih elemenata okvira koji je obuhvaćao ukupno 150 tekstova. Pri odabiru članaka vodilo se računa o zastupljenosti pojedinih tema: iz svake tematske cjeline članci su birani nasumično, ali pri tome je očuvana struktura dobivena u prethodnoj analizi. Tako je iz prvotno tematski označenih 623 članka u korpus ušlo 83 članka o Marku Perkoviću Thompsonu, 15 o Saboru, 12 o široj društvenoj situaciji, deset o incidentima, devet o “zabraniteljima”, osam o regulativi i sudskoj praksi, osam o HOS-u te pet članaka koji se bavili ostalim, neklasificiranim temama. Elementi okvira identificirani su dodjeljivanjem oznaka odgovarajućim dijelovima teksta.



**Prikaz 3** Tematska struktura članaka

## Evaluacija — Kako se u članku ocjenjuje uporaba pozdrava zds?

Pitanje koje je usmjerilo označavanje glasilo je: *Da je ovo jedini članak koji smo pročitali o korištenju pozdrava zds, bismo li stekli dojam da je riječ o nečemu dobronamjernom, štetnom ili ne bismo mogli procijeniti (zbog uravnoteženog predstavljanja argumenata objiju strana ili odsustva vrijednosnih sudova i emocija)?* Prema takvoj procjeni, u više od polovice teksto-va (53 %) prevladava negativno vrednovanje uporabe sintagme, u 27 % pozitivno, a u 19 % neutralno ili su pozitivni i negativni aspekti uravnoteženi (Prikaz 4). Ovakvi rezultati upućuju na to da su, barem u internetskom medijskom prostoru u prva tri kvartala 2025. godine, prevagu odnijele negativne interpretacije pozdrava zds, pri čemu je prvenstveno bila riječ o negativnim *reakcijama* na pokušaje afirmacije pokliča.




**Prikaz 4.** Evaluacija uporabe zds u člancima (broj i postotak članaka)

## Akeri — Čije su riječi i djelovanje povod objavljivanja tekstova, komu se u tekstu daje najviše prostora?

Akeri su imenovani u 88,67 % analiziranih članaka, a u toj ulozi pojavilo se ukupno stotinu različitih pojedinaca ili skupina. Među njima prednjače pjevač *Marko Perković Thompson*, koji se spominje 16 puta u 150 članaka, zatim premijer *Andrej Plenković* (12 puta), oporbena saborska zastupnica *Dalija Orešković* (10 puta), predsjednik Sabora *Gordan Jandroković*

(sedam puta), saborska zastupnica Sandra Benčić i pučka pravobraniteljica Tena Šimonović Einwalter (svaka po pet puta) te saborski zastupnik Miro Bulj (četiri puta). Devet aktera spomenuto je triput, 21 akter dvaput, dok se 61 pojavio samo jedanput.



**Prikaz 5** Akteri — distribucija grupa prema broju pojavljivanja

Takva raspodjela upućuje na višeglasje i raspršenost pokretača medijske pažnje. Međutim, ako se označeni akteri grupiraju prema društvenim funkcijama (Prikaz 5), vidljivo je da najviše prostora zauzimaju pojedinci iz političke sfere, što ukazuje na središnju ulogu politike u kreiranju medijskih diskursa o ZDS-u u analiziranom vremenskom rasponu. Zastupljenost osoba iz kulturnih i estradnih krugova može se zahvaliti prvenstveno Marku Perkoviću Thompsonu, dok se na trećem mjestu nalaze akteri čija je uloga obično tumačenje i kontekstualizacija događaja, poput sveučilišnih profesora, povjesničara ili političkih analitičara.


### **Rizici — Koje su opasnosti povezane s uporabom ili dopuštanjem uporabe pozdrava ZDS, a koje s njegovom potpunom zabranom i sankcijama?**

Negativne posljedice (dopuštanja) uporabe ZDS-a navode se u 68,7 % tekstova. Trideset i četiri zabilježena rizika nakon označavanja tematski su grupirana na sljedeći način:

- /1 **Desna radikalizacija i fašizacija** (društveno-politički rizici): *normalizacija ustaštva i fašizma, povezanost s neonacizmom i ustaštvom, dopuštanje propagiranja ustaštva, rehabilitacija ustaškog pokreta kroz povezivanje s Domovinskim ratom, put prema nacizmu, desna radikalizacija HDZ-a, jačanje krajnje desnice, širenje autoritarizma, manipulacija i dominacija nad stanovništvom;*
- /2 **Povijesni revizionizam i falsifikacija povijesti** (ideološki, simbolički i interpretativni rizici): *relativiziranje i simpatiziranje NDH i ustaštva; dopuštanje propagiranja ustaštva, redefinicija/revizionizam povijesti, falsificiranje povijesti Domovinskog rata, veličanje ratnih zločina, dezinformiranje mladih;*
- /3 **Ugrožavanje države i pravnog poretka** (pravni i institucionalni rizici): *udar na pravnu državu, protuustavnost ZDS-a, protuzakonitost ZDS-a, toleriranje kršenja zakona;*
- /4 **Društvena polarizacija i nasilje** (socijalni i sigurnosni rizici): *podjele u društvu, poziv na mržnju i nasilje, nasilničko ponašanje, prijetnja javnoj sigurnosti, toleriranje ekstremizma, politizacija sporta;*
- /5 **Nepravda prema žrtvama i borcima** (četrdesetih i devedesetih; simbolički i socijalni rizici): *nepoštovanje žrtava NDH, nepoštovanje prema braniteljskoj žrtvi, narušavanje reputacije hrvatskih branitelja;*
- /6 **Odstupanje od civilizacijskih vrijednosti i tradicije** (vrijednosni i normativni rizici): *odstupanje od ideja humanosti i civilizacijskih vrijednosti,*

napad na europske vrijednosti, pervertiranje kršćanskih vrijednosti, nepoštovanje tradicije, kulture i vrijednosti RH;

**/7 Narušavanje međunarodnog ugleda Republike Hrvatske** (reputacijski rizici): *narušavanje reputacije RH, negativni utjecaj na turizam.*



**Prikaz 6** Rizici — distribucija grupa prema broju pojavljivanja


Kao što je vidljivo iz Prikaza 6, među potencijalnim rizicima uporabe pokliča ZDS najčešće se spominju sveobuhvatni društveno-politički procesi desne radikalizacije i fašizacije, rizici vezani uz društvenu netrpeljivost i nasilje, a potom i ideološke i povijesne manipulacije koje te procese podupiru.

Negativne posljedice potpune zabrane i kažnjavanja ustaškog pozdrava, njih 23, istaknute su u 26 % tekstova:

**/1 Ugrožavanje slobode govora i demokratskih standarda** (politički i demokratski rizici): *dokidanje slobode govora i izražavanja, urušavanje demokracije, dehumaniziranje političkih neistomišljenika, sotoniziranje i*

progon Thompsona, selektivno sankcioniranje skupina koje nemaju društvenu moć, povratak Jugoslavije;

- /2 **Pravni i institucionalni rizici:** apsurdnost privođenja i procesuiranja velikog broja ljudi, nepoštivanje pravosudnog sustava i zakona;
- /3 **Ideološka manipulacija i proizvodnja "moralne panike"** (politički rizici): neopravdano plašenje rastom ustaštva, izazivanje suprotnog učinka zabranama, izazivanje suprotnog učinka preuveličavanjem problema, manipulacija stanovništvom;
- /4 **Povijesni revizionizam i asimetrična interpretacija prošlosti** (ideološki, simbolički i interpretativni rizici): krivotvorenje povijesti, prikrivanje jugokomunističkih i velikosrpskih zločina, "i crvena zvijezda ima dvostruku konotaciju";
- /5 **Društvena polarizacija i identitetski sukobi** (socijalni i simbolički rizici): podjele društva, napadi na hrvatske simbole, nepoštovanje prema precima i narodu, reakcije ljevice kao u Srbiji, "u Srbiji je gore";
- /6 **Drugi socijalni i politički rizici:** manipulacija braniteljima, gubitak podrške desnice, slabljenje tradicionalnih medija.



**Prikaz 7** Rizici zabrane — distribucija grupa prema broju pojavljivanja


Iz ove perspektive (Prikaz 7) kao najčešći rizici navode se različiti oblici narušavanja demokratskih tekovina povezanih sa slobodom izražavanja, a kao sljedeći problem ističe se zastrašivanje građana izmišljenom ili prenaplašenom prijetnjom. Treća skupina rizika po brojnosti, ona povezana uz povijesni revizionizam, u ovim slučajevima ne nastoji izravno poricati zločinački karakter NDH i s njom povezanog pozdrava, već nastoji u istu ravan dovesti naslijeđe i simbole Jugoslavije. U usporedbi s rizicima uporabe ZDS-a, koji se nerijetko artikuliraju kao strukturne i sistemske prijetnje, ovi su rizici nešto usmjereniji prema pitanjima individualnih sloboda.

### Atribucija rizika — Komu (ili čemu) se pripisuje odgovornost za negativne posljedice uporabe i dopuštanja uporabe pozdrava ZDS, a komu za negativne posljedice njegove zabrane?


Atribucija rizika prisutna je u polovici analiziranih tekstova, pri čemu se ukupno imenuju 52 pojedinca, skupine ili druga relevantna čimbenika. Među njima se najveća individualna odgovornost pripisuje premijeru Andreju Plenkoviću (21 put), zatim pjevaču Marku Perkoviću Thompsonu (17 puta) te predsjedniku Sabora Gordanu Jandrokoviću (15 puta). Sljedeći su krivci policija (14 puta), nositelji političkih funkcija/institucije, dužnosnici (12 puta) i HDZ-ova vlada (8 puta). Osam je pojedinaca ili skupina koji se pojavljuju između tri i šest puta, devet dvaput, a preostalih 29 samo jedanput.

Suprotna perspektiva, odnosno atribucija rizika povezanih sa zabranom i sankcioniranjem pozdrava, znatno je rjeđe zastupljena. Ona se pojavljuje u 13,33 % tekstova i obuhvaća ukupno 15 pojedinaca ili skupina, uglavnom široko određenih lijevo orijentiranih društvenih aktera. Mediji na lijevom spektru pojavljuju se pet puta, apologeti komunizma, ljevica, gradonačelnik Zagreba Tomislav Tomašević i oporba triput, a ostalih deset odgovornih jedanput ili dvaput.

Kao što je vidljivo iz Prikaza 8 i Prikaza 9, iz obje se perspektive kao najčešći izvori rizika navode političari — ponajprije pojedinci, a potom i "političari općenito" te pojedine političke stranke. Odgovornost se nerijetko pripisuje i neformalnim ili *ad hoc* formiranim skupinama koje se još ne percipiraju kao stabilno definirani društveni akteri. To s jedne strane može odražavati specifičnost pojedinih rizika, a s druge činjenicu da smo tijekom analiziranog razdoblja svjedočili nastajanju i jačanju novih diskurzivnih aktera unutar ove teme.



**Prikaz 8** Atribucija rizika korištenja ZDS — distribucija grupa prema broju pojavljivanja



**Prikaz 9** Atribucija rizika zabrane zds — distribucija grupa prema broju pojavljivanja

### Koristi — Koje su pozitivne strane (dopuštanja) ZDS-a, a koje zabrane ZDS-a?


Dvadeset pozitivnih aspekata i posljedica korištenja ustaškog pozdrava ističe se u čak 40 % analiziranih tekstova. Po obilježavanju one su grupirane na sljedeći način:

- /1 **Domovinski rat i nacionalno-povijesni kontinuitet** (simboličke i povijesno-identitetske koristi): *vezan uz simboliku i naslijeđe Domovinskog rata (Bojna Čavoglave), povijesna borba protiv Jugoslavije/velikosrpstva, usmjerenje Hrvatske prema idealima zbog kojih su branitelji žrtvovali živote, iskaz poštovanja prema hrvatskim braniteljima;*
- /2 **Nacionalni identitet, tradicija i vrijednosti** (identitetske i vrijednosne koristi): *promicanje pravih domoljubnih vrijednosti, promicanje tradicionalnih i kršćanskih vrijednosti, poštovanje tradicije (stari hrvatski pozdrav), nacionalno buđenje mladih, izraz zajedništva, Zenga cipele su dobre i domoljubne;*
- /3 **Pozitivne emocije i rasonoda** (afektivne i socijalne koristi): *dobra zabava/atmosfera, izražavanje pozitivnih emocija, ZDS dio integralnog repertoara, povijesni koncert;*
- /4 **Sloboda izražavanja i legitimnost** (demokratske i normativne koristi): *practiciranje slobode izražavanja, ZDS koriste legitimne udruge, odluka Visokog prekršajnog suda, nije bilo sporno Tuđmanu i Račanu.*

Kao zasebne kategorije izdvojene su sljedeće:

- /5 **Legitimacija NDH:** izvori današnje Hrvatske su u NDH;
- /6 **Političko-pragmatička korist:** utvrđivanje položaja premijera na čelu vladajuće stranke.

Pozitivni aspekti ZDS-a ponajprije se artikuliraju u kontekstu koncerata Marka Perkovića Thompsona. Kao što je vidljivo iz Prikaza 10, među koristima dominira zaokretanje narativa s četrdesetih na devedesete godine 20. stoljeća, odnosno političko legitimiranje pozdrava njegovim povezivanjem s Domovinskim ratom, a potom i sa širim vrijednosnim okvirima nacionalnog identiteta, zajedništva i tradicije. Nadalje, u nezanemarivom broju slučajeva kao pozitivni aspekti ističu se odsutnost negativnih posljedica, odnosno razrješavanje spornosti pozdrava pozivanjem na autoritetne izvore ili njegovim tumačenjem kao oblika slobodnog izražavanja. Podjednako se često pojavljuje i korištenje ZDS-a kao dijela kolektivnog i afektivnog, a ne primarno političkog iskustva.



**Prikaz 10** Koristi korištenja ZDS — distribucija grupa prema broju pojavljivanja

Koristi potpune zabrane ZDS-a artikuliraju se u tek 4 % analiziranih tekstova. U tim se slučajevima navode pravne i institucionalne koristi (*zaštita ustavnih vrednota i vladavina prava i pravna sigurnost*; ukupno četiri puta), zatim socijalne i sigurnosne koristi (*osjećaj sigurnosti stanovnika Republike Hrvatske i sprečavanje budućih incidenata*; ukupno dvaput) te političke i demokratske koristi (*napredak i dobrobit Hrvatske, poštivanje demokracije i sloboda govora*; ukupno četiri puta).

Uočena asimetrija između dviju suprotstavljenih perspektiva dijelom proizlazi iz činjenice da dio oponenta uporabe pozdrava polazi od stava da je ZDS već u potpunosti zabranjen u svim javnim kontekstima, ali da se postojeći propisi ne provode dosljedno te se stoga sankcije ne promatraju u kontekstu mogućih dobrobiti, već u svjetlu propuštenih prilika.

### Atribucija koristi — Komu ili čemu se pripisuju zasluge za pozitivne strane korištenja ZDS-a naspram zabrane ZDS-a?

Atribucija koristi znatno je rjeđa od samog navođenja koristi te je označena u svega 5,33 % analiziranih članaka, pri čemu se imenuje ukupno šest pojedinaca ili skupina. Najčešće se spominju *navijači Torcida* (tri puta) i *premijer Andrej Plenković* (dvaput), dok se *hrvatska mladež*, *pjevač Marko Perković Thompson*, *ministri koji su posjetili njegov koncert* i *policija* pojavljuju po jedan put.

Atribucija koristi povezanih sa zabranom i sankcioniranjem pozdrava još je rjeđe prisutna te se pojavljuje u 3,33 % tekstova. U tom se kontekstu *prvi hrvatski predsjednik Franjo Tuđman* spominje četiri puta, *SDP* i *ostala oporba* dvaput, a *“dokazani branitelji”* jedanput.

### Rješenje — Što se predlaže kako bi se spriječili ili umanjili rizici koji proizlaze iz uporabe, odnosno zabrane ZDS-a?


Prijedlozi rješenja problema vezanih uz uporabu ZDS-a (prisutni u 42,67 % tekstova), raspoređeni su u sljedeće grupe:

- /1 **Pravna i institucionalna rješenja** (zakonodavstvo, pravosuđe, sankcije): *novi i jasniji zakon, podizanje javne svijesti kroz pravne instrumente, kažnjavanje zlorabljenja, zabrana ustaških obilježja na koncertima, pokretanje zahtjeva za zaštitu zakonitosti u slučaju oslobađajućih presuda, presude koje uzimaju u obzir sve okolnosti slučaja*;
- /2 **Politička rješenja** (osuda, pozicioniranje, politički sukob): *politička osuda, jasnija javna osuda glorifikacije i relativizacije NDH, politički obračun, održa-*

vanje HDZ-ove ideološke pozicije, povratak demokraciji političkim preslagivanjem, odmak od svih totalitarizama;

- /3 **Obrazovna i preventivna rješenja** (dugoročna promjena vrijednosti i znanja): *edukacija mladih, građansko obrazovanje, veća sredstva za obrazovanje, antifašizam kao temelj društva, jačanje demokracije i tolerancije, podizanje javne svijesti, Crkva treba utjecati na vjernike;*
- /4 **Upravljanje simbolima i javnim praksama** (simbolička, kulturna i administrativna rješenja): *ukloniti ZDS i sličnu simboliku iz svih javnih i državnih događanja: zabrana ustaških obilježja na koncertima, odbacivanje povezivanja ZDS-a s Domovinskim ratom, na obilježavanjima Domovinskog rata isticati samo službenu zastavu RH, zaposlenici u javnoj upravi ne trebaju pohoditi događaje poput Thompsonovih koncerata, zabrana upotrebe ZDS-a na stadionima, preuzimanje organizacije navijačkih mimohoda, zabrana toliko masovnih koncerata u Zagrebu;*
- /5 **Društvena deeskalacija i odgovornost** (smirivanje sukoba, normativna i vrijednosna rješenja): *smirivanje strasti, odmak od politike, odgovornost pojedinaca i institucija, sloboda govora, poštivanje Ustava.*

U korpusu su najzastupljeniji prijedlozi pravne i institucionalne regulacije te sankcioniranja uporabe ZDS-a, odnosno represivni okvir, dok zatim slijede politička i ideološka rješenja, koja se u velikoj mjeri svode na retorička. Obje skupine omogućavaju relativno brzu primjenu, a ponekad i provjeru učinka. Dugoročna rješenja, poput prevencije i ulaganja u obrazovanje, rjeđe su zastupljena. Još rjeđe spominju se mjere usmjerene na sprječavanje normalizacije ZDS-a reguliranjem simbolike u javnom prostoru na nižim razinama od državne, dok su najmanje zastupljena rješenja koja (nerijetko neprecizno) pozivaju na konsenzualno smirivanje sukoba (Prikaz 11.)




**Prikaz 11** Rješenja rizika korištenja ZDS — distribucija grupa prema broju pojavljivanja

Prijedlozi rješenja problema vezanih uz zabranu i sankcioniranje ZDS-a pojavljuju se u samo 4,7 % tekstova. Dvaput se ističe *ulaganje u mlade* kao obrazovno i preventivno rješenje, dok se ostala rješenja pojavljuju po jedan put: *zakonska zabrana promicanja komunizma* (pravno i institucionalno), *lustracija povijesti i vrednovanje Domovinskog rata i ZDS-a kao antifašističkog* (ideološko-revizionistička), *spuštanje tenzija* (deeskalacijsko) i suprotno — *“da idući put bude milijun ljudi”* (eskalacijsko/mobilizacijsko) te *sloboda govora* (normativno-vrijednosno).

### Proponenti — Tko predlaže rješenja problema povezanih s uporabom pozdrava ZDS, a tko rješenja problema povezanih s njegovom zabranom?

Proponenti se imenuju u 20,67 % analiziranih tekstova, pri čemu se ukupno spominje 28 pojedinaca ili skupina. Kao proponent najčešće se pojavljuju *premijer Andrej Plenković* (pet puta), zatim *pučka pravobraniteljica Tena Šimonović Einwalter* i *predsjednik Republike Zoran Milanović* (po četiri puta), *saborski zastupnik Milorad Pupovac* (tri puta), dok se *predsjednik SDP-a Siniša Hajdaš Dončić* i *Mirela Holy* pojavljuju po dva puta. Svi ostali proponenti pojavljuju se jedanput.



Prikaz 12 Proponenti — distribucija grupa prema broju pojavljivanja

Pridruže li se proponentima njihove društvene uloge, pokazuje se kako su i ovoj kategoriji natpolovičnom većinom zastupljeni domaći političari ili dužnosnici i to mahom pojedinci.

Proponenti povezani s perspektivom dopuštanja uporabe pozdrava znatno su rjeđe zastupljeni. Ta se perspektiva pojavljuje u 6 % tekstova: *premijer Andrej Plenković* spominje se tri puta, *ministar unutarnjih poslova Davor Božinović* dva, dok se *HOS-ov zapovjednik Marko Skejo*, *politički komentator Ivica Granić*, *Ljubo Česić Rojs*, *Trpimir Goluža* te *anonimni Hrvati na društvenim mrežama* pojavljuju po jedan put.

## Antagonisti

Antagonisti ili *folk devils*, odnosno oni koji se u tekstovima pojavljuju kao odgovorni za opće društveno propadanje bez navođenja konkretnog prijestupa, identificirani su u 14 % analiziranih članaka. Takav oblik okrivljavanja znatno je češći iz perspektive zagovornika uporabe pozdrava, pri čemu se nositelji krivnje pojavljuju u 12 % tekstova. U toj grupi imenovano je ukupno 16 pojedinaca ili skupina. Najčešće se, šest puta, spominju *mentalni komunisti i Jugoslaveni*, po tri puta *poražena ljevica*, *komunistički gojenci* te *progonitelji Thompsona*, *mržnja i pustoš duša*, dvaput *Milorad Pupovac* i *"antife"*, a svi ostali samo jedanput.

S druge strane, antagonisti iz perspektive onih koji ne podržavaju uporabu pozdrava pojavljuju se u svega 2 % slučajeva: dvaput je riječ o *rułji*, a jedanput o *crnim tipkovnicama*.

## 7. Etnički motivirano nasilje

Normalizacija govora mržnje i diskriminacija stvaraju plodno tlo za izravno nasilje prema pripadnicima određene ranjive skupine. Ako se neku skupinu unaprijed obilježava kao neprijateljsku, šalje se poruka kako je nasilno djelovanje prema njoj legitimno. Isto se može dogoditi ako se režime koji su činili zločine protiv navedene skupine nastoji legitimirati i ako se nastoji opravdati njihove postupke. U ovom biltenu izdvojili smo neke od primjera nasilja usmjerenog prema Srbima. To smo podijelili u nasilje usmjereno prema imovini, odnosno etnički motivirani vandalizam, i nasilje usmjereno prema osobama, odnosno primjere etnički motivirane interpersonalne agresije.

### /7.1 Etnički motivirani vandalizam i uvredljivi grafiti

I ove su godine antifašistički spomenici i spomenici žrtvama ustaškog režima bili omiljenom metom vandala. U noći 22. veljače spomenik



zagrebačkom partizanskom odredu “Silvestar Pelcl” išaran je fašističkim grafitima. To predstavlja tek jedan u nizu incidenta u kojima je taj spomenik pretrpio vandalizam toga tipa, a u dva ranija navrata ploča s njega bila je ukradena i oštećena.<sup>146</sup>

Nepoznati počinitelji u ožujku su oskvrnuli i Spomen-područje “Dudik” pokraj Vukovara, nacrtavši na njemu sliku stabla s kojeg vise obješeni ljudi, popraćenu natpisom “Serbian Family Tree” (u prijevodu: “srpsko obiteljsko stablo”).

Nakon vikenda 19. i 20. srpnja nepoznati su počinitelji na Trnjanskoj cesti u Zagrebu uništili kamen spoticanja (*Stolpersteine*) postavljen u spomen Ljubomiru Tomiću, žrtvi ustaškoga terora. To je samo jedan u nizu uništenih kamenova spoticanja u hrvatskoj prijestolnici posljednjih godina.<sup>147</sup>

Antifašistički spomenik koji je najviše bio na meti vandala bila je spomen ploča Prvom splitskom partizanskom odredu u parku na Plokita-  
ma u Splitu. Ploča je prvo razbijena,<sup>148</sup> a zatim u dva navrata išarana ustaškim grafitima.<sup>149</sup> Osim tih spomenika, vandalizirani su i spomenici u Spomen-parku Dotrščina u Zagrebu, na koji su nepoznate osobe urezale natpis “NDH” i ustaško ušato “U”, kao i spomenik poginulim borcima kod mjesta Hrboki u Istri, na kojem je napisano “ustaše” i simbol velikog ustaškog “U”.<sup>150 151 152</sup>



/ Vandalizirana spomen ploča Prvom splitskom odredu u Splitu



/ Urezani natpis NDH na spomeniku na Dotrščini kraj Zagreba

Osim uništavanja i grafitiranja antifašističkih spomenika, porastao je i broj uvredljivih grafita koji veličaju NDH i propagiraju mržnju protiv Srba. U ovom biltenu nema dovoljno prostora da se spomene svaki primjer vandalizma putem grafita pa ćemo spomenuti samo nekolicinu ilustrativnih slučajeva. Na ruševinama pravoslavne crkve Svete nedelje u Gornjem Karinu vandali su i ove godine ispisali grafite: “Za dom spremni!”, “Ubij Srbina”, “Ustaše 1991.” uz koje su nacrtali i traktor.<sup>153</sup>

Često je bilo crtanje već spomenutog grafita “Serb(ian) Family Tree”, koji izravno poziva na linčovanje Srba, a varijanta je istovjetnog grafita koji neonacisti u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama (SAD) upotrebljavaju protiv Afroamerikanaca i Latinoamerikanaca, kao i na ovom grafitu snimljenom u Zagrebu. Grafit je popraćen ustaškim simbolima i šovinističkim sloganom “Srbe na vrbe”.



/ Grafiti u zagrebačkom naselju Malešnica

U Glušcima kraj Metkovića grafiti s govorom mržnje nacrtani su tjedan dana prije komemoracije za devedeset mještana toga sela koje su ustaše ubile u Jasenovcu.<sup>154</sup> Riječ je o jedinom selu s većinski srpskim stanovništvom u neretvanskom kraju, što upućuje na pretpostavku da je datum odabran ciljano kako bi se zastrašilo mještane.



/ Poruke mržnje u Glušcima kraj Metkovića



Nedugo nakon nasilnog prekidanja Dana srpske kulture u Splitu, na sportskoj dvorani u četvrti Plokite osvanuli su grafiti kojima se Srbe tjera van iz Hrvatske te se poziva na njihovo ubijanje. Grafiti su popraćeni uobičajenom ustaškom ikonografijom.<sup>155</sup>

U noći s 13. na 14. prosinca, grafiti s porukama mržnje osvanuli su na fasadama i porodičnim kućama Srba u Tenji, Sarvašu i Banovcima u Osječko-baranjskoj županiji. Ovaj je slučaj poseban jer je riječ o području na kojem već dugo nije zabilježen nikakav međuetnički incident. Također, ovo je jedan od rijetkih primjera gdje su se na meti vandala našle porodične kuće Srba. Time je govor mržnje iz javnog prostora prešao izravno u intimni prostor doma.<sup>156</sup>

U Zadru je 5. srpnja zabilježen slučaj oštećivanja automobila skupine turista iz Srbije. Mladi ljudi koji su iz Beograda došli na sportski turnir u Zadru zatekli su četiri svoja osobna automobila s probušenim gumama. Budući da na čitavom parkiralištu niti jedan drugi automobil nije bio oštećen, lako je pretpostaviti da su povod bušenja guma upravo bile srpske registracijske oznake.<sup>157</sup>

## */7.2. Etnički motivirani napadi na osobe*

U ovoj godini zabilježen je velik broj eksplicitnih prijetnji nasiljem usmjerenih prema viđenijim pripadnicima srpske zajednice i institucijama povezanim sa Srbima u Hrvatskoj. Jedna od prvih meta osobito drskog zastrašivanja bila je redakcija tjednika *Novosti* koja se već godinama nalazi na udaru političara desnice, a odnedavno je izvrgnuta i institucionalnim pritiscima. U srijedu, petog veljače, u redakciju *Novo-*

sti stiglo je prijeteće pismo naslovljeno na glavnog urednika. U pismu se nalazio prah nepoznatog sastava za koji je autor pisma tvrdio da je “novičok”, nervni otrov koji se u Rusiji koristio u atentatima na protivničke režima. U pismu je stajalo da je “novičok” *poklon* za “25. godišnjicu četnikovanja u *Novostima*”. O prijjetnji je obavještena policija koja i dalje provodi istragu, a prah su analizirali specijalisti za atomsko-biološko-kemijsku obranu Hrvatske vojske.<sup>158</sup>

Petnaestog srpnja prijjetnju je dobio i mirovni aktivist Zoran Pusić. Zaprimljeno pismo obiluje eksplicitnim uvredama i prijjetnjama Pusiću i njegovoj obitelji, a potpisano je s “Osvetnici Bleiburga” te završava pozdravom “Za dom spremni!”<sup>159</sup> Ubrzo nakon toga, slično intonirano pismo dobio je i predsjednik Srpskog narodnog vijeća, Boris Milošević, a pismo prenosimo u nastavku.

Četnik: BORIS MILOŠEVIĆ

Četničko narodno vijeće (SNV)

Miloševiću, ti si neobrijani četnik, za razliku od obrijanih: Pupo-  
vca, D. Jovića, Višnjica, Tatalovića, Vukobratovića, Uzelca, Jec-  
kovke, Šimprage... Nema razlike između neobrijanih i obrijanih  
četnika kad je u pitanju djelovanje protiv Hrvatske. Ti si sad jedan  
od četničkih vožda u Hrvatskoj, a i u srpskom svetu.

Nedavno ste se okupili u Jadovnom, uz prisustvo par domaćih iz/  
dajnika, da obilježite ubojstva 40.000 Srba u NDH. Možda ne znaš,  
ubijeno ih je 400.000, kao i u Jasenovcu 1.400.000, i još toliko u  
drugim dijelovima NDH.

U svom si govoru lupetao toliko toga, u skladu sa srpskim lažima,  
ističući da su svi ubijeni uz ZA DOM SPREMNI te da se taj pozdrav  
mora zabraniti. Nisi se sjetio zahvaliti hrvatskoj vladi koja vam  
je financirala (s 8400 eura), održavanje tog četničkog, odnosno  
protuhrvatskog skupa.

Četniče, ako ne znaš što je bilo, nama hrvatskim braniteljima  
(1991. — 95.), a naročito HOS-ovcima, ZDS je bio motiv u borbi  
protiv vas četnika. To je bio jedan od odgovora na pjesmu tvom  
rođaku, četniku: Slobodane, šalji nam salate, bit će mesa, klat  
ćemo Hrvate. Ti, očito, nisi čuo za tu, kao i za druge četničke  
pjesme.

Zahvaljujući ZDS-u jebali smo vam mater, počevši s “Bljeskom”  
i završili s “Olujom”, nakon koje je uslijedila poznata četnička

BEŽANIJA. A prije toga ste čvrsto odlučili da ne želite živjeti u ustaškoj Hrvatskoj, nego u velikoj Srbiji.

Četniče Miloševiću, nemoj misliti da ne znamo što i kako radite.

HRVATSKI BRANITELJ

I uz najljepši hrvatski pozdrav:

ZA DOM — SPREMNI

P. S. Sljedeći put nećemo te gađati kriškom limuna, nego nečim tvrdim.”<sup>160</sup>

Prijetnje smrću ispod objave na SDSS-ovim službenim stranicama od 28. listopada primio je i Milorad Pupovac. Pupovcu i hrvatskim Srbima prijetilo se smrću i nasiljem ispod objave u kojoj je podijeljen slobodan govor Milorada Pupovca o negiranju zločina u Jasenovcu. Prijetnje su prijavljene policiji.<sup>161</sup>



Miro Ivanković

Ima li itko ovom četničkom govnetu začepiti smrdljiva usta?

Prijetnje je doživio i predsjednik “Prosvjete” Nikola Vukobratović u anonimnom pismu potpisanom s “Hos-ovac”. Anonimni autor vulgarno vrijeđa Vukobratovića, nazivajući ga “četnikom”, a *Novosti* “četničkim *Novostima*” te ga upozorava da bi bilo “lijepo i preporučljivo da se u Zagrebu kreće u traktoru, ali blindiranom”.

Fizički napadi motivirani mržnjom prema Srbima ili tek usmjereni protiv osoba srpske nacionalnosti najekstremnija su manifestacija politike koja se zasniva na etničkim podjelama. Agresija prema ranjivim skupinama ne mora uvijek biti eksplicitno motivirana etničkom mržnjom i nekad je teško razlučiti je li neki napad na osobu bio etnički motiviran ili je čak samo posljedica toga što su počinitelji smatrali kako organi reda, zbog atmosfere u društvu, neće jednako revno štiti Srbe. Etnički motivirani fizički napadi često se manifestiraju kao produžetak mrzilačkog diskursa koji dolazi iz medija ili s političkih govornica pa možemo reći da se često diskurzivno nasilje prisutno u medijima ili izjavama političara i sistemsko infrastrukturno nasilje prelamaju na tijelima ljudi, čime nacionalizam dobiva svoje najružnije lice.

U galeriji AMZ u Zagrebu 5. ožujka verbalno i fizički napadnuti su novinarka Silva Ćapin i snimatelj Dražen Žerjav s VIDA TV-a. Prilikom snimanja izložbe "Ivan Meštrović i Tomislav Gotovac: Intima javnoga" nepoznat muškarac ušao je i počeo glasno negodovati zbog sadržaja izložbe, tvrdeći da ona "vrijeđa hrvatski moral". Muškarac je zaprijetio okupljenima da će "završiti kao John Lennon", nakon čega je šakom udario Dražena Žerjava u glavu. Napad je prijavljen policiji.

Na plaži Šparadići kod Grabešnice, nedaleko od Šibenika, 26. lipnja napadnuta je skupina mladića koji su se došli kupati. Mladiće su napala dva muškarca, od kojih je jedan zamahivao na njih metalnom šipkom, dok je drugi polijevao vodom njih i njihove stvari, uz prijetnje i tvrdnju da se mladići nalaze na "privatnoj plaži" i vičući im da su četnici koji im "kvare mir". Napadači su se smirili i povukli nakon što su vidjeli da jedan od napadnutih snima čitav incident.<sup>162</sup>

I dok u prethodnim napadima nitko nije bio ozbiljnije ozlijeđen, incident koji se u subotu 28. lipnja dogodio u općini Rakovica kod Plitvica rezultirao je teškim ozljeđivanjem napadnutog turista iz Srbije. Dvojica napadača okomila su se na skupinu turista koji su se zaustavili na parkiralištu ispred *shopping* centra jer su vidjeli da autobus ima srpske registracijske oznake. Mladići su uputili niz uvreda četvorici turista, a jedan od napadača između ostaloga je doviknuo: "Što ćete vi ovdje? Moj did' se borio protiv vas!". Zatim je udario jednog od turista, 48-godišnjaka, šakom u glavu i srušio ga na tlo, pri čemu je žrtva zadobila teške tjelesne ozljede u vidu frakture kostiju lubanje.<sup>163</sup>

Srpski turist napadnut je i 11. listopada u Fažani. Trojica počinitelja prišla su 34-godišnjem državljaninu Srbije i uz uvrede i prijetnje strgnula su mu majicu s leđa.<sup>164</sup>

Fizički napad, čini se, za dlaku su izbjegli karatisti iz Srbije na prvenstvu Balkana u karateu u Rijeci. Naime, 8. studenog, u vrijeme kad su skupine navijača nasilno prekidale manifestacije na Danima srpske kulture, ispred sportske dvorane Zamet primijećena je skupina maskiranih osoba kako čeka kraj autobusa tima iz Srbije.<sup>165</sup> Organizatori su pozvali policiju, koja je legitimirala okupljene osobe, ustanovivši da je riječ o maloljetnim licima. Predsjednik Hrvatskog karate saveza, Davor Cipek, u ime organizatora ispričao se Karate savezu Srbije.<sup>166</sup> Nitko od počinitelja nije priveden, nego su, kao maloljetnici, prijavljeni službi socijalne skrbi.<sup>167</sup>

Dvojica mladića napala su dvojicu državljana Srbije 5. prosinca, nakon što su u kafiću čula da razgovaraju na ekavici. Žrtvama su razbili prozor na kombiju i pokušali su ih izvući iz vozila. Počinitelji su identificirani

i privedeni, a protiv njih podnesena je kaznena prijava za nasilničko ponašanje i oštećenje tuđe imovine u vezi sa zločinom iz mržnje.<sup>168</sup>

U znak prosvjeda protiv nasilne atmosfere u društvu i jačanja desnog ekstremizma na koje vlast, nažalost, nije adekvatno reagirala, 30. studenog u Zagrebu, Puli, Rijeci i Zadru održan je protestni marš pod nazivom "Ujedinjeni protiv fašizma". Marševe u Rijeci i Zadru napale su nasilne skupine u crno obučenih mladića, maskiranih kapuljačama. Uz već rutinsko uzvikivanje ustaškoga pozdrava, u Rijeci je barem tridesetoro okupljenih bacalo pirotehnička sredstva na prosvjednike prije i nakon marša, ozlijedivši jedno dijete i jednu odraslu osobu. Od cijele skupine uhićeno je samo njih devetoro koji se terete zbog prekršaja javnog reda i mira.<sup>169</sup>

U Zadru je skupina huligana pokušala napasti prosvjednike i sukobila se s interventnom policijom koja je morala primijeniti nadražujuća sredstva, a na početku marša prosvjednike su maskirani ljudi gađali balonima napunjenima crvenom bojom. Najtužnije od svega opet su bile izjave pojedinih organizacija i političara koji su svojim izjavama u većoj mjeri napadali sudionike nenasilnog antifašističkog marša nego huligane koji su ih nasilno napali. Braniteljska udruga HVIDRA tako je osudila prosvjede i pozvala na sigurnosno-obavještajni progon sudionika. Vladu i nadležna državna tijela pozvali su da se očituju po pitanju toga postoje li elementi kaznenih djela veličanja simbola bivše totalitarne komunističko-fašističke države, kršenja odredaba Ustava RH koji zabranjuje obnavljanje ikakvog jugoslavenskog državnog zajedništva te kršenja Rezolucije Europskog parlamenta. Također, s obzirom na učestalost tih aktivnosti koje pretpostavljaju djelovanje organiziranih skupina, traže da Sigurnosno-obavještajna agencija (SOA) u skladu sa zakonskim ovlastima prikupi i analizira sve podatke u svrhu zaštite nacionalne sigurnosti, ustavnopravnog poretka, interesa i dobrobiti hrvatskih građana.

Pritom su naročito upozorili na aktivnosti srpske manjinske zajednice "pod krinkom kulturnih zbivanja koje su svojim sadržajem i promocijom autora memoranduma SANU bile aktivno usmjerene na provokaciju hrvatskih građana u tužnom mjesecu obilježavanja Dana sjećanja na žrtve Domovinskog rata i Dana sjećanja na žrtvu Vukovara i Škabrnje". "Možemo slobodno reći da je velikosrpska ideologija metastazirala u svim smjerovima u srpskoj zajednici u Hrvatskoj."<sup>170</sup>

Prosvjednike je napao i nekadašnji gradonačelnik Splita i saborski zastupnik Andro Krstulović Opara. Koristeći izrazito dehumanizirajući diskurs, prosvjednike je nazvao "škovacama" i "gamadi".<sup>171</sup> Osuda prosvjeda i govor mržnje stigli su i iz najviših krugova Vlade Republike

Hrvatske. Komentirajući prosvjede, ministar obrane i potpredsjednik Vlade Ivan Anušić za prosvjed je rekao da je “protiv Hrvatske, možda i projugoslavenski”<sup>172</sup> te je osobito stigmatizirao uporabu ćirilice na jednom od transparenta, istaknuvši uporabu ćirilice kao jednim od dokaza da je prosvjed navodno bio “antihrvatski.”<sup>173</sup>

## Zaključak

Jedan od zaključaka koji se može izvući iz ovogodišnje analize jest taj da je dio ikonografije povezane sa fašističkim ustaškim pokretom počeo sve više ulaziti u politički *mainstream*. Najbolji primjer za to učestalost je korištenja ustaškog pozdrava “Za dom spremni!”. Usprkos zaključcima Vijeća za suočavanje s prošlošću iz 2016., koji su uveli izraz “dvostruka konotacija” u javni diskurs, pozdrav se sve češće počeo koristiti u kontekstima koji nemaju veze s komemoracijama HOS-a. Također, dok su se ranije članovi Vlade ograđivali, pa čak i osuđivali navedeni pozdrav, kao u primjeru prošlogodišnje reakcije premijera Andreja Plenkovića na ustaški pozdrav dubrovačkog gradonačelnika Mate Frankovića, ove godine osude — kad ih je i bilo — nisu bile tako oštre te su se u pravilu pojavljivale paralelno s kritiziranjem ljevičarske oporbe. Dapače, ministar obrane i zamjenik predsjednika Vlade, Ivan Anušić priznao je kako je na Thompsonovom koncertu pozdravio tim pozdravom. To pokazuje kako postoji pokušaj da se neki aspekti ustaškog režima uvedu u javni prostor, da se njihova zločinačka prošlost revidira, a da se njima pridaje novo značenje. Nažalost, nužna posljedica toga stavljanje je hrvatskog patriotizma u kontinuitet s ustaškim režimom, čiji zločini su se relativizirali i u Saboru.

Govor mržnje korišten protiv srpskih medija, organizacija i pojedinaca dolazio je prvenstveno od političara i desničarskih medija. Za razliku od 2024., kad je isti pratio dinamiku predizbornih zbivanja, ovdje se antisrpska retorika koristila gotovo rutinski, s jasnom namjerom da je se uvede u politički *mainstream*. U trenucima kad je nasilnu retoriku zamijenilo fizičko nasilje, predstavnici institucija vlasti osuđivali su nasilje, ali su te osude često dolazile i uz osudu druge strane koju bi krivili za provokacije i antihrvatsko djelovanje, posežući za tipičnim modelima okrivljavanja žrtve (*victim blaming*). Porast nasilnih djela protiv imovine i osoba, sve otvoreniji obračuni s antifašističkim nasljeđem, kao i klevetnički napadi na javno eksponirane intelektualce iz krugova srpske zajednice pokazuju kako se etničko nasilje u našem društvu počinje sve više tolerirati. U dobroj mjeri to možemo gledati i kao odraz sve jačih političkih podjela u svijetu, kao i jačanja desnih tendencija. Uistinu, napadi na Srbe najčešće idu paralelno i sa seksizmom, homofobijom, transfobijom, ksenofobnim napadima na strane radnike i Rome te svim ostalim manifestacijama sve prisutnijeg i, nažalost, sve normaliziranijeg političkog nasilja.

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IMPRESSUM

Bulletin #29: Historical Revisionism, Hate Speech, Discrimination,  
and Violence Against Serbs in 2025

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Zagreb, March 2026

**SNV  
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srpsko  
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vijeće

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вијеће

serb  
national  
council

*SNV Bulletin #29*

*Historical Revisionism,  
Hate Speech,  
Discrimination,  
and Violence Against  
Serbs in 2025*



## Introduction

Since 2013, the Serb National Council (SNV) has been publishing an annual publication entitled “Historical Revisionism, Hate Speech, and Violence against Serbs,” which monitors cases of anti-Serb rhetoric, public hate speech directed against Serbs, historical negationism and revisionism, as well as violent acts committed against persons and property belonging to members of the Serb community in Croatia or people presumed to belong to that community. This bulletin is primarily a political report whose purpose is to provide a minority perspective on day-to-day political events in the previous year, and it is based on a database compiled from media reports, reports by civil society organisations and the legal service of the Serb National Council. The bulletin does not constitute a legal document, and the fact that a particular act is highlighted in this bulletin as hate speech does not imply its legal qualification as such. Although methods of scientific discourse analysis and frame analysis were used in the preparation of the bulletin and the presentation of information, it likewise does not represent a scientific analysis of public discourse in Croatia in the previous year. Its primary purpose is to inform the domestic and international public about certain problematic phenomena in Croatian society. The examples in this bulletin were drawn from a database of more than 1,500 documented newspaper articles and reports, while the frame analysis of hate speech was produced on the basis of a separate database of 2,000 articles from online portals. The bulletin is thematically organised around several key events that attracted media and public attention and that are illustrative of the current social climate. Below are some concise conclusions based on the database and the cited examples:

- /1 Twenty-two cases of threats and ethnically motivated physical violence were recorded. This represents a significant increase compared to the previous year, when 11 people were subjected to physical violence or threats. The number of individuals who were victims of physical violence and threats is higher than the number of cases, since violence was often directed at groups of people and minority organisations as a whole. Political representatives of the Serb national minority received death threats, and in three cases journalists from minority media outlets were attacked.
- /2 Fifty-one cases of vandalism were recorded, which is twelve more than last year. Most cases involved offensive graffiti, and one case of de-

struction of property was also recorded, while in 20 cases monuments dedicated to the antifascist struggle and to victims of genocide in the Second World War were vandalised. It should be noted that some monuments were vandalised repeatedly in succession.

- /3 Hate speech this year was particularly linked to the rehabilitation of the fascist regime of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), the salute “For Homeland — Ready!” (ZDS) and other symbols and figures of that criminal regime. Numerous efforts were undertaken aimed at denying Ustasha crimes and the fascist nature of the Ustasha regime.
- /4 Cultural events that were often labelled as “anti-Croatian” were subjected to organised attacks, culminating in attacks during the Days of Serbian Culture in November. Through threats and violence, attackers sought to prevent the holding of cultural events. In addition, individual cultural workers, writers, and authors were frequently targeted.
- /5 In parallel with attacks on the Serb national minority, the antifascist heritage in Croatia was exposed to fierce attacks and contestation. These attacks manifested themselves in labelling antifascists as “terrorists” and in denying the antifascist character of the National Liberation Struggle (NOB).
- /6 The perpetrators of attacks were often members of football supporter groups and people presenting themselves as representatives of veterans of the Homeland War. Regrettably, politicians from right-wing political parties often supported the aforementioned incidents and characterised them as legitimate expressions of popular dissatisfaction with the allegedly privileged position of the Serb national minority. At the same time, the number of calls for institutional discrimination against the Serb national minority increased, and individuals accused Serbs of “provocation” or “taunting,” thereby justifying and downplaying violence against them. This trend shows that anti-Serb rhetoric has become a normalised part of the political programmes of right-wing and conservative parties. The same applies to the denial of the antifascist heritage of the Second World War and of the antifascist foundations of Croatian statehood named in the Constitution.
- /7 Hate speech was not directed exclusively at the Serb national minority; an increased number of violent incidents and instances of hate speech were also recorded against civil society activists, left-leaning politicians, foreign workers, Roma, women, and members of the LGBTQIAP+ population. This demonstrates that nationalist rhetoric is not aimed solely at members of the targeted ethnic group but extends to many other vulnerable populations and excludes and stigmatises anyone who

does not fit into the dominant ethnocentric and patriarchal ideological framework.

- /8 An increase in the number and intensity of instances of hate speech and ethnic violence was recorded following concerts by Marko Perković Thompson in Zagreb and Sinj, as well as in August and November, the months in which Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and the Remembrance Day for the Victims of the Homeland War and for the Victims of Vukovar and Škabrnja are commemorated.
- /9 The conducted analysis of reporting on the salute “For Homeland — Ready!” (ZDS) on Croatian online portals shows that the central event associated with the sudden rise in media interest was the concert by singer Marko Perković Thompson held on 5 July in Zagreb. This event is profiled as a key point after which ZDS is more frequently affirmed in the public space, with the media continuously following reactions and subsequent instances of its use. Although arguments concerning the use or prohibition of the salute often develop through the transmission of statements by organisations or individuals, debates in the Croatian Parliament stand out as the key arena of tension. The distribution of individuals and groups involved in debates on tolerating the use of ZDS, as well as the solutions proposed in those debates, points to the central role of political actors and formal institutions in shaping the media discourse on ZDS. In this context, responses to identified risks and incidents are faster and more visible than systematic work on prevention. Although negative attitudes towards ZDS, supported by more thoroughly developed arguments, are more prevalent in the media space during the first three quarters of the year, the analysis points to an important underlying problem: the salute “For Homeland — Ready!” is not a marginal phenomenon that is unequivocally condemned by the broader public as hate speech and as the rehabilitation of symbols of a fascist regime, but is increasingly presented as a legitimate subject of political debate.

## *Hate speech and historical negationism*

The judgment handed down by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) against Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza for incitement to genocide states that international standards which punish and restrict hate speech were developed in order to suppress the danger and harm arising from various forms of communication that incite prejudice. In the same judgment, the first in which an international tribunal convicted perpetrators for committing crimes against humanity through the mass media, the Trial Chamber emphasised that, alongside the protection of freedom of expression and political views, it is necessary to pay careful attention to any ethnically marked speech in the public space in order to ensure that it does not endanger minority groups in society. The judges of the Tribunal defined hate speech as “a discriminatory form of aggression that destroys the dignity of the targeted group. Hate speech does not only produce a sense of lesser social value among members of the targeted group, but also among others, who may begin to perceive and treat them in an inhumane manner. Dehumanising people on the basis of their ethnic identity or membership of another group can thus result in irreparable harm.” This judicial definition of hate speech was also followed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in its 2022 recommendation, in which hate speech is defined as “the incitement, promotion, dissemination, or justification of violence, hatred, or discrimination against a person or a group of persons, or the denigration of persons on the basis of their real or attributed personal characteristics or status such as ‘race’, colour, language, religion, nationality, national or ethnic origin, age, disability, sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation”. Among recent academic definitions, we highlight the simple definition by Martins, Gomes and others, who state that hate speech is “any emotional expression that conveys subjective attitudes to an audience with the intention of discriminating against a group. It may be expressed in various ways: in writing, non-verbally, visually, or artistically, and disseminated through any medium, including the internet, print, radio, or television”.

These formulations have been confirmed by numerous studies in the fields of anthropology, communication studies, sociology, and political science, which have clearly indicated the existence of causal links between hate speech and visible forms of violence. In recent times, particular attention has been paid to stochastic violence, a form of political violence prompted by hostile public rhetoric directed against

a vulnerable social group. Stochastic violence requires the presence of three elements, the first of which is incendiary speech, often formulated in black-and-white terms that present one side as the victim and the other as the aggressor, and that contains a “mirror accusation” whereby hatred towards a vulnerable group is attributed to that very group by those who present themselves as defenders of the dominant group. Minorities are thus accused of hating or seeking to destroy a traditional way of life, destabilising society, or in various ways “subjugating” the dominant community. Such speech often does not need to be explicit but is frequently indirect or even coded (in English-language literature this form of communication is known as dog whistling). The second element is the speaker themselves, who uses his or her media exposure to place such speech into the public sphere, and the third is the perpetrator themselves, who resorts to threats or acts of direct violence, prompted or encouraged by the speaker’s use of incendiary discourse. The fact that there is no clear connection between the speaker and the direct perpetrator allows the speaker to disclaim responsibility for the act of violence itself. In this way, perpetrators of hate speech, particularly those from the political, media, and cultural spheres, can continue to invoke freedom of expression and deny the harmful consequences of their actions, from which they often derive political and financial benefit.

## */1 Statements by Politicians and Institutional Discrimination*

The analysis of hate speech by the authors of this and previous bulletins of the Serb National Council over the past several years has shown that political processes are in fact the primary source of the incitement and escalation of interethnic tensions in Croatia. In this publication, political hate speech is divided into speech acts of discrimination, that is, hate speech for which politicians used the platform provided by their position in society as well as the social capital and access to mass media that derive from it, and concrete acts that resulted in the institutional discrimination of Serbs in Croatia.

### */1.1. Public Statements by Politicians*

Following last year’s parliamentary elections, the far-right party Homeland Movement (Domovinski pokret), which had emphasised its anti-Serb and anti-immigrant positions during the election campaign, became part of the governing coalition. One of the consequences of this development in the political situation was, unfortunately, the growing normalisation of exclusionary and discriminatory speech in political discourse. This year as well, some MPs used the Croatian

Parliament as a platform for attacks on the Serb national minority and its political representatives. Some of these attacks went beyond the bounds of usual political confrontation, as they were based on ethnic stereotypes and presented to the public an image of Croatian Serbs as a threat to the constitutional order. Some examples were not even part of a concrete debate on the rights and position of minorities but instead made use of the mechanism of MPs' free speeches. During the morning session in the Croatian Parliament on 15 January, MP of the far-right Homeland Movement Stipo Mlinarić Čipe used this mechanism at his disposal to make serious and unfounded accusations against Dragana Jeckov, an MP from the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS), claiming that she had known about the crime in Negoslavci. At the same time, his party colleague Ivica Kukavica, stated in passing that he was bothered by the use of the word "hiljada" in Parliament for "thousand" (instead of the standard Croatian form "tisuća"). Milorad Pupovac described this as "a trigger for hatred and intolerance and proof that extremist parties exist here". Through such statements, an attempt was made — in a particularly unscrupulous manner — to discredit MPs of the Serb national minority by associating them with war crimes and, from nationalist positions, to condemn the use of certain words that are used in both the Croatian and Serbian languages, thereby in effect subjecting the public sphere to a policy of linguistic purity and stigmatising the ethnic and linguistic identity of individual MPs. The implication of this is, of course, a desire to remove from the public and political space all statements and content that can be deemed "insufficiently Croatian".<sup>1</sup>

Stipo Mlinarić Čipe continued in the same vein during the debate on the resignation of his party colleague Josip Dabro from the post of Minister of Agriculture, after a video leaked to the public showing the latter firing a pistol into the air through a car window. First, he published a post on his Facebook profile in which he accused Serbs of stockpiling weapons in villages: "Croats do not need an outside enemy. We are perfectly capable of doing that ourselves. Here we are again. When a Croat commits even the smallest offence, we immediately jump at him. Crucify him, string him up, lynch him! But what about those who have been rampaging, threatening, and shooting for years as if the war had ended only yesterday? We leave them alone," Mlinarić wrote. "Will I live to see the day when someone from the media dares to publicly ask — what do Serbs in those villages need automatic weapons for? Where do they get them from? How many pieces do they have? It is not hard to guess. Once they had five times more weapons than Croats, and today that ratio is certainly even worse. Bolt-action rifles have been replaced by machine guns, and there is hardly a house without an arsenal. And then what? Nothing. Silence. For years, bursts of automatic gunfire

have echoed through Serbian villages — for weddings, Christmas, Orthodox Easter. In front of churches, in the streets, publicly, in front of cameras! And nobody cares. The laws, it seems, do not apply to them. But when a Croat fires a shot from a pistol outside a populated area — that is immediately seen as an attack on national security. The hypocrisy is obvious. A Croat with a pistol — a threat. Armed Chetniks — a taboo subject. As if the goal were for Croats to be helpless, for us to always be ready for a new massacre. We are harming ourselves. We are trampling on ourselves. We do not need an external enemy — we are perfectly capable of doing that ourselves. How long will we remain silent? How long will we watch this injustice and turn our heads away? It is time for questions, answers and justice — for everyone. I expect this Government of mine to make a turnaround in this area.”<sup>2</sup>

With this statement, Mlinarić justified the illegal and dangerous actions of his party colleague through a mirror message in which the same offence is attributed, without any evidence, to Serbs in Croatia, additionally implying that they are violent and “rampage, threaten, and shoot”, and calling them “armed Chetniks,” which directly marks them as enemies of Croats and a danger to society, and implies that Serbs are preparing a “new massacre” of Croats. Instead of condemning the potential endangerment of human lives caused by former minister Dabro’s irresponsible and dangerous behaviour, Mlinarić Čipe chose to use one of the biggest scandals faced by this Government to incite hostility against Serbs.

Later, Josip Dabro defended his actions with a similar statement, responding to MP Dragana Jeckov by saying, in paraphrase, that he might shoot in fields, but that he does not shoot in the centre of the village at every wedding like her fellow villagers, adding that Dragana Jeckov’s fellow villagers were “amnestied people who took up arms against Croatia”. He was referring to the residents of the village of Negoslavci, where the majority of the population are Serbs. In doing so, Dabro linked an entire Serb community with an armed rebellion, further perpetuating the image of them as armed and dangerous individuals. Of course, unlike Dabro’s shooting in fields and on roads, the alleged arming and shooting by Serbs from Negoslavci has not been confirmed or proven.<sup>3</sup>

The local elections held in May last year provided individuals with an additional pretext for targeting the Serb national minority in a negative context. After the elections in Vukovar, in which Domagoj Bilić, the candidate of the Homeland Movement, was heavily defeated by the candidate of the Croatian Sovereignists (Hrvatski suverenist), Marijan Pavliček, Stipo Mlinarić Čipe held a press conference at which he said

that he had evidence that Pavliček had won the election with the help of Serbs and that he was “Dragana Jeckov’s little puppet”. At the same conference, he also boasted that his party had “kicked the SDSS out of the Government” and passed a law on the removal of “Chetnik monuments”. Disqualifying political opponents because “Serbs supposedly vote for them”<sup>4</sup> and highlighting the absence of representatives of the Serb national minority from power as a political achievement to be proud of was a continuous rhetorical pattern of Homeland Movement MPs, thereby turning the exclusion of Serbs from political life in Croatia into a political programme on which they consistently work.

It is therefore not surprising that other actors on the political scene also began to adopt this rhetoric — suddenly, being “against Serbs,” and especially against the participation of Serbs in politics, became a desirable political position on the right and centre-right, and messages that ethnicise and Croatise the political space, purging it of the “Serb threat,” were fully legitimised, so that individuals from political options within which such statements would until recently have been unthinkable began to use them as well. The Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) candidate in the elections, Kruno Raguž, dissatisfied with the result, thus poured out a series of insults and homophobic statements in a Facebook post, some of which also targeted Vukovar Serbs. Among other things, he derogatorily referred to Vukovar Serbs as “Srbadija,” called the president of the local SDSS branch, Srđan Kolar, a “fat Serbian yokel” and a “ćak” (a reference to the derogatory term “ćaci” used by protesters in Serbia for supporters of President Aleksandar Vučić), and said that Serbs were “bought off,” which was why they allegedly did not support him in the elections.<sup>5</sup> Even more worrying is the fact that Raguž wrote this post from the profile of the official SDP Vukovar page. He later published the same post in an amended form without the aforementioned insults on national grounds.

There was also hate speech during the campaign for the elections in Split, albeit not from candidates themselves, but from individuals promoting certain candidates. Diana Mataković, a biology teacher at the “Vladimir Nazor” Fifth Grammar School in Split, used social media to urge the parents of her current pupils, as well as her now adult former pupils, to vote in the second round of the elections for the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) candidate Tomislav Šuta. After being warned that parent-teacher communication groups should not be used for political agitation, she demonstratively left the group, saying that she “does not like Serbs and Yugoslavs”. After the messages appeared in the media, Tomislav Šuta and the high school distanced themselves from Diana Mataković and her actions.<sup>6</sup>

One of the accusations frequently promoted by the right wing of the political scene was a conspiracy theory about Serbs in Croatia and their organisations as instruments for spreading the so-called “Serbian world”. This conspiracy theory was primarily linked to the opening of Serbian cultural centres, which are otherwise conceived as places of community and cultural exchange. In the conspiratorial ideas of part of the right-wing political spectrum, a narrative has been maintained for a year portraying them as “spy centres” preparing some kind of invasion of Croatia. This thesis was reiterated in speeches and public appearances, among others, by the independent MP and historian Josip Jurčević. For example, in a free-topic speech in the Croatian Parliament on 14 March, Jurčević said that Serbian cultural centres are “hostile, identity fortresses that will destabilise security in Croatia and serve as strongholds if there is a security or military destabilisation,” and that they are “led by occupying authorities who, in connection with the Erdut Agreement, relocated their structure to Croatia, with very clear objectives”. Jurčević also announced that it is “increasingly likely that there will be security, even armed destabilisation in Croatia’s surroundings”.<sup>7</sup> Some right-wing portals reported Jurčević’s speech, which in effect attacked the right of the Serb minority to nurture its own culture and criticised the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia and the Croatian Danube region, as well as the Erdut Agreement, whose implementation was guaranteed by the international community. The Erdut Agreement and the very idea of reconciliation were also attacked by Homeland Movement MP Predrag Mišić. On 20 November, he responded to SDSS MP Anja Šimpraga on Facebook, calling the Erdut Agreement a “deranged, corrupt idea”.<sup>8</sup>

Mišić also stoked fear of Serbian cultural centres ahead of the local elections in Slavonski Brod. At a press conference on 25 April, Predrag Mišić, Nikola Barišić, and Ivan Stipić condemned the support of the independent mayor of Slavonski Brod, Mirko Duspara, for the work of the Serbian Cultural Centre “Branko Radičević”. For Barišić, the activities of the said cultural centre were problematic, while Ivan Stipić openly accused the mayor of supporting the “Greater Serbian project of Svetosavlje,” the ideology of Saint Sava. Mišić, for his part, said that “today centres are being opened that glorify an ideology because of which children died”, soon afterwards implying that the opening of a Serbian cultural centre represents a kind of danger to Croatia: “For whom are Serbian cultural centres being built? Is this a continuation of some past, dark times? Serbian Orthodox centres are springing up like mushrooms all over Croatia. I fear we will pay for this in the times ahead”.<sup>9</sup>

Through such statements, the life, political and cultural activity of Serbs in Croatia is openly singled out as a potential threat to public security,

thereby unequivocally legitimising any form of institutional and extra-institutional repression and attacks against them.

The party We Can! (Možemo!) was also accused of implementing “Greater Serbian policy”. Homeland Movement MP Ivica Kukavica, following a statement by Zagreb Mayor Tomislav Tomašević that there would no longer be concerts in Zagreb like Thompson’s, said that equating the symbols of Croatian Defence Forces (HOS) units with Ustasha ideology was “Greater Serbian policy”. This opened the way to a topic that will be discussed later in this bulletin, namely the equating of any condemnation of symbols and salutes originating from the fascist Independent State of Croatia (NDH) with Greater Serbianism, with the very term “Greater Serbian” becoming, in effect, a legitimate way for right-wing politicians to discredit their opponents. In this way, conspiratorial discourse about an alleged re-establishment of a “Greater Serbia” was expanded beyond the direct targeting of Serbian political organisations and became a means of defaming any policy that advocates different views on the wars of the 1990s.<sup>10</sup>

In addition to political parties and cultural centres, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) was also accused of spreading the so-called Greater Serbian idea. During a reception organised in Dicmo by the association Croatian Orthodox Centre, Predrag Mišić expressed his intention to re-establish the Croatian Orthodox Church, a religious organisation formed by the Ustasha authorities during the Independent State of Croatia, stating that the Serbian Orthodox Church is a “parapolitical organisation that implements Greater Serbian policy”.<sup>11</sup>

### */1.2. Reduction of Funding for Novosti*

One of the frequently highlighted programme principles of right-wing parties such as the Homeland Movement and Bridge (MOST) during the previous year was the abolition or reduction of funding for *Novosti*, the weekly newspaper of the Serb national minority. Consequently, the adoption of the Proposal of Decisions on the Allocation of Funds for Cultural Autonomy Programmes by the Council for National Minorities on 24 April 2025 resonated strongly with the public, as *Novosti* was allocated EUR 200,000 less than in the previous year, reducing the paper’s funding by 35%. The President of the Council for National Minorities, Tibor Varga, denied that this was a political decision, but nevertheless asserted that “the Council has a mandate to finance only programmes related to cultural autonomy,” thereby implying that *Novosti*’s funding was reduced because the weekly features articles about political topics. The criterion for distinguishing cultural topics from political ones remained unclear, and Varga refused to explain what had changed in

the editorial policy of the weekly *Novosti* over the past year that would justify such a drastic reduction in funding. The MP of the Italian national minority, Furio Radin, described the reduction of funding for *Novosti* as a political act, while the MP of the Serb national minority, Milorad Pupovac, said the following: “You will probably very soon hear a political party say that its goals have been fulfilled after the Council decided to reduce funding for the independent Serbian weekly by more than thirty per cent. That should be enough for you.”<sup>12</sup>

He was alluding to the goals proclaimed by the Homeland Movement during the 2024 campaign. These allusions were soon confirmed by Stipo Mlinarić Čipe in an appearance on the N1 Television, where he said that his party had insisted in negotiations with the HDZ on reducing funding for the weekly *Novosti* and that this had been their condition for cooperation with the HDZ.<sup>13</sup> With this statement, Mlinarić explicitly admitted that demands for institutional discrimination against the Serb national minority had been the subject of coalition negotiations between the Homeland Movement and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), but even more worrying is that he thereby admitted that the law had been directly violated and that members of the Council for National Minorities, who guarantee their impartiality under material and criminal liability, had been exposed to political pressure.<sup>14</sup> Čipe’s statements were indirectly confirmed by former Homeland Movement MP Igor Peternel, who has since joined the party Homeland and National Gathering (DOMINO). On the topic of the reduction of budgetary funds for *Novosti*, Peternel held a press conference in the Croatian Parliament at which he said that the Homeland Movement’s programme had included the abolition of budgetary funding for *Novosti*, which for him does not constitute an attack on minority media, but rather represents justified criticism of an editorial policy that does not meet the legal and professional standards of a minority publication. However, he stressed that he does not consider the reduction of funding a success, as the financing of the weekly *Novosti* should be abolished entirely. Peternel’s statement is particularly concerning because it justifies the cessation of funding on unnamed and undefined legal and professional criteria and implies that representatives of the majority ethnic group should have the right to prescribe criteria for the editorial policies of minority media, which would seriously restrict the cultural autonomy of minorities. It also appears that Peternel would apply these strict professional criteria only to minority media, and not to other media to a greater or lesser extent funded by taxpayers’ money. In addition, the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities contains no provisions prescribing media content or excluding the support of writing on political and social topics. What is clearly problematic for Mlinarić and Peternel is the manner of writing about these topics that departs

from an ethno-nationalist matrix, which was in a way confirmed by Peternel himself when he labelled it a “continuation of the *Feral Tribune* discourse”.<sup>15</sup>

The Minister of Culture, Nina Obuljen Koržinek, denied claims that the reduction of funding for *Novosti* was motivated by political pressure, emphasising that the decision was based exclusively on the criteria of the Council, and adding that she sees the motive for the reduction in the fact that *Novosti* does not address only Serbs but also a “broader audience”.<sup>16</sup>

The reduction of funding for the weekly *Novosti* was also met with a reaction from the Croatian Journalists' Association (HND), the umbrella professional association of journalists in Croatia. The President of the HND, Hrvoje Zovko, said that this represented “a blow to the already fragile freedom of the media in the country,” highlighting the following at a press conference: “Squadrons of historical revisionism and censorship are advancing from all sides. This is an attack not only on one editorial office, but on the entire journalistic community and on those who think differently. If we do not raise our voices and oppose this, they will knock on other doors as well.” He described as scandalous the explanation given by the President of the Council for National Minorities, Tibor Varga, that political content cannot be financed and that only programmes of cultural autonomy may be supported, as meeting such conditions would mean “agreeing to ghettoisation”. The decision was commented on in a similar manner by the editor of *Novosti*, Andrea Radan, who pointed out that the editorial policy of the weekly has not changed at all since the previous year, but that what had changed was “the fact that a demand arrived from the Homeland Movement for *Novosti* to be deprived of funding, and the funding was deprived”.<sup>17</sup>

Statements by politicians confirming that political pressure was decisive in the cessation of funding for *Novosti* were also confirmed for the portal *direktno.hr* by journalist Gordan Malić, who clearly stated that, in his view, the cause of the reduction in funding lay in the specific ideological position of *Novosti*. Malić said: “When reading the weekly it is more than obvious that it is a Serbian-Yugoslav-communist concept, since representatives of Serbs in Croatia do not wish to renounce the legacies of the community in which they were at least a constituent people. Their choice could have been civic-liberal or moderately socialist, but they chose this... Personally, I have nothing against them continuing to promote these ideas on the market, but they obviously consider these issues inseparable: minority and ideological.”

Malić, like Peternel, considers the funding of minority media to be linked to prescribing what the ideological framework should be through which certain media comment on day-to-day political events, and he chose the ideologically charged label “Serbian-Yugoslav-communist” to describe the concept of *Novosti*, thereby effectively equating the Serbian perspective with, for the right, undesirable ideological notions of Yugoslavism and communism. Furthermore, in an example of “mirror discourse,” Malić reversed the thesis and accused Serbs of discriminating against other national minorities. “That attitude among some political Serbs that they ‘deserve more,’ which is in itself discriminatory towards others, produced a lot of trauma in the past. Now it turns out that the state is taking money away from them, even though it gives it to them, and that rights are being denied to them which others do not have either, because this is not about a right but about racketeering. If *Novosti* is so important to the Serbian community in Croatia, let them rent out some of the properties with which this Government rewarded them to a retail company such as Pevex and the matter is resolved. Politically and accounting-wise.”<sup>18</sup>

Malić describes the positions of Serbian representatives and journalistic associations, who are calling for the funding of their weekly to be governed by the same legal criteria that apply to all minority media, as “discriminatory” and as “racketeering”. In addition, he refers to the return of confiscated property to Serbian organisations as a “reward” rather than a legal right, and labels criticism of the decision as “provoking trauma,” which again alludes to war trauma and places the articulation of demands by the Serb national minority in the context of a traumatic past.


### /1.3. Other Forms of Discrimination

The reduction of funding for the weekly *Novosti* was not the only example or attempt at discrimination to which Serbs were exposed last year. Certain state institutions, private companies, and local self-government bodies took steps and made decisions that relate in a problematic way to members of the Serb national minority, their history, culture and political activity. These decisions, unlike the more media-visible cases of ethnically motivated violence, were most often not covered by the media, yet they nonetheless reveal that in Croatia some institutions treat, or seek to treat, Serbs differently from other national minorities or from members of the majority population.

In February this year, the former Deputy Mayor of Vukovar from the ranks of the Serb national minority, Srđan Milanković, and the Deputy Mayor, Srđan Kolar, pointed out that Vukovar Serbs have difficulty ob-


taining employment in the city administration and that they are under-represented in city offices and services in relation to their share of the population, which violates the provisions of the Constitutional Act on proportionality. Namely, only 16% of Serbs are employed by the City of Vukovar, which is far less than the 29.73% who, as specified by the Constitutional Act, should be employed in positions within the City.<sup>19</sup> In addition, none of the heads of city departments are of Serbian nationality, which is striking in a city where Serbs make up almost a third of the population. According to a statement by Srđan Kolar for the portal *Srbi.hr*, it has also happened that certain competitions were annulled if a job was awarded to someone deemed “unsuitable.”<sup>20</sup> The now former Mayor of Vukovar, Ivan Penava, denied that this constituted systematic discrimination, stating that all employment procedures are conducted in accordance with the law.

The example of the termination of the contract of the goalkeeper of the club *HNK Vukovar 1991* shows how discrimination against Serbs affects the lives of individuals who themselves are not politically active, but who are nevertheless caught up in the nationalist political climate. The club annulled the young goalkeeper’s contract after a post appeared in a Dinamo supporters’ Facebook group entitled “Dinamo, the Biggest Croatian Club,” in which his playing for the club was questioned because he “follows the fan pages of Zvezda and Partizan,” two Serbian clubs, and because on Instagram he followed an account under the name “*četnici\_1941*,” apparently dedicated to Chetniks.<sup>21</sup> The football club Vukovar 1991 soon reacted with its own statement apologising “to all supporters, partners, and the public for not taking all the necessary steps in time in this case to protect the dignity and reputation of the club”. They informed the public that the contract with Nedić had been terminated. The timing of the statement and the manner in which the club informed fans and followers about the termination of the contract imply that it was partly motivated precisely by pressure coming from supporter groups. Srđan Nedić, after that statement, publicly apologised and said that he had followed the mentioned page, which has not been active for six years, as a twelve-year-old,<sup>22</sup> and stressed his belief that sport should bring people together. Despite the apology, Nedić was not allowed to continue playing for Vukovar 1991, and numerous hateful comments appeared online calling for his expulsion from Croatia and invoking a “reaction” by the supporter groups Bad Blue Boys (BBB) and Torcida. Such posts were written even under the announcement of the termination of the contract with Srđan Nedić on the Facebook page of the Croatian Football League, “Prva Hrvatska liga”.<sup>23</sup> Under the post in which the page administrator tagged *HNK Vukovar 1991*, some commentators wrote, among other things the following:




/ Hateful comments directed at Sedam Nedić published on social networks

**Grunf:** *His Croatian citizenship should be taken away, in case he holds it, and he should be torpedoed out of Croatia immediately, with no chance of ever re-entering the country... Chetnik scum.*



**Antun Škrtić:** *Send him to where he stems from.*

**Marin Josičin:** *He shouldn't have done that; even a cow in a barn knows its place.*



**Mario Tomić:** *You can see he's got Chetnik genocidal genes.*

**Slavko Vonić:** *How could he even wear the jersey of the suffering Vukovar. Barf. Get him as far away as possible.*

**Anica Čizmazija:** *Leave the kid alone. If only such things would be our biggest problems.*

**Robert Najman:** *“Tell him to fuck the fuck off to his Chetnik mother. Send him to ‘Smellia’ with the rest of them.”*

Nedić ultimately became the goalkeeper of the football club Radnik from Bijeljina,<sup>24</sup> and this case illustrates how Serbs from Croatia can easily become targets of those who present themselves as guardians of “patriotic values,” and how institutions in such cases will not protect them from potential loss of employment. Although there is no room for chauvinistic messages in sport, it does not appear that the past of athletes of Croatian origin is scrutinised in a similar way in order to find certain politically undesirable messages that they liked on social media as children.<sup>25</sup>

Last year also saw a case of exceptionally zealous action by the Hvar police towards a Serbian citizen who photographed himself for social media with three fingers raised. The police determined that he had thereby committed a misdemeanour under Article 5 of the Misdemeanours against Public Order and Peace Act. He was therefore fined with 700 euros, and the court additionally imposed a penalty of expulsion from Croatia.<sup>26</sup> As will be described in the following chapters of this bulletin, in many cases over the previous year, including during public events, concerts, and protests, the police failed to react to far more explicit expressions of ethnic hatred than the one at issue in this case. Police officers thus observed the use of a fascist salute, insults, and even violent behaviour, such as throwing pyrotechnic devices at gathered protesters during an antifascist march in Rijeka. In all of these cases, action was taken only against some of the perpetrators, and nothing was done to immediately stop such behaviour. This raises the question of why, in this case, there was a swift reaction by the repressive apparatus and the judicial system. Such conduct certainly suggests that there is a different interpretation of the Misdemeanours Act and its selective application to manifestations of alleged Serbian nationalism, while the glorification of Ustasha ideology in some more dangerous situations is tacitly tolerated.<sup>27</sup>

A particular form of discrimination is represented by conspiracy theories spread by certain representatives of the legislative and executive branches during the outbreak of African swine fever in September last year. At that time, the village of Jagodnjak in Osijek-Baranja County, predominantly inhabited by Serbs, was identified as one of the epicentres of the spread of the infection. Although pig farmers of Serbian origin also suffered major losses from the disease, which required pigs to be culled, the leader of the Homeland Movement, Ivan Penava, first put forward the thesis that this was a “special war” against Croatia. More serious than this, unfortunately already customary rhetoric for

that party, was the statement by the Minister of Agriculture, David Vlačić, who said that “a special war cannot be ruled out”.<sup>28</sup> It is devastating that even the minister of the department responsible for remedying the said economic catastrophe adopted rhetoric that blamed those affected by that catastrophe for it. This statement encouraged other members of the Homeland Movement, such as Stipo Mlinarić Čipe, who said that African swine fever first appeared in Jagodnjak, “a village I remember from 30 years ago, where the first Chetnik rebellion took place,”<sup>29</sup> thereby placing the outbreak of the disease in the context of war events from thirty years ago and implying that it was once again a matter of deliberate action by Serbs against Croats. Nationalist statements in connection with the outbreak of swine fever were also made by Ivica Kukavica, who used the names of streets in Jagodnjak as an argument for the alleged disloyalty of the local population: “It is interesting that in Jagodnjak streets bear the names of Vladimir Nazor, Vuk Karadžić, Boris Kidrič, Svetozar Miletić, Žarko Zrenjanin, and Sava Kovačević,”<sup>30</sup> and he stated that “we have the right to say that we suspect everything; at this moment one form of war is to harm our state through special, economic war”. The Prime Minister, Andrej Plenković, denied the statements of his coalition partners from the Homeland Movement, including the man he entrusted with leading the affected department, saying that there was no evidence that the outbreak of African swine fever was the result of any “special war”.<sup>31</sup> Despite this, there were no sanctions for the public dissemination of such rumours, which in an already tense atmosphere can cause further divisions in society.

## 2. The Media and Online Hate Speech

### /2.1. News and Reports

A particular category of improper journalistic reporting consists of news items published in mass media that, in a certain way, label or single out Serbs, associating them with negative phenomena or actions. As in previous years, this year again the newspaper *Hrvatski tjednik* published, in almost every issue, at least one article about Serbs written in an overtly nationalist tone. On 6 February, journalist Andrea Černivec used the news of the nomination of the film *The Man Who Could Not Remain Silent* by Nebojša Slijepčević for an Academy Award to attack both the film and the system of financing film productions. She wrote that “while they reproach others for financing various associations, those in power continue to unreservedly financially support and promote Greater Serbian war-time products.”<sup>32</sup> It should be emphasised that the film deals with a crime committed in the village

of Štrpci during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina by members of a paramilitary unit from Serbia, making accusations of “Greater Serbianism” hardly connected to the film’s subject matter. In a particularly offensive manner, *Hrvatski tjednik* also reported on the death of Pope Francis I. Its front page featured a photo of the recently deceased head of the Roman Catholic Church with the headline: “Farewell to the Pope: Not Worth a Single Croatian Tear Because He Loved the Criminal Serbian Orthodox Church More than Croatian Catholics and Stepinac!” In addition to insulting the late Pope and his spiritual legacy, the article by Andrea Černivec also insults the Serbian Orthodox Church by calling it “Chetnik”.<sup>33</sup>

On the internet portal *direktno.hr*, performances by Serbian cultural associations were portrayed as controversial. Citing an “anonymous source” who allegedly sent a video whose authenticity was supposedly confirmed by none other than the host of the nationalist programme *Bujica*, Velimir Bujanec, *direktno.hr*, in an article signed only with the initials “d.m.,” claimed that a women’s choir during an Orthodox Easter celebration at the Krka Monastery near Kistanje performed the “pesma” (“song”) *Ne damo te zemljo Dušanova* (lit. *We Are Not Giving You Away, the Land of Dušan*), which — first and foremost — offends Albanians from Kosovo, as well as Montenegrins and, as per usual, Croats. Moreover, the article targets the patrons and organisers of the celebration: “Prosvjeta,” the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Serb Democratic Forum (SDF), claiming that in Dalmatia and Lika they are “run by a certain Jovica Krstanović, a figure with considerable tenure in the snv, especially when it comes to housing the Greater Serbian occupier and ethno-business with the soss...”. The celebration is thus entirely unjustifiably and without evidence placed in the context of links to a “Greater Serbian occupier,” while the ekavian form *pesma* is mockingly used in quotation marks.<sup>34</sup>

Four days later, the portal published another article about the same celebration, once again anonymously, and signed with the initials “a.v.,” prompted by a group photograph of the ensemble “Fenečki biseri” that performed at the event. The article emphasised that one of the ensemble’s members, in a photo where the group poses outdoors, “raised three fingers, which is considered a Serbian nationalist salute.” In addition, the article attempted to turn an ordinary group photograph into a scandal, with the headline: “After the Serbian Celebration Financed by Croatia They Provoked with Photos: ‘Until Next Time’.”<sup>35</sup>

The portal *direktno.hr* also occasionally published headlines that place Serbs in the context of danger or threat to Croats, even when the headline itself has no obvious connection to the rest of the text. An example

is the article “Artificial Intelligence Thinks Croats are Serbs: ‘We need a Ministry of Digital Defence,’”<sup>36</sup> published on 4 January with the dramatic overline “Experts Warn”. The article in fact relays a conversation with two supposed experts on artificial intelligence and the errors that large language models (LLMs) often make, including mistakes in identifying languages, but the headline creates a far more ominous picture of the influence of artificial intelligence and employs language that invokes militarisation of the issue. This example illustrates the practice of nationalist clickbait, in which concepts related to Serbia and Serbs are used to attract attention through sensationalist exploitation of prejudice.

Even content seemingly positive towards national minorities was, on some portals, used as a vehicle for hate speech. The regional Rijeka-based portal *Lokalpatrioti-rijeka.com* published, on 13 January, a news item about a bilingual calendar on the history of Rijeka published by the Italian Community of Rijeka. The article speaks positively about the local Italian community and its contribution to Rijeka’s cultural life, but the anonymous author used the occasion to attack the local Serbian community: “The Italian Community of Rijeka (*Comunità degli Italiani di Fiume*) has once again shown its inexhaustible love for its beloved city in which it lives and whose affection is beyond doubt. At one time they were even the sole BEARER OF LOCAL PATRIOTISM and identity in Rijeka. Today, with more or less success as now. This is slowly changing through this portal, as we take on the greatest burden ourselves. Unlike the most numerous Serbian community in Rijeka, which has achieved a big ZERO in terms of local patriotism over these past 30 years! The question is whether they even deserve a Serbian Cultural Centre? Why should Rijeka build one for them? On what concrete merits? Because they vote for Rijeka’s SDP? Let them feel called out — as they should — since they do not feel this city as their own.”<sup>37</sup>

Accusing members of the Serbian community in Rijeka of “not feeling the city as their own” and questioning whether Rijeka’s Serbs deserve a cultural centre undeniably labels an entire national minority as disloyal to its local community, calls for the revocation of their right to practise their own culture, and constitutes a form of provocation at a time when Serbian cultural centres in Croatia have been slandered by certain politicians as “spy centres”. As with most news published on portals, the authors are anonymised, signalling that both they and the editors are aware of the fact that such content is unacceptable.

## */2.2. Columns and Letters from Readers*

In addition to reports and news items, some print media and portals provided space to columnists who resort to hate speech against Serbs. Columns allow far greater scope for the personal views of columnists, and the proclaimed rules of “objective” media reporting are much looser, enabling a more explicit articulation of specific political positions. As such, they are used to convey clearer and more explicit calls for hatred and discrimination, as well as to promote revisionist and denialist ideas. Some particularly significant columns worth mentioning are those by Zvonimir Hodak on the portal *direktno.hr*, Marcel Holjevac from *7dnevno* (whose columns are also carried by *dnevno.hr*), and Zlatko Kramarić, a former liberal politician and mayor of Osijek. Marcel Holjevac comments on current political events in his columns, often criticising the policies of left-wing and liberal politicians and activists. In doing so, he sometimes employs strongly nationalist language. For example, in a column dated 2 November, Holjevac questioned antifascism as a political position, writing: “According to the experiences of my generation, antifascism is a reserve position of Chetnikdom.” Questioning antifascism, which is not only an ideology but one of the civilisational achievements of modern Europe, was not sufficient for Holjevac — he further implied that behind it lies precisely “Chetnikdom”.<sup>38</sup>

Later, Holjevac also blamed Milorad Pupovac for hateful incidents at the Days of Serbian Culture, claiming that he had “provoked” the violent incidents, which will be discussed later in the bulletin. He went a step further by denying genocide and war crimes committed by the Israeli army against the civilian population of Palestine: “Well, look, it is clear to everyone that an exhibition honouring some person nobody has ever heard of, who is ‘coincidentally’ — which Pupovac overlooked — interesting only as one of the authors of the SANU Memorandum, is a provocation. And when the Croatian government does not react to such cheap and transparent provocations, the street reacts. Admittedly, perhaps he is right, sometimes the smartest thing is to ignore certain things. But in any case, provocations, whatever they may be, should not be fallen for nor responded to violently. Just look at what Hamas achieved with its attack on Israel, which was also essentially a provocation — with the aim of forcing Israel to move into Gaza (to retrieve hostages!) and then play the victim.” In addition, he repeated a mantra that has recently become almost commonplace in the anti-Serb discourse of the Croatian right: the claim that cultural events of the Serbian national minority are a prelude to conspiratorial, even wartime, policies. He wrote the following: “The Homeland War in reality began with Serbian cultural gatherings orchestrated by Jovan Rašković, the predecessor of Milorad Pupovac. Let us not forget that! One should not

be naïve; culture is not always just culture; culture is also politics. The ‘Serbian World’, which is a political project, spreads through Serbian culture. Pupovac knows this very well and knows that Serbs ‘know how to turn everything into politics’.”<sup>39</sup>

The thesis of “provocation” was also repeated by Croatia’s ambassador to Albania, Zlatko Kramarić. In his column published on the Albanian portal *argumentum.al*, and republished in Croatia on 1 December by *maxportal.hr*, Kramarić wrote about the protests “United Against Fascism,” which were held on 30 November in Zagreb, Zadar, and Rijeka. Among other things, the ambassador objected to certain banners at the protests that used the Cyrillic script alongside Latin, writing: “Cyrillic is a legitimate and constitutionally protected script in Croatia. But when it is used as a political prop rather than as a cultural symbol, it is clear that it is given the function of provocation, not dialogue. If one wishes to protect the rights of Serbs in Croatia, that is good and necessary. But using the script as a lever of political provocation does not contribute to civilised conversation.” Kramarić thus once again positioned himself as someone who, as a member of the majority nation, arbitrarily delineates what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable use of a minority script in public space. Furthermore, he denied that national minorities in Croatia face any threat at all, despite numerous examples of hate speech as a daily feature of political culture in Croatia and violent incidents. The inversion of theses presented in the column implies that the protest — prompted by a series of violent incidents that occurred precisely during cultural events — was in fact directed against Croatia itself: “The claim that Serbs or any other minority in Croatia are systematically endangered simply fails to hold up. Legal protection of minorities in Croatia is among the highest in Europe, from political representation to cultural autonomy. There are incidents, sometimes hate speech, but these are not patterns of state policy, rather marginal outbursts that institutions generally sanction. Therefore, the key question remains: what were they protesting against today? Against fascism, or against Croatia as a political community?”<sup>40</sup>

On the portal *direktno.hr*, lawyer-turned-columnist Zvonimir Hodak regularly writes the column “Lijevom našom” (“Our Left Homeland”), in which he also criticises the left and liberal opposition, but frequently advances nationalist theses and accusations directed at Croatian Serbs. He concluded his column of 20 January with a quip about the genocide of Serbs during the Second World War: “They tried to bury us, but they forgot that we are seeds. And while we boast about being seeds, Serbs are better. After the massacres in the NDH there were almost a million more of them than before the massacres.”<sup>41</sup>

In a column dated 29 September, Hodak continued to repeat familiar denialist phrases about the “Jasenovac myth,” referring to an interview with Bojan Arbutina in the weekly *Novosti*. Hodak writes: “There will be money as well for Jasenovac mythomaniacs who are industrious and diligent like busy little bees. The myth of the Ustasha camp Jasenovac is a paradigm of the leftist lie in our ‘Left’ homeland!”<sup>42</sup> For the alleged “mythomania” surrounding Jasenovac — which for Hodak lies in the fact that the Jasenovac death camp is historically accurately referred to as the “Jasenovac camp system” — the columnist will, of course, blame Serbs who “imposed it on us in Yugoslavia”.

Historians of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are well aware of the dark role played by letters-to-the-editor sections in daily and weekly newspapers in instigating ethnic hatred and persecuting political dissenters during the 1990s. Such sections can serve as a perfect propaganda tool through which hateful views aligned with editorial positions are disguised as “the opinion of the people,” thereby presenting hate speech as the “voice of the majority”. In *Hrvatski tjednik*, the letters-to-the-editor section regularly serves to present intolerant and chauvinistic views and messages. In the issue of 18 June, a letter signed by Mira Ivanišević was published. The author expresses hope that “the construction of Serbian cultural centres across Croatia will at least slightly civilise the descendants of war criminals so that they will show us where our missing are,”<sup>43</sup> which once again invokes collective guilt and implies that Serbs are descendants of war criminals who need to be civilised and who deliberately conceal the locations of persons missing from the last war.

### */2.3. Hatred as Part of Media Editorial Policy*

As in previous years, certain media outlets place hate speech and the sowing of nationalism at the very foundation of their editorial policies. What they do departs from journalistic reporting and in fact represents right-wing and nationalist propaganda of the worst kind. In the previous chapters, *Hrvatski tjednik* was mentioned extensively as an example of a publication that devotes significant space in each issue to attacks on Serbs, antifascist values, and other vulnerable groups, and this year female politicians from the opposition have also become targets, labelled on a front page that evokes the sexist persecution of the so-called “witches from Rio” from the early 1990s, and even the Pope himself. A similar policy is followed by Velimir Bujanec’s show programme *Bujica*, broadcast live on a whole series of local television stations and with a fairly popular YouTube channel. Bujanec has repeatedly hosted politicians from right-wing parties and activists from nationalist movements, and even a glance at the titles of his shows reveals that

their content is very often directed against other ethnic groups, with particular emphasis on the Serb national minority. The show broadcast on 21 May, for example, carried the title: “Leljak and Count Tolstoy Against the Ban on Bleiburg! Jurčević on Pupovac’s Crimes,” while the show of 13 June, featuring Ante Prkačin, was titled: “Bosniaks Have Started Lying Like Serbs — Paraga Planned an Assassination”, and on 12 December the appearance of former Minister of Culture Zlatko Hasanbegović was announced with a new call to deprive minority media of funding: “Dr Zlatko Hasanbegović: The Right-Wing Platform is Taking Culture and Shutting down Pupovac’s *Novosti!*”<sup>44</sup>

The work of *Podcast Velebit* also continued, and its episodes over the past year contained even more sensationalist attacks on Serbs than *Bujica*. On 29 April, journalist and publicist Davor Dijanović appeared on *Velebit* in an episode entitled “Some Journalists in Croatia Work for the Serbian Secret Service”. In that episode Dijanović spoke once again about the “Jasenovac myth” as a “whip against Croats” and stressed that budget financing of minority media means “financing the Serbian world”. Last year the podcast also repeatedly hosted the literary historian Slobodan Prosperov Novak. In a programme published on 15 October entitled “The Serbian Language Does Not Exist — Serbs Speak the Croatian Language”, he said that “the concept of the Serbian language as created by Vuk Karadžić is pure theft of the Croatian language”. Prosperov Novak also appeared as a guest after the protest “United Against Fascism” in an episode entitled: “For a Banner in Cyrillic in Zagreb, at least a Fine Should Be Charged,” where he linked the symbolism of the protest with Chetnik ideology, called journalist Boris Dežulović a “Split ORJUNA member who spoke in Cyrillic on the steps in Pula,” and described bilingual banners as a violation of the language law that should be fined.<sup>45</sup>

Portals such as *narod.hr*, the Portal of the Croatian Cultural Council, the *Kamenjar Portal* and the portal *Dragovoljac* also continued their activities this year, regularly featuring attacks on Serbs, the LGBTQAI+ population and denialist attitudes towards the antifascist legacy.

#### /2.4. Comments and Posts on Social Media Networks

Alongside the growing presence of online platforms in everyday life and the use of social media networks not only as a means of interpersonal communication but also as a space for the dissemination of user-generated content that can also play an informative role for users, the need to monitor hate speech on these platforms is also increasing. Here, hate speech will be divided into that present on social media and that found in comments below articles on online portals. This type of hate

speech deserves attention because it has two extremely specific characteristics that make it particularly dangerous. The first stems from the often anonymous nature of communication on social networks, which allows people to write serious calls for hatred, often liable to criminal prosecution, without fear of social or legal consequences due to the ease of hiding their identity. The second arises from the fact that false news and calls for hatred can spread extremely quickly through social networks, driven by the technical nature of their algorithms that encourage user engagement, which increases the more controversial, provocative and emotionally charged the shared content is. Here we will present some of the most common examples of hatred in online posts directed against Serbs.

A large number of hateful comments appeared after the incidents at the Days of Serbian Culture in November, and in the run-up to the protest organised afterwards in Split by the football supporters' group Torcida.

J1

**Jesam 123** prije 2 mjeseca

Kakvi dani srpske kulture, pa Vi 12jeseci tučete vlastitu djecu, avlast Vam je fašistička, o čemu pričate, o ubojstvu Đinđića, ili Maradžorđevića, o skrivanju Ratka Mladića 20 god u Srbiji, o podršci Rusiji a prodaji oružija Ukrajini. O uništenju Vukovara, ili Škabrnje te cijele BiH gdje nisu Srbi. Vaša kultura nam netreba, i nemojte govoriti o njoj jer ju nemate. Narod ste pohlepan, i ratoboran kad ste 10 na jednog...Ono malo pravih Srba dolje iz Niš nemože od Vas progovoriti, ostali sve Cigani...

**Jesam 123:** *What Days of Serbian Culture are you talking about? For twelve months you have been beating your own youth, your government is fascist. What are you even talking about — the murder of Đinđić, or Karađorđević, hiding Ratko Mladić for 20 years in Serbia, supporting Russia while selling weapons to Ukraine? About the destruction of Vukovar, or Škabrnja, or all of Bosnia and Herzegovina wherever there were no Serbs. We don't need your culture, and don't talk to us about it because you don't even have one. Your people are backward and tribal, brave only when you're ten against one... The handful of real Serbs down in Niš can't get a word in from all of you, only Gypsies remain...*

RM

**Renato Mihoci** prije 2 mjeseca

Štakore smrdljivi izdajnički, koga su slavili tvoji frendovi? Večeras se slavilo četništvo, okrećeš teze, dok ovi provociraju. Jel za to Jean Michel Nicolier poginuo?

**Renato Mihoci:** *You stinking, treacherous rat, who did your friends celebrate? Tonight Chetnikdom was being celebrated, you twist the arguments while they provoke. Is that what Jean-Michel Nicolier died for?*

 **enter calc** prije 2 mjeseca

pokušaj jednon napisat komentar koji nije čitav paragraf ispraznica. ponavljan, nema ko za vas provodit silu. svi vi koji ste borbu za teritorij protiv talijanskih okupatora pomišali s neakvin ideološkin principima antifašizma imate priko 60 godina. postojite samo na internetu. nemate vi ni drugog izbora nego tolerirat. izletit ćete iz države zajedno s onih 3% u dogledno vrime, samo gledaj i kukaj.

**enter calc:** *Try writing a comment that isn't a paragraph full of nonsense and platitudes. I repeat, there is no one who will implement force for you. All of you who have confused the struggle for territory against the Italian occupiers with some ideological principles of antifascism are over 60 years of age. You exist only on the internet. You have no other choice but to tolerate it. You'll be flying out of the country together with those 3% soon enough, just keep on watching and whingeing.*


**DS**

**Dragan Skukan** prije 2 mjeseca

Imaju pravo ovi ljudi. Dok cihjela Hrvatska tuguje sjećajući se svojih žrtava i nestalih, agresori i zločinci orgijaju i vesele se po Hrvatskoj a Plenković ih nagrađuje sa našim novcima. To treba spriječiti. Mi Imamo svoj dignitet i ponos, gdje je njihovo poštivanje, ne može nitko gaziti naše žrtve i plesati na njihov spomen.

**Dragan Skukan:** *These people are right. While the whole of Croatia is mourning and remembering its victims and the missing, the aggressors and the criminals are organising orgies and celebrations all over Croatia. Meanwhile, Plenković keeps rewarding them with our money. That needs to be stopped. We have our dignity and pride, where is their respect? No one can walk all over our victims and dance on their graves.*

In addition to comments on articles, messages of hatred also spread on social networks, often in the form of and also under posts of politically exposed individuals. Krešimir Rotim, a member of the presidency of the Bridge party, described the violent incidents at the Days of Serbian Culture as “a job” (well done):



**Krešimir Rotim:** "From Kruševac, Prizren, Cetinje, Dubrovnik, Knin, Nevesinje, from Avala, Lovćen and Šara, Serbdom cries out: arise, Lazarus."

*From this year's "Easter" concert at the Krka Monastery organized by the Serbian cultural society "Prosvjeta". A bit of claiming other people's territories and invoking the suffering this nation supposedly went through because of the "Serbdom of Knin" of Đujić's Chetniks? I don't even need to explain the symbolism of Dubrovnik in the Greater Serbian idea.*

*Setting aside the expected performance along the Pupovac-media-left axis, what exactly is the rest of the crowd appalled by? By the fact that people reacted to "Prosvjeta" performing in their city? The "Prosvjeta" that today symbolically disseminates what we went through in wartime on 5 August 1995, after, supposedly, a century and a half of intellectual, diplomatic, and bare-life struggle for the survival of our people?*

*In other words, there's only a small part of the job left. Only when the institutions of this state begin doing their job of preventing and financing a "cultural institution" that lays claim to Dubrovnik and Knin will we be able to bring this job an end. After all the suffering the defenders went through so that the flag could fly on Srđ and on the Knin Fortress, it would be the decent thing.*

*The job the boys did yesterday.*

These are some of the comments under his post:

**Stjepan Smeh**

Bilo bi dobro prosvjedima okružiti ( centre,zgrade,kuće,...) ta mjesta gdje god izvode predstave, performanse,festivale,"kulturalna "događanja,.....sa plakatima na kojima su slike njihovih zločina ( masakra,razaranja,izjavama,porukama,prijetnjama popova i SPC i velikosrpskih političara i četnikara ,raznim dokumentima koji dokazuju njihovu agresiju u ratu i miru i njihove zle i opasne namjere;memorandum SANU 1 i 2 i širenje "srpskog sveta",.....) uz zvukove eksplozija,granatiranja,krikove mučenih i time prikazati kakva je to njihova "kultura" i kaj ona donosi,..... pod nazivom " žedni Hrvatske krvi i gladni Hrvatske zemlje" od 1918 pa do danas !.....Bog i Hrvati ZDS

**Stjepan Smeh:** *It would be good to use protests to surround (centres, buildings, houses...) those places where they perform shows, festivals, "cultural" events, and other performances... with posters portraying their crimes (massacres, destruction, statements, messages, threats from priests and the Serbian Orthodox Church, their politicians calling for Greater Serbia, and Chetniks overall, with different documents proving their aggression in war and peace, their evil and dangerous intentions; the SANU memoranda 1 and 2 and the spreading of the "Serb World"... ) with sounds of explosions, mortar shells, the cries of the tortured and in that way show what their "culture" is like and what it brings... under the title "Thirsty for Croatian Blood and Hungry for Croatian Land" from 1918 all the way to today! God and Croats, For Homeland — Ready!*




**Goran Cakaric**


To je kulturno okupljanje srpske zajednice i svega sto se kultura zove uzas uzas i svi su nacionalisti samo Vucic Cernik i ubica nije.Pupovac mozes da udes odma za Srbiju ako nastavite tako jadna ti majka cedo.

**Goran Cakaric:** *This is a cultural gathering of the Serb community and all things we call culture; horrible, just horrible; and they are all nationalist and it's just Vučić who's not a Chetnik and a killer. Pupovac, you can go straight to Serbia if you keep it up like this, your poor mother.*

Similar hateful comments appeared throughout the year, especially under articles mentioning the Serb national minority and its leaders, or discussing cases of discrimination. Hate messages frequently appear on the pages of sports clubs as well. This is an example of messages under posts by the football club Sinđelić from Trpinja:



**Josip Colic:** *Chetnik pieces of shit, go to Serbia, you disgusting Chetnik cattle*



**Matija Kumaric:** *Slaughter the Chetniks, FOR HOMELAND — READY*

On 29 December the platform *Faktograf* published its own report entitled “Hatred on *TikTok* in Croatia and Serbia: With Baja and Thompson against ‘blockers’ and ‘antifascists’”. In the report, *Faktograf* journalists point to the ease with which hateful messages and disinformation reach a large number of people via accounts on *TikTok*, propelled by algorithms. As examples of anti-Serb discourse on *TikTok* in Croatia, the report mentions Krešimir Čabaj from the party DOMINO, who shared a video claiming that “anti-Croatian content” is promoted in Serbian cultural centres; MOST member Zvonimir Troskot, who stated that the Serb National Council uses millions from the budget “to promote Greater Serbia, Chetnik ideology, and the Serbian world”; and the *TikTok* account “Narodni reporteri” (“People’s Reporters”), run by right-wing activists Dominik Alpeza and Ivo Šošić, which has over 145,000 followers and features numerous videos inciting hatred, such as a video referring to the Days of Serbian Culture as a “Chetnik party in the middle of Split.”<sup>46</sup>

### */2.5. Media and Political Pressure on the Intellectual (Academic) Community: The Attack on Dejan Jović*

Since October last year, part of the political and media scene has decided, in the best authoritarian manner, to carry out an attack on

academic freedoms. Pressure on academic institutions and the scholarly community negates the values of a democratic and open society and represents a crude intrusion of politics into science. The target chosen was a political scientist of international reputation and a prominent member of the Serbian community, Professor Dejan Jović. The attacks on Jović began from the parliamentary benches, from the ranks of the Homeland Movement.

Homeland Movement MP Predrag Mišić, during a free address in the Croatian Parliament, demanded that Professor Dejan Jović be dismissed from the faculty because of an alleged statement that “Operation ‘Storm’ was genocide”. Under the video of that speech, published on the Homeland Movement’s *Facebook* page, numerous comments were posted which, among other things, called for Professor Jović to be expelled from Croatia and urged institutions to initiate criminal proceedings against him.<sup>47</sup> Anto Đapić, former president of the Croatian Party of Rights, then wrote on his *Facebook* profile:

“Dejan Jović, a professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb, during the mandate of the President of the Republic of Croatia Ivo Josipović, as a very influential adviser, has on several occasions ‘distinguished’ himself with his political analyses and commentaries that provoked sharp reactions in the Croatian public, which was, after all, his intention! As a political Serb, he continuously provokes the public in a way that calls into question, that is, nullifies the fundamental system of values on which modern, sovereign Croatia rests! There is no need to elaborate at length and counter his theses, but the latest appearance in which he characterised the Military-Police Operation STORM as genocide cannot pass without a reaction! Freedom of expression and freedom of speech have their limit at the moment when they threaten the freedoms of others, and that is the case here! Two institutions in Croatia should react promptly: one is the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia (DORH), and the other the SENATE of the University of Zagreb! Especially the SENATE, because the autonomy of the University certainly does not mean the obligation of the state to lavishly finance its work, while professors in a perfidious and unhindered manner spread deceptions and falsehoods about the very being of the Croatian state! Of course, reactions by the State Attorney’s Office and the SENATE will promptly talk about the ‘endangerment of Serbian intellectuals’ in Croatia, but these institutions are obliged to react, precisely for the sake of equality before the law! PRECISELY FOR THE SAKE OF MENTAL HYGIENE! Failure to react to this outburst as the culmination of his testing how far he can go (incidentally on the salary of Croatian taxpayers) would be a serious disgrace for both the State Attorney’s Office and the SENATE! WE ARE WAITING!”<sup>48</sup>

Both Mišić and Đapić called for state repression against a university lecturer, thereby interfering with the autonomy of the university and the autonomy of academic work. In doing so, Đapić also invented a new category of the “political Serb,” thereby further perpetuating the conspiracy theory about the alleged political influence of Serbs and the spreading of some kind of “Serbian ideology” in Croatia. The use of the term “mental hygiene” is also worrying, as it is a far from subtle call for the institutional cleansing of the public sphere of those ideas that right-wing politicians consider undesirable.

Encouraged by that and other similar reports about the alleged description of Operation “Storm” as genocide, the extra-parliamentary Autochthonous Croatian Party of Rights (A-HSP) held a protest in front of the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb, at which the party’s leader Dražen Keleminec accused Jović of “promoting the ideology of Greater Serbia and Yugoslavia” and labelled him an “enemy of the Croatian state”, thereby perpetuating a motif often repeated by some representatives of the ruling coalition about Croatian Serbs as potential enemies and spreaders of “Greater Serbian” ideas. During his speech he also attacked students who were going to lectures, accusing them of “wearing five-pointed stars, the symbol of evil under which people were killed in the 1990s.”<sup>49</sup>

An insight into the “Privrednik” panel at which Dejan Jović allegedly made the incriminating statement proves that this is the spread of fake news: none of the participants, moderators, or guests at the panel described Operation “Storm” as a genocidal action, which exposes the politicians’ statements as plain defamation directed against socially engaged intellectuals who call into question right-wing political myths about the 1990s.

After the politicians, certain columnists of the *Večernji list* daily took up the baton. The first was Žarko Ivković in the article “How the Faculty of Political Science Became a Left-Wing Political Actor”. The article in fact defends Professor Boris Havel of the Faculty of Political Science, whom the Ethics Committee sanctioned with a warning before dismissal for insulting journalist Maja Sever. Ivković presented the decision of the Ethics Committee as political: the faculty punished speech presented as a “right-wing excess” because such a decision would be in line with the “dominant sentiment of part of the media and student public”. To support his conclusion, Ivković mentioned an alleged post by Dejan Jović on *Twitter* (now *X*) from 2020 claiming that “Croatia is a failed project” and that “the very idea was retarded and monstrous,” which he said was “characteristic of a vulgar political agitator, not a political scientist with a doctoral degree.”<sup>50</sup>

The following day Jović also responded in an article “How Žarko Ivković, by Defaming Me, Attacked the Newspaper He Writes for”. In the text, Jović presented evidence that the statement attributed to him by Ivković was not his, but a quote from an interview given by the writer Pero Kvesić to Nedžad Haznadar, published on 15 November 2020 in *Večernji list*. This was followed by three further attacks on Jović in *Večernji list*.<sup>51</sup> The first was by Ivković in the article “How Dejan Jović, by Attacking Me, Confirmed the Double Standards of the Faculty Where He Teaches”, in which he continued to criticise Dejan Jović. Although he acknowledged that the incriminating words were not Jović’s but Kvesić’s, he reproached Jović for not having disassociated or distanced himself from the statement he was quoting, implying that he in fact agrees with it, and that therefore it is irrelevant whether the statement is his or not. In the end, he concluded that Jović’s affirmation of Kvesić’s statement represents continuity in his views.<sup>52</sup>


The second article by Ivan Hrستیć, “Why Doesn’t Jović Admit That He Thinks the Republic of Croatia is a Monstrous Project, but Hides behind Kvesić?”, was published on the *Večernji list* portal. In the article Hrستیć asks: “Why is Dejan Jović play-acting and not admitting that he thinks Croatia is a failed project, but hiding behind Kvesić? Is there perhaps a possibility that he does not think that, and that he found the interview excellent and stimulating, rather than the statement itself? It would seem that there is. It’s just that he did not feel the need to distance himself from that statement in such a way.”<sup>53</sup>

Since the authors failed to portray Jović as the author of the disputed statement, their accusations moved in the direction that Jović must think so, otherwise he would have conveyed the statement differently. Applied to Ivković’s original argument, the authors are in fact asking why the Faculty of Political Science (FPZG) is not distancing itself from Dejan Jović’s never transparently presented thoughts about Kvesić’s statements.

The third article was published on 26 December by Ivica Miškulin, a professor at the Catholic University of Croatia, under the title: “Six of One and Half a Dozen of the Other, or How Professor Dejan Jović Tramples on the Canon of Academic Integrity”. Miškulin repeats the accusations that Jović in fact thinks what Kvesić said. Miškulin also implied that Jović is a poor scholar because he “does not cite the works of contemporary Croatian historiography.”<sup>54</sup>

Under Hrستیć’s text on the portal, space was given to comments that insulted and openly threatened Jović, thus once again confirming the the-

sis that the line between veiled stigmatisation and threats of violence is sometimes extremely thin.



**Zarko Antic:** *Is that they guy with a few loose screws?*

**Tihomir Lelas:** *If he is Josipović's advisor, nothing more needs to be said... We just need to expand the Jakuševac landfill.*

**Josip Pleskina:** *A piece of garbage that never studied, you just need to be suitable, and they'll give you five diplomas if needed.*

**Josip Ikić:** *A pure Chetnik and the spokesman for the SANU 2*

### **/3. Supporters' Incidents**

Hate speech, the display of symbols of the NDH, and insults directed at national minorities and other vulnerable groups were unfortunately a frequent part of sporting events. Their presence at events that ostensibly should have nothing to do with day-to-day politics testifies to how normalised certain forms of chauvinism are in Croatian society as part of folklore. They also reveal an organised nationalist mobilisation of individuals and groups from the supporters' subculture, whose symbolic violence often turns into physical violence if an atmosphere is created in society in which hate speech begins to be ignored or tolerated. Frequent chanting of the Ustasha salute and nationalist slogans this year was accompanied by choreographed and organised reactions to certain current events, whereby the usual supporters' provocations took on elements of the stands' interference in day-to-day politics.

On Sunday, 26 January, a group of around one hundred football supporters formed a procession before the football match between Hajduk and Slaven Belupo and set off towards the stadium at Poljud. A supporter at the head of the column several times shouted, “For Homeland!” into a megaphone, to which the other supporters responded “Ready!”, thereby intoning the Ustasha salute. On the way to Poljud, the group chanted “Let’s go, Ustashes!” while lighting flares. The incident occurred just one day before the anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz death camp. The police reported that they had conducted a criminal investigation into the incident, but at this moment the authors have no information on how many people were reported or whether any judgments have been handed down.<sup>55</sup>

Already the following month football supporters repeated the incident at the EuroBasket match between Croatia and France in Zadar. A group of supporters sang Ustasha songs such as “The battle is on, the Ustasha flag flies for freedom and for the homeland” while chanting the salute “For Homeland — Ready!”.<sup>56</sup>

Matches in the lower Croatian football leagues were not spared incidents either. At the match between Mladost from Cerić and the football club Sinđelić from Trpinja in the First County Football League of Vukovar-Srijem County in Cerić, supporters of the home club known as the “Boars” chanted “Let’s go, Ustashes” and sang “Tonight we’ll celebrate. Tonight we’ll roast a Serb. Let him roast and turn, fuck him, he had no luck.”<sup>57</sup> The same supporters threw pyrotechnic devices towards the pitch, causing the match to be interrupted. The incident was condemned by the president of the Democratic Alliance of Serbs (DSS), Srđan Milaković and the president of the Serb National Council, Boris Milošević.<sup>58</sup>

During the Adriatic derby between Hajduk and Rijeka on 18 May, a banner was raised in honour of the victims of Bleiburg with the inscription “Croatian blood flowed in rivers, the new seed nevertheless sprouted. Bleiburg '45”, and the raising of the banner was accompanied by chanting of “For Homeland — Ready!”.<sup>59</sup>

Hajduk supporters marked the anniversary of the Military-Police Operation “Storm” in a similar way on 10 August. At the match against Gorica at Poljud they burned a Serbian flag and displayed banners in Cyrillic, allegedly stolen from Serbian supporters, while singing “It is raining, Serbia is waning,” and chanting the salute “For Homeland — Ready!”<sup>60</sup> The incident was condemned by MP Dalija Orešković, who was attacked by numerous commentators for doing so. These attacking comments were reported by the portal *direktno.hr*, which in an

article signed with the initials “kkž” described Torcida’s choreography as “brilliant.”<sup>61</sup>

Although in comments on online portals supporters’ incidents are often justified by the actions of supporters from Serbia, in the qualifying matches for the UEFA European Football Championship an incident occurred in which Croatian supporters responded with a disgraceful message to a conciliatory gesture by supporters of the Montenegro national team. During the first match at the Maksimir stadium in Zagreb, Montenegrin supporters displayed a banner apologising for the role of Montenegrin units in the attack on Dubrovnik: “From Lovćen our fairy calls, forgive us Dubrovnik”. During the return match in Podgorica on 18 November, a group of Croatian ultras began chanting “For Homeland — Ready!”. To this provocation, the home supporters responded with whistles and chants of “Ustashas, Chetniks, you all fled together!”. Croatian supporters then raised a banner responding to the apology of the Montenegrin supporters: “From Dubrovnik you can hear the cries, suck our dicks, Chetniks. There is no forgiveness!”<sup>62</sup>

On Saturday, 20 December, members of the supporters’ group Bad Blue Boys (BBB) from Zagreb decided — with a banner bearing the Ustasha salute — to respond to the conclusion of the Zagreb City Assembly calling on Mayor Tomislav Tomašević to take measures to prevent the use of fascist and Ustasha symbols on all surfaces and premises managed by the City of Zagreb. In the north stand of the Maksimir stadium, one banner with the large inscription “For Homeland — Ready!” was displayed, alongside another addressed to Tomislav Tomašević saying: “And what are you going to do about it, Mr Mayor?”. Asked about the incident, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković said that the message of the Bad Blue Boys was “logical given Tomašević’s complete inconsistency”.<sup>63</sup> The Zagreb police opened an investigation into the incident, and the Prime Minister’s reaction came under criticism from opposition politicians. For example, MP Dalija Orešković said that “the HDZ government has stood with Ustashism in order to parasitise the hatred and threats spreading under black insignia.”<sup>64</sup>

#### */4. Marko Perković Thompson Concerts*

The events that, to the greatest extent, brought hate speech in the public sphere into the focus of public attention and triggered a series of reactions from politicians from across the ideological spectrum, experts, and domestic and foreign media were the concerts of the singer Marko Perković Thompson in Zagreb on 5 July and in Sinj on 4 August, as well as the subsequent indoor tour in December. The concert in

Zagreb, according to reports by Thompson's manager Zdravko Barišić, gathered around 504,000 people and represents the largest ticketed concert in history.<sup>65</sup> Some later independent analyses, such as that of the BBC, presented figures that dispute that number.<sup>66</sup>

Numerous critics and opposition politicians consider Thompson's concert to be the moment when the spirit of neo-Ustashism, nationalism, and historical revisionism was "let out of the bottle."<sup>67, 68, 69</sup>

In this part of the bulletin, we will provide an overview of events related to Marko Perković Thompson and his concerts, as well as an overview of the reactions of the public and politicians to those events. It should be emphasised that this overview is by no means exhaustive — the analysis conducted by the authors of this report shows that the frequency of articles on news portals related to the salute "For Homeland — Ready!" increased severalfold in the months in which the concerts were held, and that the largest number of discussions about the use of this salute concerned precisely those concerts and Thompson's oeuvre.

Marko Perković Thompson began his career at the very start of the war, with the hit "Bojna Čavoglave," which opened with the salute "For Homeland — Ready!," and which became one of the songs frequently performed to boost "combat morale" during the first years of the war. During the 1990s, his career was largely associated with the far-right Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), and after the 2000 elections his concerts became places of resistance to the then liberal coalition.<sup>70</sup> During those years, Thompson and his audience began attracting attention through the use of Ustasha iconography, which often led to his concerts being banned abroad. Particular controversy was caused by the publication of a recording on the *Index.hr* portal in which Thompson performs the song "Jasenovac and Gradiška Stara," which celebrates massacres of Serbs in the death camps of the Independent State of Croatia, as well as Ustasha criminals Maks Luburić, Jure Francetić, and Ante Pavelić. Thompson initially confirmed the authenticity of the recording, only to deny it later.<sup>71</sup>

Last year, Thompson began attracting public attention as early as the end of January, when people started talking about his performance at the event welcoming the national handball team in Zagreb, after it had won silver at the World Championship in Oslo. According to a statement by the Minister of Tourism and Sport Tonči Glavina, Thompson's performance was the explicit wish of "the players, the handball federation, and the Croatian Government."<sup>72</sup> The head of the Anti-Fascist League of Croatia and activist Zoran Pusić sent an open letter to Prime Minister Andrej Plenković asking him to stop the concert because

Thompson in today's Croatia, especially among young people, is a symbol of Ustashism at least as much as the salute "For Homeland — Ready!"<sup>73</sup>

Pusić was criticised by Homeland Movement MP Stipe Mlinarić, who labelled him "a slanderer of the state in which he lives" and implied that he was "a traitor and a hater of his own country."<sup>74</sup>

Andrej Plenković responded to Pusić's letter by saying that "when organising any welcome receptions, the wishes of the athletes and sports federations are primarily taken into account, because their achievements are the reason citizens, fans, and supporters gather," and that "isolated actions of individuals cannot be a reason to question a reception that will be attended by tens of thousands of our fellow citizens gathered with the sincere wish to greet our handball players in a magnificent atmosphere and pay tribute to them for winning another world medal."<sup>75</sup>

At the event held for the handball players in the main square, Thompson sang in front of more than thirty thousand people, and footage recorded shows a group of people chanting "For Homeland — Ready!," as well as a banner bearing insults directed at Zoran Pusić. Several hos flags containing the salute "For Homeland — Ready!" were also recorded.<sup>76</sup>

Soon afterwards, Thompson's song "If You Don't Know What Happened" ("Ako ne znaš što je bilo") entered the top 20 songs competing for the Porin award in the Song of the Year category. The singer of the group Elemental, Mirela Priselac Remi, expressed dissatisfaction with the inclusion of the song and called on colleagues to boycott the vote.<sup>77</sup> This triggered numerous reactions directed against Priselac: Radio nu from Imotski announced it would no longer broadcast her songs (somewhat paradoxically explaining that it did so because it advocated "freedom of musical choice, not censorship and ideological divisions"),<sup>78</sup> the frontman of the band Daleka Obala, Jakša Kriletić Jordeš, attacked the singer on his *Facebook* profile, telling her: "Look Remi... I have to... you really get on my d... (I truly mean the real thing), of course absolutely very virtually, not physically,"<sup>79</sup> and a man also threatened to kill her, while she was verbally attacked in the street in front of her three-year-old child. These events sent a clear message to public figures that openly criticising Thompson is undesirable and will be met with threats of physical violence. The man who threatened Mirela Priselac was arrested on 12 February.<sup>80</sup>

After Thompson's success at the event held for the Croatian handball team, talk began of a possible concert at the Zagreb Hippodrome. Just six hours after tickets went on sale, the media reported that it was the concert with the highest number of tickets sold in history. All 281,774 were sold in less than 24 hours. As a result, Thompson's concert began to be perceived in the media as the biggest concert spectacle in the country and, at the same time, as the largest gathering of the clerical and nationalist right in the region.<sup>81</sup>

In the end, the media began citing the figure of half a million visitors to the concert. The right-wing segment of the media scene left no room for doubt that the concert was in fact a political event. In the 10 April issue of *Hrvatski tjednik*, Josip Jović published an article entitled "How Thompson Became a Hero Despite an Unheroic Time". The article presented the concert as a reaction to the political situation in which Croatia finds itself, in which "representatives of an aggressive minority, who occupy important positions in the institutions of the system, present themselves as moral arbiters; there are constant accusations of genocide, a search for Ustasha insignia, the promotion of Yugoslavism in culture, sport, and the media."<sup>82</sup> The Minister of Croatian Veterans, Tomo Medved, called the concert "a true patriotic spectacle"<sup>83</sup> and announced that he would do everything in his power to help Croatian veterans and the families of fallen Croatian veterans obtain tickets, which certainly represents an unprecedented engagement of a ministry in promoting a musical event. Some members of the clergy also became involved: the Franciscan friar from Imotski, father Ivo Rastočić, called out those who pointed to possible security and logistical problems, as well as the spread of hatred at the concert: "When it's music from the east then it's a 'brand'; when it's Ultra it's 'tourism'; when it's the return of old Yugo bands it's 'popularity'; when it's Marko Perković Thompson then it's petitions and panic! But the Falcon flies too high for them."<sup>84</sup>

The fact that Thompson's concert had support from the very top of the state was demonstrated by the arrival of Prime Minister Andrej Plenković at the technical rehearsal, where he was photographed with Thompson.<sup>85</sup> Unfortunately, those who hoped the event would pass in a dignified and peaceful atmosphere were mistaken. Already the day before the concert, groups of Thompson's fans dressed in black gathered in Bogovičeva Street in Zagreb, singing Ustasha marching songs, among them "Here comes the dawn, here comes the day" ("Evo zore, evo dana"),<sup>86</sup> which celebrates Ustasha commanders Jure Francetić and Rafael Boban, while near the National and University Library, close to the Hippodrome, groups of fans greeted each other with raised right arms and the salute "For Homeland — Ready!"<sup>87</sup> At the concert itself, numerous politicians and public figures were present, among

them the Speaker of Parliament Gordan Jandroković, Defence Minister Ivan Anušić,<sup>88</sup> Bridge MP Marin Miletić, Homeland Movement MP Ivica Kukavica, and the conservative activist Željka Markić.<sup>89</sup> At the concert, Thompson began the song “Bojna Čavoglave” with the salute “For Homeland — Ready!”.<sup>90</sup>

The Minister of the Interior, Davor Božinović, called the concert “a spectacle rarely seen” and said: “This was not just a concert, this was a celebration of togetherness, love for the homeland, and the values that bind us without division, with a clear message: Croatia is a democratic, European, and organised country in which everyone has the right to their music, identity, and peaceful assembly.”

He also said that the police would prosecute individual cases of singing inappropriate songs and displaying Ustasha iconography.<sup>91</sup>

In the context of everything the salute “For Homeland — Ready!” represents historically, as well as the songs sung before the concert that celebrate the perpetrators of brutal massacres of Serbs and Croatian anti-fascists, the minister’s statement can be understood as a cynical definition of a “celebration of togetherness,” an ethnocentric togetherness that excludes all those who do not agree with the political vision promoted by Thompson and the visitors to his concert. This view was also conveyed by part of the foreign press, which commented on the event. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Germany’s largest national daily, wrote that the concert was “part of a state-approved cultural policy,” as evidenced by Prime Minister Plenković’s arrival at the technical rehearsal and his photograph with Thompson. It compared the salute “For Homeland — Ready!” with the German Nazi salute “Heil Hitler”. In conclusion, it challenged the theses about “togetherness,” stating that Thompson’s concert had further contributed to the division of Croatian society: “In Croatia, hundreds of thousands of Thompson admirers are opposed by a similar number of those who resolutely reject his mixture of kitsch, war romanticism, Catholicism, and the rehabilitation of fascism. The debate surrounding Perković’s Zagreb concert will therefore occupy Croatia for some time to come,”<sup>92</sup> the article concludes.

The theses of *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* were also confirmed by a survey conducted by the market researcher Promocija plus for RTL television. According to the results of that survey, 39.2% of respondents considered Thompson’s concert in Zagreb a “magnificent event,” while 34.7% saw it as “glorification of the Ustasha regime”. That difference lies within the margin of statistical error for this type of research, suggesting that the real effect of the concert was further political polarisation, as opposed to the story of togetherness.<sup>93</sup>

On 7 July, after a session of the Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Prime Minister Andrej Plenković described the criticism coming from part of the left-wing opposition as exaggerated, and he also referred to the use of the salute “For Homeland — Ready!” in the song “Bojna Čavoglave”: “It is part of his integral repertoire at every one of his concerts, and it was the same now. Thompson is the only one who can bring together half a million people and I don’t know who is crying more, those on the right because they don’t have the privilege of him, or those on the left. What were we supposed to say? Ban him? Then they would accuse us of censoring him.”<sup>94</sup>

The salute, unfortunately, soon became an integral part of the repertoire of the summer parliamentary session held on 8 July. Responding to Milorad Pupovac, who asked: “Why was it not possible to protect constitutional values and EU values from the symbols, messages, songs, and chants that glorified members of the Ustasha movement during and after the concert and greeted them with the official salute of the NDH ‘For Homeland — Ready?’”, Damir Biloglav, an MP of the party Home and National Gathering (DoMino), said: “The young people who were at the concert don’t care about partisans, Ustashas, or Chetniks. They came to express joy, happiness, and patriotism. It is from those gatherings that they are telling all of us older ones — we don’t care about your stories and stereotypes. We are not burdened with anyone’s baggage, we do not accept blackmail, we will not allow you to put straitjackets on us. We were born in a free Croatia, we will live as we want, we will sing the songs we want, we will greet each other with the greetings we want, and we don’t care about your nonsense. On behalf of all those young people, I greet these gentlemen with the salute they would like to send to all of you: For Homeland — Ready!”.

Opposition MPs reacted to Biloglav’s outburst by asking the Speaker of Parliament, Gordan Jandroković, to sanction him. However, Jandroković refused, arguing: “We have heard all sorts of views and citizens will judge who speaks and how. Many will agree with something, many will be exclusive, as we saw after the concert. A lot of untruths have been spoken, a lot of lies, a lot of half-truths, and everyone is responsible for what they say and what they advocate. I will not be an arbiter; say what you want, and the citizens will judge.”<sup>95</sup>

Such a decision and explanation represent a departure from the previous practice of the Speaker of Parliament, who had always sanctioned the use of the Ustasha salute in Parliament.

After the successful concert at the Zagreb Hippodrome, the Mayor of Sinj and Bridge MP Miro Bulj announced a concert by Marko Perković

Thompson in Sinj to mark Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day. The concert was to be held at the Sinj Hippodrome, and 150,000 tickets were put on sale. Bulj boasted that Thompson's concert would be "the biggest gathering in the history of Sinj and the entire Cetina region". He also called on young people to come freely with HOS insignia and the salute "For Homeland — Ready!".<sup>96</sup> At the concert in Sinj, the incidents from Zagreb were repeated: T-shirts with HOS insignia and the words "For Homeland — Ready!" were sold at stalls, and the song "Jasenovac and Gradiška stara" echoed through the centre of Sinj, played over loudspeakers from a café.<sup>97</sup> This time the police reacted promptly and arrested five people for singing the song, as well as the employee of the establishment in question who had played it over the loudspeaker.<sup>98</sup>

The normalisation of the use of the Ustasha salute soon had visible consequences. Not long after the concerts, a video leaked on the *Index.hr* portal showing a group of children playing with plastic and/or wooden guns and greeting each other in the game with "For Homeland — Ready!", which demonstrates the impact of the political climate on the youngest and most vulnerable population.<sup>99</sup> Alongside the salute itself, extremely aggressive rhetoric towards everyone who criticised the wave of nationalism was also normalised. The guardian of the Franciscan monastery in Sinj, Marinko Vukman, used a sermon during the Catholic feast of the Assumption to wish suffering and death upon critics of Thompson's concert: "Let them suffer, and let those who are bothered by your togetherness, your coming to church, your song and love for God, the Church and your Croatian people, your joy and togetherness that shone especially brightly at the concerts of our Thompson in Zagreb and Sinj, die in that suffering."<sup>100</sup> The right wing was also given wind in its sails by the verdict of the Zagreb Municipal Misdemeanour Court in the case against one of the young men who had shouted the Ustasha salute "For Homeland — Ready!" into a camera before the concert, and who was tried for an offence under Article 5 of the Misdemeanours against Public Order and Peace Act. Judge Mirela Prstec Batarelo delivered an acquittal, stating that HOS had used that salute during the Homeland War. What is particularly striking is the emotional tone with which Judge Prstec Batarelo commented on Thompson's concert in the reasoning of the acquittal:

"In joyful anticipation of Thompson's concert, where his songs were played and sung on the streets of Zagreb, among other things, the words 'For Homeland — Ready!' were uttered on air during a live broadcast. The public order and peace of citizens was not disturbed, nor would it as such represent a manifestation of racist ideology, contempt for other people because of their religious or ethnic affiliation, or trivialisation of the victims of crimes against humanity."

The shouting of the Ustasha salute on air was also justified by the fact that the Speaker of Parliament, Gordan Jandroković, had refused to sanction MPs who had shouted the salute in the Croatian Parliament, as well as by the fact that during the concert the salute had been “shouted by half a million people.”<sup>101</sup>

The concert was met with numerous condemnations from the left of the political spectrum. On 10 August, the Anti-Fascist League of Croatia, the civil society organisation Documenta — Centre for Dealing with the Past, and the veterans’ association Vedra — Veterans of the Homeland War and Anti-Fascists, with the support of three citizens who had survived Ustasha and Nazi crimes, filed a misdemeanour complaint with the Ministry of the Interior against Marko Perković Thompson for shouting the Ustasha salute at the concerts in Zagreb and Sinj. They emphasised that the salute insults victims and undermines the constitutional identity.<sup>102</sup> The Mayor of Zagreb, Tomislav Tomašević, also reacted to the incidents by announcing that he would not approve the second of Thompson’s two concerts in Arena Zagreb, scheduled for 27 and 28 December, if the Ustasha salute were used at the first concert.<sup>103</sup> On 11 November, the Zagreb City Assembly adopted a conclusion banning the use of symbols, slogans, or messages that glorify, incite, or approve national, racial, or religious hatred, including the chant “For Homeland — Ready!”, on surfaces and in premises managed by the City of Zagreb. Soon afterwards it was announced that Thompson’s concert on 28 December would not take place. Thompson reacted to the ban on holding the second concert by threatening that, “if Tomašević does not abandon the ban on the concert”, he would take “much more radical steps.”<sup>104 105</sup>

At the concert on 28 December, before performing the song “Bojna Čavoglave,” Thompson called for the overthrow of the Zagreb city authorities in “elections that may be regular or extraordinary”. He then greeted the audience with the salute “For Homeland — Ready!”. After the concert, groups of fans were recorded outside Arena Zagreb chanting “Kill, kill the Serb.”<sup>106</sup> The day after the concert, a group of protesters, led by the leader of A-HSP, Dražen Keleminac, organised a protest in front of Tomislav Tomašević’s private apartment. Speakers at the rally accused the Serbs of having “planned the Croatian Spring in Belgrade in 1968,” greeted each other with “For Homeland — Ready!” and wore HOS insignia and flags with the coat of arms with the first white field, and announced a referendum to remove Tomislav Tomašević in February.<sup>107</sup> On 29 December, Thompson announced that he would file a criminal complaint with uskok (Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime) against Tomašević because the cancellation of the concert had caused financial damage to the city.<sup>108</sup>

## /5. Incidents at Cultural Festivals

### /5.1. "Nosi se" and "FALIŠ"

The summer following Thompson's concerts resulted in a series of incidents at cultural events instigated by individuals from veterans' associations and supporters' groups. These incidents were often on the verge of escalating into open violence. The most serious incident occurred before an anti-war play that was due to be staged as part of the "Nosi se" festival in Benkovac. A group of veterans gathered in the area behind the City Library where the performance was to take place; they used the salute "For Homeland — Ready!", and some of those assembled insulted the journalist Melita Vrsaljko and threatened that she "should be thrown under a car because she is a provocateur."<sup>109</sup> Actress Maruška Aras was also attacked, with those gathered shouting that she was "a wh\*re and a mistake of nature."<sup>110</sup> The police did not react and, according to some reports, certain officers even hugged the troublemakers and told Vrsaljko that they could not guarantee her safety. The performance was postponed, and the organisers soon postponed the festival as well for security reasons. The police filed misdemeanour charges against some of the protesters, and five of them, including the president of the Benkovac branch of the Croatian Homeland War Volunteers Association, Nediljko Genda, were banned from approaching Melita Vrsaljko within 30 metres.<sup>111</sup>

While some politicians condemned the attack on the festival organisers, the actions of those who expressed solidarity with the Benkovac "banners," as they were soon dubbed in the media, were worrying. Tomislav Sokol, an HDZ Member of the European Parliament (EP), when asked by an N1 journalist whether he saw "darkness and a bad spirit that has come out of the bottle," responded with an implicit condemnation of the festival organisers: "Perhaps the spirit that has come out of the bottle is simply that *de-tuđmanisation* and all the processes of left-wing cultural struggle that we have watched since 3 January 2000 have come to an end. It is an attempt to impose a left-wing, anti-national narrative that mocks the Homeland War and that obviously no longer works."<sup>112</sup>

The attack on the festival organisers was also politically legitimised by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Croatian Veterans Tomo Medved, who on 28 August convened a meeting with representatives of veterans from Benkovac, and from Zadar and Šibenik-Knin counties. According to a statement from the ministry, Minister Medved expressed understanding for the veterans' concerns. The participants in the meeting stated that "content promoted as peaceful and anti-war

in its execution humiliates Croatian veterans and relativises the sacrifice. It is particularly painful that all of this is being done in towns that suffered destruction and horrors in the Homeland War.”<sup>113</sup>

The Šibenik Festival of Alternative and Left (FALIŠ) soon found itself on the radar of the “banners”. Some Šibenik veterans called for the abolition of funding for the festival,<sup>114</sup> and the journalist Tihomir Dujmović fiercely attacked FALIŠ on his *Facebook* profile. For Dujmović, the primary issue was that, in addition to funding from the state and city budgets, the festival was also financed with funds from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serb National Council:

“WHY ARE PORFIRIJE AND PUPOVAC’S SNV FINANCING THE ‘FALIŠ’ FESTIVAL? Is there a single project in which the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), the Serb National Council (SNV), the Croatian Journalists’ Association (HND), and the Croatian state participate together? Tell me one Croatian national, political, or social interest for which money is provided by the SPC, the SNV, and the Croatian state? Unfortunately, there isn’t one, nor has there ever been. Except for the ‘Fališ’ festival, which the Croatian state has been financing for years, humiliating its own citizens of the city of Šibenik with numerous provocations at that festival.”<sup>115</sup>

Columnist Marcel Holjevac went a step further in anti-Serb rhetoric directed at the “Nosi se” festival, saying that the festival was “a continuation of the Log Revolution by other means”.<sup>116</sup>

After the cancellation of the “Nosi se” festival and threats of protests at FALIŠ, the premiere screening of the film “Mirotvorac,” dedicated to Josip Reihl-Kir, was also postponed in Zadar. The film’s director, Ivan Ramljak, stated that he did not feel safe after the events in Benkovac and asked for the Zadar premiere of “Mirotvorac” to be postponed until the autumn. The reason for the postponement was fear that members of supporters’ groups might interrupt the screening of the film.<sup>117</sup> The postponement of these cultural events shows that the incidents resulted in an atmosphere of fear among cultural professionals, and that the lukewarm and often affirmative reaction of the Croatian Government suggested that interrupting cultural events offering a different perspective on the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and which are in some way connected with Serb institutions in Croatia, is a legitimate form of political action.

On 7 September, the Coordination of Veterans’ Associations from the Homeland War of Šibenik-Knin County organised a protest in Šibenik against the staging of FALIŠ. MPs from the Homeland Movement, Damir Biloglav and Ivica Kukavica, supported the protest with their physical

presence, while the festival was supported by Croatian President Zoran Milanović. The protesters again used the salute “For Homeland — Ready!” and waved NOS flags bearing said salute.<sup>118</sup>

### /5.2. Days of Serbian Culture

November was marked by violent incursions into the Days of Serbian Culture, an event that had been held regularly and without major incidents since 2006, organised by the Serbian Cultural Society “Prosvjeta”. Serbian cultural centres, which over the past two years had been stigmatised and slandered as centres of alleged espionage activity and an extension of the “Serbian world,” last year became targets of attacks by masked street hordes who, with insults, shouts of Ustasha slogans, and direct threats of violence, attempted to disrupt, and in some places succeeded in disrupting, a programme dedicated to cultural exchange between the two peoples. The attacks began in the premises of the Blatine City District in Split, where a group of around fifty men dressed in black, with hoods pulled over their heads, stormed the venue where a performance by a cultural and artistic society from Novi Sad was to be held.<sup>119</sup> Shouting “For Homeland — Ready!,” “Croatia, Croatia,” and “Serbian trash”, the hooligans told the “Prosvjeta” members present that “they could not hold the performance there, and that there was no place for such a programme in the month marking the fall of Vukovar.”<sup>120</sup> Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and the Mayor of Split, Tomislav Šuta, condemned the incident in the strongest terms, but the Split branch of the Homeland Movement (DP), Plenković’s coalition partner in Government, praised the attack on *Facebook*, cynically calling the chanting of the Ustasha salute and the insulting of those gathered “polite and dignified”: “DP Split and DP Split-Dalmatia County clearly state: Croatia is a free country, but freedom also implies respect for the sacrifice. Whoever ignores that consciously insults the feelings of Croatian citizens. On this occasion, we also express full support for the brave young people who, in a polite and dignified manner, expressed their civic disagreement with the provocative gathering and interrupted it. Their message is clear: in Split you do not spit on Vukovar and Croatia! Split lives and breathes the sacrifice of Vukovar — a city of heroes and a friend of Split. Whoever does not understand this should learn and not provoke,” the DP concluded in its *Facebook* post.<sup>121</sup>

The post was also liked by the Minister of Agriculture from the ranks of the Homeland Movement, David Vlajčić. The violent interruption of the programme was also supported by the Split branch of the HSP, as well as by the HDZ deputy chair of the Blatine City District, Julija Budimir Began, who stated the following: “The boys gathered spontaneously. There was no group insulting or pushing. There was nothing bad in this.

Such things, especially in the month of piety towards Vukovar, should not be happening.”<sup>122</sup> The police identified and arrested nine attackers, and although they were initially remanded in custody, a panel of the Split County Court overturned the detention order.<sup>123</sup>

Following the attack in Split, a performance by the folk song and dance ensemble “Veselin Masleša” in Ogulin, planned as part of the same event, was cancelled. Members of the ensemble, which has a rich tradition, reported that they would not come to Ogulin because, in light of the attack in Split, they did not feel safe. At the opening of the exhibition “Efemeris — the Dejan Medaković Legacy” in Zagreb, around fifty masked men gathered opposite the Serbian Cultural Centre in Preradovićeve Street, chanting “For Homeland — Ready!”, “Call, Just Call” (“Zovi, samo zovi”) and “Croatia, Independent State”.<sup>124</sup> When the police arrived, the men dispersed, but not before insulting a journalist from Vida tv and spitting at her.<sup>125</sup> Alongside condemnations of the violence, some politicians once again expressed support for the masked hooligans. Thus, the Mayor of Sinj, Miro Bulj of the Bridge party, sought justification for the hooligans, writing on his *Facebook* profile:

“All the media today are writing about the ‘hooligans’ who gathered in front of the Serbian Cultural Centre in Zagreb. But no one is writing about why they gathered. No one mentions whose legacy was to be presented there as part of the exhibition. It is the legacy of Dejan Medaković, one of the 16 members of the working group of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts that in 1986 produced the infamous SANU Memorandum, the conceptual foundation of the Greater Serbian policy that launched the aggression against Croatia.”

Although the exhibition in no way dealt with Dejan Medaković’s political work, nor affirmed or promoted his views, Bulj used the incident as justification to accuse Milorad Pupovac of “celebrating the legacy of those who are authors of monstrous criminal documents.”<sup>126</sup>

Parallel with the events in Zagreb, the football supporters’ group Torcida organised a protest on the Split waterfront, at which its members demanded the release from prison of the young men accused of violently interrupting the Days of Serbian Culture in Split. Between 1,000 and 2,000 protesters gathered, again chanting “For Homeland — Ready!” and “Croatia, Independent State”. In addition to demanding the release of the accused from detention, speakers at the protest demanded that everyone who receives public money sign a declaration that they will respect the Declaration on the Homeland War, and they asked representatives of Croatian Serbs to “publicly distance themselves from the Greater Serbian Saint Sava ideology and the genocide

against the Croatian people".<sup>127</sup> Asked about the Ustasha salutes at the protest, the Mayor of Split, Tomislav Šuta, said: "I am not happy that this is happening, but what I must say is that everyone has the right to their opinion, that they have the right, in the spirit of democracy, to say what they consider important at this moment, and that we live in a democratic state."<sup>128</sup>

One of the arguments used from the outset to justify the attacks on the Days of Serbian Culture was the fact that they were held in November, the month of the fall of Vukovar. This was happening even though none of the programmes in question dealt with Vukovar or the wars of the 1990s. The implication of this argument — that Serbs in the month of the Vukovar tragedy should not hold any cultural events, that is, that they should be invisible — rests on the premise of attributing collective guilt, and in fact instrumentalises and abuses the victims of Vukovar in order to justify ethnic discrimination. Nevertheless, many politicians were guided by this cynical excuse in order to justify calls for the postponement of the exhibition "Serbian Woman — Heroine of the Great War," which deals with the experiences of Serbian women in the First World War, in Vukovar. The first to call for the cancellation of the exhibition was the Mayor of Vukovar, Marijan Pavliček, who wrote on his *Facebook* profile that he considered the holding of "such" exhibitions during days of mourning inappropriate. In this context, the determiner he used could only mean Serbian exhibitions, and since the whole of November has never officially been declared a month of mourning, the message from the Vukovar mayor clearly turns the very culture of Serbs into something scandalous and offensive, which can be removed from the public space at will. Pavliček warned that the exhibition should be postponed in order to avoid "an unnecessary escalation," clearly evoking earlier examples of violent interruptions of events within the Days of Serbian Culture.<sup>129</sup> Pavliček's demand was joined by the Minister of Culture, Nina Obuljen Koržinek, who stated that the exhibition at this time was not acceptable "not because of the content but because of the impression".<sup>130</sup> In doing so, she effectively confirmed Pavliček's earlier articulated message about the undesirability of any content connected with Serbs in November — a message that is, at best, insensitive, and at worst openly discriminatory, especially when it comes from someone exercising executive authority.

Even before the organisers of the exhibition had managed to cancel it, the escalation that Pavliček had announced occurred: the supporters' association BVB Vukovar plastered the building of the Joint Council of Municipalities (zvo) in Vukovar, where the exhibition was to be held, with photographs of JNA soldiers and Chetnik paramilitaries from the time of the fall of Vukovar, and two insulting banners were displayed:

“Look at Serbs talking about heroes” and “Government of the Republic of Croatia (RH) or government of the RSK”, referring to the Republic of Serbian Krajina.<sup>131</sup>

### */6. Rehabilitation of the NDH and an Analysis of the Use of the Salute “For Homeland — Ready!” in Croatian Electronic Media*

The rehabilitation of the fascist regime of the Independent State of Croatia, a puppet entity formed by the Axis powers during the Second World War, has been carried out in the public sphere by means of two discursive and practical methods: historical negationism and the recontextualisation of symbols associated with the Independent State of Croatia. The actors implementing this rehabilitation were present at all levels of Croatian society: from protesters, supporters, and marginal right-wing politicians to members of the academic community, judicial institutions, and holders of political office. The historical profession defines historical negationism as the malicious falsification and distortion of historical sources in order to provide a “revised” picture of the past. The main goal of negationists is generally to gain political and ideological influence and to subordinate historical knowledge to a particular ideological objective. The most blatant historical examples of historical negationism are the “Lost Cause” ideology in the first half of the twentieth century, used to legitimise racist Jim Crow laws in the former slaveholding states of the American South, and Holocaust denial by pro-fascist politicians and historians, which gained momentum from the 1970s onwards. In sixteen European Union (EU) member states and in Canada, negationist policies and historiography are prohibited by law and equated with hate speech and the dissemination of chauvinistic ideologies. In Croatia, examples of historical denial of the genocide against Serbs in the Second World War have flourished since the early 1990s. Another form of rehabilitation of fascist regimes that has begun to appear in the Croatian public sphere is far more subtle — it involves the reinterpretation and recontextualisation of certain symbols as symbols of “resistance to totalitarianism” or “resistance to Greater Serbian aggression in the Homeland War”. In this way, symbolism burdened with a fascist and genocidal history is presented as patriotic. Of course, the ultimate consequence of this is precisely the creation of a symbolic continuity between the fascist NDH regime and the contemporary national state, and the denial of the emancipatory and state-building role of the anti-fascist struggle, which is grounded in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.

Anniversaries connected with the date of the establishment of the NDH and the date marking the breakout of prisoners from Jasenovac once again, as last year, provided an opportunity for journalists of *Hrvatski tjednik* to place negationist theses on the pages of their paper. Thus, in the issue of 10 April, the NDH is praised in an article signed by Stipo Pilić under the title: “10 April 1941 is the Most Significant Date in the History of the Modern Croatian State”. In the article, Pilić claims that 10 April is “the embodiment of the Croatian national idea regardless of the nature of that state’s relationship to other states, because the destiny of our people as a small nation is not to dictate to others, but to be ourselves and to be as sovereign as possible in alliance with the great powers”. The article is accompanied by statements by politicians and historians such as Blanka Matković, Zlatko Hasanbegović, and Tomislav Jonjić, who declare themselves in favour of commemorating 10 April. Hasanbegović and Jonjić described 22 June, Anti-Fascist Struggle Day, and 8 May, the Day of the Liberation of Zagreb, as “an expression of Yugoslavism and in opposition to the idea of Croatian state independence,” as well as “dates of Yugoslav occupation”. The article and the statements by some of the historians quoted establish a semantic opposition between the fascist NDH as an expression of the desire for independence and the anti-fascist legacy as “Yugoslav occupation.”<sup>132</sup>

On 24 April, on the eve of the Day marking the breakout of the prisoners, *Hrvatski tjednik* carried several articles devoted to denying the crimes in Jasenovac. Davor Dijanović’s article “Jasenovac is an Anti-Fascist Crime” claims the following: “At the scientific level, the Jasenovac myth has been defeated, but powerful Yugoslav and Greater Serbian political, media, and academic structures in Croatia do not allow its final burial.” The article goes on, referring to negationist literature, to claim that even “for 88.6% [of Jasenovac victims], there are data that are false, incorrect, contradictory, and unreliable. Or there are no data on sources, so in those cases these are phantom victims”. Such a claim represents a frequently used spin employed by genocide and Holocaust deniers, whereby certain real or fictitious ambiguities or incompletenesses in historical sources are taken as proof that the names of victims are fictitious. The same negationist tone is present in the article by Nikola Banić and M. Koić entitled: “Nothing New: Citizens are Right to Boycott It, New Fake Victims Are Being Uncovered, and the Yugoslav Charlatan Klasić Continues to Lie about the Number of Victims and Refuses to Present Evidence”.<sup>133</sup> Already in the headline, the work of historians who recognise the genocide is labelled as lies, and their name is accompanied by the chauvinistic neologism “Yugoserb,” which seems intended as both a political and an ethnic disqualification.

One example of the promotion of a negationist narrative appeared on 14 July on the pages of the Rijeka branch of the Bridge party, which published a video of its member Krešimir Rotim (later elected vice-president of the party). The video was conceived as a response to another video published by the SDP Youth concerning the display of pro-Ustasha symbols at Thompson's concert. In that video, Rotim rehabilitates the Ustasha movement, claiming that in the principles of the Ustasha movement there is "not an F of fascism," but rather "a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Greater Serbian idea". Rotim further denies that the Ustasha sold Dalmatia to Italy, and he also denies the number of victims of Jasenovac, stating that around 440 bodies were discovered in Jasenovac and that with unofficial estimates we arrive at a figure of around 600. "How is it possible that in a place where over 83,000 people were killed no traces of such a huge crime have been found."<sup>134</sup>

The Bridge initially deleted the disputed video, but their MP Nikola Grmoja defended Rotim: "Rotim is a historian, he has the right to his views, which, after all, is what historical science is based on — on questioning," and he said that Jasenovac "was used for Serbian propaganda."<sup>135</sup> Rotim himself responded to the condemnations via *TikTok*, launching a nationalist attack on the previously published and established historiography of Jasenovac and the NDH: "The history of Croatia will be written by Croats. It will not be written by Anglo-Saxons, Greater Serbs, communist, and their useful idiots on the Croatian media-political scene." In the *TikTok* video, Rotim also defended Dario Kordić, a war criminal convicted for the murder of 120 Bosniak civilians in Ahmići.<sup>136</sup>

The previous chapters of this bulletin have already documented in excessive detail the frequent use of the salute "For Homeland — Ready!" at gatherings of the right in Croatia, as well as at sports events and concerts. A salute whose use in previous years had been only occasional last year became an almost constant and normalised part of the repertoire of the political right. The analysis prepared by the authors, which we will present at the end of this chapter, will provide some of the reasons and controversies that accompanied the use of this salute, but what is new this year is the fact that even certain court judgments resulted in the legitimisation of the salute. In addition to the ruling of the Zagreb Minor Offences Court already mentioned in the chapter on the concerts of Marko Perković Thompson, the final ruling of the High Minor Offences Court against the Ministry of the Interior (MUP) and in favour of the controversial commander of the IX HOS Battalion "Rafael Boban," Marko Skejo, was also significant. The ruling, delivered in March last year and published in June, concerns proceedings initiated

four years earlier, when Skejo, during the celebration of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day in Knin, greeted the gathered supporters three times with “For Homeland,” to which they responded “Ready!”, for which he was charged under Article 5 of the Misdemeanours against Public Order and Peace Act. The Minor Offences Court in Šibenik acquitted Skejo, after which the Ministry of the Interior appealed to the High Minor Offences Court. In its acquittal, the High Minor Offences Court referred to the recommendations of the so-called The Council for Dealing with Consequences of the Rule of Non-Democratic Regimes, which is responsible for the conclusion about the “dual connotation” of the salute. The panel of the High Minor Offences Court upheld the Šibenik court’s ruling, explaining that members of the disbanded IX Battalion “Rafael Boban” had been incorporated into the 114th Brigade, which participated in the liberation of Knin, so the disputed salute could be used in their honour. Thus the celebration of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day was in fact turned into an event paying tribute to soldiers who died under HOS insignia, even though HOS units did not participate in Operation “Storm” at all. An unnamed legal expert interviewed for the weekly *Express* called the ruling “a blow to the constitutional and democratic order”.<sup>137</sup> Skejo, however, has not stopped linking the salute “For Homeland — Ready!” directly with the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). This year, at the same celebration in Knin, he again used the salute “For Homeland — Ready!” and later, when asked about it, said that “no one should be bothered by the Independent State of Croatia because it has its foundation, its foothold, and there is no need to be ashamed of it”.<sup>138</sup>

The most shameful example of the rehabilitation of the fascist regime last year was the round table “A Scientific Approach to Researching the Victims of Jasenovac,” organised on 28 October by the parliamentary group of the parties Home and National Gathering and the Croatian Sovereignists. Journalist and publicist Robert Bajruši called the round table “the most gruesome revisionist event in the history of the Croatian Parliament”.<sup>139</sup> Before the event itself, SDP leader Siniša Hajdaš Dončić asked the Speaker of Parliament Gordan Jandroković to ban the gathering because authors known as deniers of the genocide in Jasenovac, Nikola Banić and Igor Vukić, would be speaking there. In response to his request, Jandroković said: “There is no legal basis or procedural possibility that would allow me to ban this gathering. Although I consider this to be a self-evident fact, I want to emphasise that as Speaker of the Croatian Parliament I do not have the role of censor of the content of discussions organised by various parliamentary groups”.<sup>140</sup>

At the round table itself, a series of negationist claims were made — Igor Vukić said that in Jasenovac “there were victims, but not a large


number of them,” and stressed that Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška were not death camps, but labour camps intended to isolate citizens undesirable to the authorities of the time. According to Vukić’s claims made at the round table, “there were no mass killings there that would lead to a number of victims on the scale of several tens of thousands. A myth has been created that almost everyone who entered the camp lost their life there.” Vukić said that in the camps “there was health care, musical ensembles, the possibility of playing sports, and corresponding with family. Jasenovac was not a spa, but neither was it a torture chamber, yet life could be lost due to disease, escape, or reprisals for partisan sabotage.” After diminishing the victims of Jasenovac and the suffering of sadistically murdered and surviving prisoners in such a cynical way, Vukić expressed the wish that the Independent State of Croatia enter the Constitution as “an expression of the desire of the Croatian people for statehood,” even though it was formed after the occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers and, as such, had no legitimacy among the Croatian people.

At the same gathering, Nikola Banić asserted that the victim list of the Jasenovac Memorial Site (JUSP Jasenovac) was unreliable because it contained “duplicated and falsified victims”. Pero Šola also spoke at the event, saying that the most reliable source was “the registers of deaths, in which Jasenovac is listed as the place of death for 297 people between 1941 and 1945”.<sup>141</sup>

These scandalous statements prompted Milorad Pupovac to announce that, on behalf of the SNV, he would file criminal charges against Igor Vukić and others for the public approval and minimisation of crimes committed in the Ustasha camp Jasenovac. The recording of the negationist round table was removed from the Croatian Parliament’s website.<sup>142</sup>

### */6.1. Analysis of the use of the Phrase “For Homeland — Ready!” in Croatian Electronic Media*

In 2025, the Ustasha salute “For Homeland — Ready!” (ZDS) echoed through hippodromes and stadiums, was shouted and written on city streets, and could also be heard from the parliamentary lectern. Such incidents prompted a series of debates in the public and media sphere. The aim of this analysis is to determine to what extent, when, and in what way was ZDS discussed in part of the Croatian media — when did the interest in the topic increase, who stimulated it, in what contexts it appeared, and what arguments and interpretations were offered to the audience.




**Figure 1.** Number of articles per portal from the 1st of January to the 30th of September 2025

The mixed (quantitative and qualitative) analysis<sup>143</sup> was conducted on articles from 22 Croatian portals published between 1 January and 30 September 2025. Data on the articles were collected using the TakeLab Retriever Platform (Dukić et al., 2024).<sup>144</sup> A keyword search recorded 2,229 articles mentioning the phrase “For Homeland — Ready!” or the Croatian abbreviation “zds,” compared to 785 articles in the same period and on the same portals in 2024. After manual review, as well as

the removal of articles unavailable at the time of review and duplicate links, 2,032 articles remained. The first part of the analysis was carried out on those articles. Figure 1 shows the number of articles in which the phrase “For Homeland — Ready!” was mentioned on each of the included portals.

In terms of the temporal dynamics of article publication, as can be seen in Figure 2, a sharp increase occurred in July, the month in which the largest number of texts was published (816), followed by August (598), and September (352). The highest concentration of articles was recorded between 6 and 9 July, immediately after Marko Perković Thompson’s concert at the Zagreb Hippodrome. In addition to those dates, in July there was another sharp spike on the 14th, after MP Miro Bulj ended his speech in Parliament with the ZDS salute. In August, increased publication was driven by a series of events: Marko Perković Thompson’s concert in Sinj (4 August), the Ombudswoman’s reaction to the concert (6 August), the chanting of ZDS at the Operation “Storm” anniversary (articles of 5 and 6 August), followed by statements from HOS associations condemning the act (14 August), the burning of the Serbian flag and chanting of ZDS at Poljud (articles of 11 August), one in a series of veterans’ protests in Benkovac (21 August), and an acquittal for chanting ZDS at Thompson’s Zagreb concert (21 August). In September, heightened media interest was primarily prompted by the topical morning session of the Croatian Parliament on 15 September, at which ZDS was one of the central topics.



**Figure 2.** Daily number of articles by month


The continuation of the analysis is based on the framing approach, which assumes that by selecting and emphasising certain aspects of

reality, media content constructs frames and narratives that guide the way readers interpret events and understand social issues, which also influences the shaping of public opinion.<sup>145</sup> In the sample of articles mentioning “For Homeland — Ready!” or “ZDs,” the following elements of media frames were identified and analysed:

- /1 **The Central Issue** — In this research, the issue of the use of the salute “For Homeland — Ready!”. All other elements of argumentation were observed from two perspectives:
  - a) the use of the salute should be allowed/it is acceptable to use it;
  - b) the salute should be completely banned and sanctioned;
- /2 **Theme** — The predominant theme of the individual text in which the central issue is mentioned; the themes were not predetermined;
- /3 **Evaluation/Sentiment of the Article** — The prevailing value judgement or affective tone of the text;
- /4 **Actor** — The person, group, or institution that prompted the publication of the article or is most frequently cited in the text;
- /5 **Risk** — The negative consequences of allowing and using the salute vs. banning and sanctioning it;
- /6 **Attribution of Risk** — Individuals, groups, or other factors to which responsibility is attributed for the risks of use/allowing vs. banning/sanctioning;
- /7 **Benefits** — The positive consequences of use/allowing vs. banning/sanctioning;
- /8 **Attribution of Benefits** — Individuals, groups, or other factors to which the positive aspects of use/allowing vs. banning/sanctioning are attributed;
- /9 **Solution** — Proposed responses to the problem of use/allowing vs. banning/sanctioning;
- /10 **Proponent** — Individuals, groups, or institutions proposing solutions to the problem of use/allowing vs. banning/sanctioning;
- /11 **Antagonist** — Individuals, groups, or institutions named in the texts as culprits for the general poor state of society, without clear identification of specific risks; classified according to the two perspectives.

In order to obtain a sample showing what was most represented in the media, and thus potentially most influential, the corpus for frame analysis was composed of articles published on days when more than 25 texts were published on the five analysed portals. These are the portals that in the observed period from 1 January to 30 September published the largest number of articles mentioning “ZDS”: *dnevno.hr*, *direktno.hr*, *Slobodnadalmacija.hr*, *Index.hr*, and *24sata.hr*. In this way, a sample of 623 articles was extracted.

The most represented theme by far, accounting for as much as 55.2% of the coded articles, is Marko Perković Thompson — primarily his concert at the Zagreb Hippodrome on 5 July, followed by the one in Sinj on 4 August, and several articles about the singer’s private life. This is followed by the theme of Parliament and parliamentary debates (9.8% of articles), and the broader problematisation of the social situation, primarily related to the shift of society to the right (8% of articles).




**Figure 3.** Thematic structure of articles

In the next step, a corpus was created for analysing the other frame elements, comprising a total of 150 texts. When selecting the articles, careful consideration was applied to ensure the representation of individual themes — within each thematic unit, articles were select-

ed randomly, while preserving the structure obtained in the previous analysis. Thus, from the initially thematically coded 623 articles, the corpus included 83 articles about Marko Perković Thompson, 15 about the Croatian Parliament, 12 about the wider societal situation, ten about incidents, nine about the “banners”, eight about legislation and case law, eight about NOS, and five articles dealing with other, unclassified topics. Frame elements were identified by assigning labels to the corresponding parts of the text.

### Evaluation — How is the Use of the Salute “zds” Assessed in the Article?



**Figure 4.** Evaluation of the use of “zds” in the articles

The question that guided the coding was: *If this were the only article we had read about the use of the salute “zds,” would we come away with the impression that it is something benevolent, harmful, or would we be unable to make a judgement (because of a balanced presentation of the arguments of both sides or the absence of value judgements and emotions).* According to that assessment, in more than half of the texts (53%) a negative evaluation of the use of the phrase prevails, in 27% the evaluation is positive, while in 19% it is neutral or the positive and negative aspects are balanced (Figure 4). Such results indicate that, at least in the online media space in the first three quarters of 2025, negative interpretations of the

salute “zds” predominated, primarily in the form of negative *reactions* to attempts to affirm the chant.

### Actors — Whose Words and Actions Prompt the Publication of the Texts, Who is Given the Most Space in the Text?

Actors are named in 88.67% of the analysed articles, and in that role a total of one hundred different individuals or groups appear. Leading among them is the *singer Marko Perković Thompson*, followed by *Prime Minister Andrej Plenković* (12 times), *opposition MP Dalija Orešković* (ten times), *Speaker of Parliament Gordan Jandroković* (seven times), *MP Sandra Benčić* and the *Ombudswoman Tena Šimonović Einwalter* (five times each), and *MP Miro Bulj* (four times). Nine actors are mentioned three times, 21 actors twice, while 61 appear only once.

Such a distribution points to a multiplicity of voices and a dispersal of the triggers of media attention. However, if the coded actors are grouped according to their social functions (Figure 5), it becomes clear that individuals from the political sphere occupy the most space, indicating the central role of politics in creating media discourses on “zds” in the analysed period. The presence of people from cultural and entertainment circles can primarily be attributed to Marko Perković Thompson, while in third place are actors whose role is usually to interpret and contextualise events, such as university professors, historians, or political analysts.





Figure 5. Actors — group distribution by number of occurrences

## Risks — What Dangers are Associated with the Use or Permitting the Use of the “zds” Salute, and Which with its Complete Prohibition and Sanctions?

The negative consequences of (permitting) the use of “zds” are cited in 68.7% of the texts. Thirty-four recorded risks, after coding, were thematically grouped as follows:

- /1 **Right-wing radicalisation and fascisation (socio-political risks):** *normalisation of Ustashism and fascism, links with neo-Nazism and Ustashism, permitting the promotion of Ustashism, rehabilitation of the Ustasha movement by linking it with the Homeland War, a path towards Nazism, the right-wing radicalisation of the HDZ, strengthening of the far right, the spread of authoritarianism, manipulation, and domination of the population;*
- /2 **Historical revisionism and falsification of history (ideological, symbolic, and interpretative risks):** *relativising and sympathising with the NDH and Ustashism; permitting the promotion of Ustashism, redefinition/revisionism of history, falsifying the history of the Homeland War, glorifying war crimes, misinforming young people;*
- /3 **Endangering the state and the legal order (legal and institutional risks):** *a blow to the rule of law, the unconstitutionality of zds, the illegality of zds, tolerating violations of the law;*
- /4 **Social polarisation and violence (social and security risks):** *divisions in society, a call to hatred and violence, violent behaviour, a threat to public safety, tolerating extremism, the politicisation of sport;*
- /5 **Injustice towards victims and fighters (of the 1940s and the 1990s; symbolic and social risks):** *disrespect for the victims of the NDH, disrespect for the sacrifice of veterans, damaging the reputation of Croatian veterans;*
- /6 **Departure from civilisational values and tradition (value-based and normative risks):** *deviation from ideas of humanity and civilisational values, an attack on European values, perverting Christian values, disrespect for the tradition, culture and values of the Republic of Croatia;*
- /7 **Damage to the international reputation of the Republic of Croatia (reputational risks):** *damaging the reputation of the Republic of Croatia, a negative impact on tourism.*




**Figure 6.** Risks — group distribution by number of occurrences

As can be seen from Figure 6, among the potential risks of the use of the “zds” chant the most frequently mentioned are broad socio-political processes of right-wing radicalisation and fascisation, risks related to social intolerance and violence, followed by the ideological and historical manipulations that support these processes.

The negative consequences of a complete ban and punishment of the Ustasha salute, 23 of them, are highlighted in 26% of the texts:

- /1 **Threats to freedom of speech and democratic standards (political and democratic risks):** *the abolition of freedom of speech and expression, the collapse of democracy, dehumanising political opponents, the satanisation and persecution of Thompson, selective sanctioning of groups that lack social power, the return of Yugoslavia;*
- /2 **Legal and institutional risks:** *the absurdity of detaining and prosecuting large numbers of people, disrespect for the judicial system and the law;*

- /3 Ideological manipulation and the production of “moral panic” (political risks): *unjustified scaremongering about the growth of Ustashism, producing the opposite effect through bans, producing the opposite effect by exaggerating the problem, manipulation of the population;*
- /4 Historical revisionism and asymmetrical interpretations of the past (ideological, symbolic and interpretative risks): *falsifying history, concealing Yugoslav communist and Greater Serbian crimes, “the red star also has a double connotation”;*
- /5 Social polarisation and identity conflicts (social and symbolic risks): *divisions in society, attacks on Croatian symbols, disrespect for ancestors and the nation, reactions of the left as in Serbia, “it is worse in Serbia”;*
- /6 Other social and political risks: *manipulation of veterans, loss of support on the right, weakening of traditional media.*



**Figure 7.** Banning risks — group distribution by number of occurrences

From this perspective (Figure 7), the most common risks cited are various forms of undermining democratic achievements linked to freedom of expression, while the next problem highlighted is intimidating citizens with an invented or exaggerated threat. The third largest group


of risks, those related to historical revisionism, in these cases does not seek directly to deny the criminal character of the NDH and the salute associated with it but rather attempts to place the legacy and symbols of Yugoslavia on the same level. In comparison with the risks of using “zds,” which are often articulated as structural and systemic threats, these risks are somewhat more focused on issues of individual freedoms.

### Attribution of Risks — To Whom (or What) is Responsibility Attributed for the Negative Consequences of the Use and Permitting the Use of the “zds” Salute, and to Whom for the Negative Consequences of its Ban?


Attribution of risks is present in half of the analysed texts, with a total of 52 individuals, groups or other relevant factors named. Among them, the greatest individual responsibility is attributed to *Prime Minister Andrej Plenković* (21 times), followed by *the singer Marko Perković Thompson* (17 times) and *Speaker of Parliament Gordan Jandroković* (15 times). Next come *the police* (14 times), *holders of political office/institutions, officials* (12 times) and *the HDZ government* (eight times). Eight individuals or groups appear between three and six times, nine twice, and the remaining 29 only once.

The opposite perspective, that is, the attribution of risks associated with banning and sanctioning the salute, is significantly less represented. It appears in 13.33% of the texts and encompasses a total of 15 individuals or groups, mostly broadly defined left-leaning social actors. *Media on the left of the spectrum* appear five times, *apologists for communism, the left, the Mayor of Zagreb Tomislav Tomašević* and *the opposition* three times, while the other responsible parties appear once or twice.

As can be seen from Figure 8 and Figure 9, from both perspectives politicians are most often cited as the sources of risk — primarily individuals, followed by “politicians in general,” and certain political parties. Responsibility is also frequently attributed to informal or *ad hoc* formed groups that are not yet perceived as stable, clearly defined social actors. On the one hand, this may reflect the specific nature of certain risks, and on the other, the fact that we witnessed the emergence and strengthening of new discursive actors within this topic during the analysed period.



**Figure 8.** Risk attribution of using “zds” — group distribution by number of occurrences



**Figure 9.** Risk attribution of banning “zds” — group distribution by number of occurrences


### Benefits — What are the Positive Aspects of (Permitting) “zds,” and What of Banning “zds”?

Twenty different positive aspects and consequences of using the Ustasha salute are highlighted in as many as 40% of the analysed texts. According to coding, they are grouped as follows:

- /1 **The Homeland War and national-historical continuity (symbolic and historical-identity benefits):** *linked to the symbolism and legacy of the Homeland War (“Bojna Čavoglave”), the historical struggle against Yugoslavia/“Greater Serbianism,” directing Croatia towards the ideals for which veterans sacrificed their lives, showing respect for Croatian veterans;*
- /2 **National identity, tradition and values (identity and value benefits):** *promoting true patriotic values, promoting traditional and Christian values, respect for tradition (an old Croatian salute), the national awakening of young people, an expression of unity, Zenga shoes are good and patriotic;*
- /3 **Positive emotions and entertainment (affective and social benefits):** *good fun/atmosphere, expressing positive emotions, zds as part of an integral repertoire, a historic concert;*
- /4 **Freedom of expression and legitimacy (democratic and normative benefits):** *practising freedom of expression, zds is used by legitimate associations, the decision of the High Misdemeanour Court, it was not controversial for Tuđman and Račan.*

The following are singled out as separate categories:

- /5 **Legitimation of the NDH:** *the origins of modern-day Croatia are in the NDH;*
- /6 **Political-pragmatic benefits:** *consolidating the Prime Minister's position at the head of the ruling party.*



**Figure 10.** Benefits of using “zds” — group distribution by number of occurrences

The positive aspects of “zds” are primarily articulated in the context of Marko Perković Thompson’s concerts. As can be seen from Figure 10, among the benefits the dominant move is shifting the narrative from the 1940s to the 1990s, that is, politically legitimising the salute by linking it to the Homeland War, and then to broader value frameworks of national identity, unity, and tradition. Furthermore, in a not insignificant number of cases the absence of negative consequences is highlighted as a positive aspect, that is, resolving the contentiousness of the salute by invoking authoritative sources or interpreting it as a form of free expression. Equally frequent is the use of “zds” as part of a collective and affective, rather than primarily political, experience.

The benefits of a complete ban on “zds” are articulated in only 4% of the analysed texts. In these cases legal and institutional benefits are

cited (*protection of constitutional values and the rule of law and legal certainty*; four times in total), followed by social and security benefits (*a sense of security for the inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia and the prevention of future incidents*; twice in total) and political and democratic benefits (*the progress and wellbeing of Croatia, respect for democracy and freedom of speech*; four times in total).

The observed asymmetry between the two opposing perspectives partly stems from the fact that some opponents of the use of the salute proceed from the view that “zds” is already fully banned in all public contexts, but that existing regulations are not enforced consistently, and therefore sanctions are not viewed in the context of possible benefits, but in the light of missed opportunities.

### Attribution of Benefits — To Whom or to What is Credit Attributed for the Positive Aspects of Using “zds” as Opposed to Banning it?

Attribution of benefits is significantly rarer than the listing of benefits itself and is marked in only 5.33% of the analysed articles, with a total of six individuals or groups named. Most often mentioned are *Torcida supporters* (three times) and *Prime Minister Andrej Plenković* (twice), while *Croatian youth*, *the singer Marko Perković Thompson*, *ministers who attended his concert*, and *the police* each appear once.

Attribution of benefits associated with banning and sanctioning the salute is even rarer and appears in 3.33% of the texts. In that context, *the first Croatian president Franjo Tuđman* is mentioned four times, *the SDP* and *the rest of the opposition* twice, and “*proven veterans*” once.


### Solution — What is Proposed in Order to Prevent or Mitigate the Risks Arising from the Use or the Ban of “zds”?

Proposed solutions to the problems related to the use of “zds” (present in 42.67% of the texts) are distributed into the following groups:

- /1 **Legal and institutional solutions (legislation, judiciary, sanctions):** *a new, clearer law, raising public awareness through legal instruments, punishing abuses, banning Ustaša insignia at concerts, initiating requests for the protection of legality in cases of acquittals, verdicts that take all circumstances of the case into account;*
- /2 **Political solutions (condemnation, positioning, political conflict):** *political condemnation, clearer public condemnation of the glorification and relativisation of the NDH, political confrontation, maintaining the HDZ’s*

ideological position, a return to democracy through political realignment, distancing from all totalitarianisms;

- /3 **Educational and preventive solutions (long-term change of values and knowledge):** educating young people, civic education, more funds for education, antifascism as the foundation of society, strengthening democracy and tolerance, raising public awareness, the Church should influence the faithful;
- /4 **Management of symbols and public practices (symbolic, cultural and administrative solutions):** remove ZDS and similar symbolism from all public and state events: banning Ustasha insignia at concerts, rejecting the linking of ZDS with the Homeland War, at Homeland War commemorations display only the official flag of the Republic of Croatia, employees in public administration should not attend events such as Thompson's concerts, banning the use of ZDS in stadiums, taking over the organisation of supporters' marches, banning such mass concerts in Zagreb;
- /5 **Social de-escalation and responsibility (calming conflict, normative and value solutions):** calming passions, stepping away from politics, responsibility of individuals and institutions, freedom of speech, respect for the Constitution.




**Figure 11.** Solutions to the risks of using “zds” — group distribution by number of occurrences

In the corpus, the most represented proposals are those of legal and institutional regulation and sanctioning of the use of “zds,” that is, a repressive framework, followed by political and ideological solutions, which to a large extent boil down to rhetoric. Both groups allow relatively rapid implementation and sometimes even evaluation of their

effects. Long-term solutions, such as prevention and investment in education, are less represented. Even less frequently mentioned are measures aimed at preventing the normalisation of “zds” by regulating symbolism in the public space at levels below the state, while the least represented are solutions that (often imprecisely) call for a consensual calming of conflict (Figure 11).

Proposals for solving problems related to banning and sanctioning “zds” appear in only 4.7% of the texts. *Investment in young people as an educational and preventive solution* is highlighted twice, while the other solutions appear once each: *a legal ban on promoting communism* (legal and institutional), *lustration of history and evaluating the Homeland War and “zds” as antifascist* (ideological-revisionist), *lowering tensions* (de-escalatory) and the opposite — *“so that next time there are a million people”* (escalatory/mobilising), and *freedom of speech* (normative-value).

**Proponents — Who Proposes Solutions to the Problems Associated with the Use of the “zds” Salute, and Who Proposes Solutions to the Problems Associated with its Ban?**



**Figure 12.** Proponent — group distribution by number of occurrences

Proponents are named in 20.67% of the analysed texts, with a total of 28 individuals or groups mentioned. The most frequent proponent is *Prime Minister Andrej Plenković* (five times), followed by the *Ombuds-woman Tena Šimonović Einwalter* and the *President of the Republic Zoran Milanović* (four times each), *MP Milorad Pupovac* (three times), while *SDP president Siniša Hajdaš Dončić* and *Mirela Holy* appear twice each. All other proponents appear once.

If proponents are associated with their social roles, it becomes clear that in this category too domestic politicians or officials predominate by more than half, mostly individuals.

Proponents associated with the perspective of permitting the use of the salute are far less represented. This perspective appears in 6% of the texts: *Prime Minister Andrej Plenković* is mentioned three times, *Min-ister of the Interior Davor Božinović* twice, while *HOŠ commander Marko Skejo*, *political commentator Ivica Granić*, *Ljubo Česić Rojs*, *Trpimir Goluža* and *anonymous Croats on social media* appear once each.

### Antagonists

Antagonists or folk devils, that is, those who appear in the texts as responsible for general social decay without a specific offence being cited, are identified in 14% of the analysed articles. This form of blaming is far more frequent from the perspective of supporters of the use of the salute, with bearers of blame appearing in 12% of the texts. In this group a total of 16 individuals or groups are named. Most frequently, six times, *mental communists and Yugoslavs* are mentioned, three times *the defeated left*, *communist protégés* and *the persecutors of Thompson*, *hatred and barrenness of souls*, twice *Milorad Pupovac* and *the “antifas,”* and all others only once.

On the other hand, antagonists from the perspective of those who do not support the use of the salute appear in only 2% of cases: twice they are *a mob*, and once *black keyboards*.

## /7. Ethnically Motivated Violence

The normalisation of hate speech and discrimination creates fertile ground for direct violence against members of a particular vulnerable group. If a group is labelled in advance as hostile, a message is sent that violent action against it is legitimate. The same can happen if there are attempts to legitimise regimes that committed crimes against that group and to justify their actions. In this bulletin we have singled out

some examples of violence directed against Serbs. We have divided this into violence directed at property, i.e. ethnically motivated vandalism, and violence directed at individuals, i.e. examples of ethnically motivated interpersonal aggression.

### */7.1. Ethnically Motivated Vandalism and Offensive Graffiti*

This year, too, anti-fascist monuments and memorials to the victims of the Ustasha regime were a favourite target of vandals. On the night of 22 February, the monument to the Zagreb Partisan unit “Silvestar Pelcl” was defaced with fascist graffiti. This is just one in a series of incidents in which the monument has suffered that type of vandalism, and on two earlier occasions its plaque was stolen and damaged.<sup>146</sup>

In March, unknown perpetrators also desecrated the Dudik Memorial Site near Vukovar, drawing on it an image of a tree with hanged people, accompanied by the inscription “Serbian Family Tree.”

After the weekend of 19 and 20 July, unknown perpetrators destroyed a *Stolperstein* placed in memory of Ljubomir Tomić, a victim of Ustasha terror, on the street Trnjanska Cesta in Zagreb. This is only one in a series of stumbling stones destroyed in the Croatian capital in recent years.<sup>147</sup>

The anti-fascist memorial most frequently targeted by vandals was the memorial plaque to the First Split Partisan Detachment in the park in the Plokite neighbourhood of Split. The plaque was first smashed<sup>148</sup>





/ Vandalized memorial to 1st partisan detachment of Split



/ Carving "NDH" on Dotrščina monument near Zagreb

and then, on two occasions, defaced with Ustasha graffiti.<sup>149</sup> In addition to these monuments, memorials in Dotrščina Memorial Park in Zagreb were also vandalised, with unknown persons carving the inscription “NDH” and the Ustasha “U,” as well as the monument to fallen fighters near the village of Hrboki in Istria, on which “Ustashes” and the symbol of the large Ustasha “U” were written.<sup>150 151 152</sup>

Alongside the destruction and graffitiing of anti-fascist memorials, the number of offensive graffiti glorifying the NDH and propagating hatred against Serbs also increased. There is not enough space in this bulletin to mention every example of vandalism by graffiti, so we will cite only a few illustrative cases. On the ruins of the Orthodox Church of St Nedelja in Gornji Karin, vandals this year again wrote graffiti: “For Homeland — Ready!”, “Kill the Serb,” “Ustashes 1991,” alongside which they also drew a tractor.<sup>153</sup>


The already mentioned “Serb(ian) Family Tree” graffiti, which directly calls for the lynching of Serbs, was frequently drawn. It is a variant of an identical slogan used by neo-Nazis in the United States against African Americans and Latinos. In this case it was a graffiti recorded in Zagreb. The graffiti was accompanied by Ustasha symbols and the chauvinistic slogan “Hang Serbs on the willows” (“Srbe na vrbe”).



/ “Hang Serbs on the Willows”



/ “For Homeland — Ready! Kill the Serb”



/ "Kill the Serb!  
Get out of Croatia!"

In Glušci near Metković, hate speech graffiti was drawn a week before the commemoration for ninety villagers from that settlement who were killed by the Ustashas in Jasenovac.<sup>154</sup> It is the only village with a majority Serb population in the Neretva region, which suggests that the date was deliberately chosen in order to intimidate the residents.

Shortly after the violent disruption of the Days of Serbian Culture in Split, graffiti appeared on the sports hall in the Plokite district calling for Serbs to leave Croatia and for them to be killed. The graffiti was accompanied by the usual Ustasha iconography.<sup>155</sup>

On the night of 13-14 December, graffiti with messages of hatred appeared on the façades and family houses of Serbs in Tenja, Sarvaš, and Banovci in Osijek-Baranja County. This case is particular because it concerns an area where no interethnic incident has been recorded for a long time. It is also one of the rare examples in which the family homes of Serbs were targeted by vandals. In this way, hate speech moved from the public space directly into the intimate space of the home.<sup>156</sup>

A case was recorded in Zadar, on 5 July, when the cars of a group of tourists from Serbia were damaged. Young people who had come from Belgrade to a sports tournament in Zadar found four of their passenger cars with punctured tyres. Since not a single other vehicle in the entire car park was damaged, it is easy to assume that the Serbian registration plates were the reason for the tyres being slashed.<sup>157</sup>

## */7.2. Ethnically Motivated Attacks on Persons*

This year saw a large number of explicit threats of violence directed at prominent members of the Serbian community and institutions connected with Serbs in Croatia. One of the first targets of particularly brazen intimidation was the newsroom of the weekly *Novosti*, which for years has been under attack from right-wing politicians and has recently also been exposed to institutional pressure. On Wednesday, 5

February, a threatening letter addressed to the editor-in-chief arrived at the *Novosti* office. The letter contained powder of an unknown composition which the author claimed was “Novichok,” the nerve agent used in Russia in assassinations of opponents of the regime. The letter stated that the “Novichok” was a gift for the “25th anniversary of Chetnik activity in *Novosti*”. The police were informed of the threat and are still conducting an investigation, while the powder was analysed by specialists for atomic, biological, and chemical defence of the Croatian Armed Forces.<sup>158</sup>

On 15 July, the peace activist Zoran Pusić also received a threat. The letter received abounded in explicit insults and threats against Pusić and his family, was signed “Avengers of Bleiburg,” and ended with the salute “For Homeland — Ready!”<sup>159</sup> Soon afterwards, a similarly worded letter was also received by the President of the Serbian National Council, Boris Milošević, and we reproduce it below:

Chetnik: BORIS MILOŠEVIĆ

Chetnik National Council (SNV)

Milošević, you are an unshaven Chetnik, unlike the shaven ones: Pupovac, D. Jović, Višnjić, Tatalović, Vukobratović, Uzelac, Jeckov, Šimpraga... There is no difference between unshaven and shaven Chetniks when it comes to acting against Croatia. You are now one of the Chetnik dukes in Croatia, and in the Serbian world.

Recently you gathered in Jadovno, in the presence of a few domestic traitors, to mark the murders of 40,000 Serbs in the NDH. Maybe you don't know, 400,000 of them were killed, as well as 1,400,000 in Jasenovac, and just as many in other parts of the NDH.

In your speech you babbled so much, in line with Serbian lies, emphasising that all were killed to the chant FOR HOMELAND — READY! and that this salute must be banned. You didn't remember to thank the Croatian Government which financed (with 8,400 euros) the holding of that Chetnik, that is anti-Croatian, gathering.

Chetnik, if you don't know what it was like for us Croatian defenders (1991—95), and especially for the HOS members, ZDS was a motivation in the fight against you Chetniks. It was one of the responses to the song to your relative, the Chetnik: “Slobodan,

send us salad, we'll bring the meat, we'll slaughter Croats." You obviously haven't heard of that, or of other Chetnik songs.

Thanks to ZDS we fucked your mothers, starting with Operation "Flash" and ending with Operation "Storm", after which the well-known Chetnik exodus followed. And before that you firmly decided that you did not want to live in Ustasha Croatia, but in Greater Serbia.

Chetnik Milošević, don't think we don't know what and how you are working.

CROATIAN DEFENDER

And with the most beautiful Croatian salute:

FOR HOMELAND — READY!

P.S. Next time we won't throw a slice of lemon at you, but something more substantial.<sup>160</sup>

Milorad Pupovac also received death threats under a post on the official SDS pages of 28 October. Pupovac and Croatian Serbs were threatened with death and violence under a post sharing Milorad Pupovac's free speech about the denial of crimes in Jasenovac. The threats were reported to the police.<sup>161</sup>



Miro Ivanković

Ima li itko ovom četničkom govnetu začepiti smrdljiva usta?

**Miro Ivanković:** *Is there someone who can shut this Chetnik piece of shit's foul mouth?*

The president of "Prosvjeta," Nikola Vukobratović, also experienced threats in an anonymous letter signed "nos member". The anonymous author vulgarly insults Vukobratović, calling him a "Chetnik" and the weekly *Novosti* "Chetnik *Novosti*". They also warn him that it would be "nice and advisable to move around Zagreb in a tractor, but an armoured one",

Physical attacks motivated by hatred of Serbs or simply directed against persons of Serbian nationality are the most extreme manifesta-

tion of policies based on ethnic divisions. Aggression towards vulnerable groups does not always have to be explicitly motivated by ethnic hatred, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish whether an attack on a person was ethnically motivated or even merely a consequence of the perpetrators believing that, because of the atmosphere in society, the authorities would not protect Serbs with equal zeal. Ethnically motivated physical attacks often manifest themselves as an extension of hateful discourse coming from the media or political podiums, so we can say that discursive violence present in the media or in politicians' statements and systemic infrastructural violence are often refracted through people's bodies, giving nationalism its ugliest face.

At the AMZ Gallery in Zagreb on 5 March, journalist Silva Ćapin and cameraman Dražen Žerjav from VIDA TV were verbally and physically attacked. While filming the exhibition "Ivan Meštrović and Tomislav Gotovac: The Intimate of the Public," an unknown man entered and began loudly objecting to the content of the exhibition, claiming that it "offends Croatian morality". The man threatened those present that they would "end up like John Lennon," after which he punched Dražen Žerjav in the head. The attack was reported to the police.

On Šparadići Beach near Grabešnica, not far from Šibenik, on 26 June, an attack took place on a group of young men who had come to swim. The young men were attacked by two men, one of whom swung a metal bar at them, while the other poured water over them and their belongings, threatening them and claiming that the young men were on a "private beach" and also shouting at them that they were Chetniks who were "disturbing their peace". The attackers calmed down and withdrew after they saw that one of those attacked was filming the entire incident.<sup>162</sup>

While no one was seriously injured in the previous attacks, the incident that occurred on Saturday, 28 June, in the municipality of Rakovica near Plitvice resulted in serious injuries to a tourist from Serbia. Two attackers set upon a group of tourists who had stopped in the car park in front of a shopping centre after they saw that the bus had Serbian registration plates. The youths directed a series of insults at the four tourists, and one of the attackers, among other things, shouted: "What are you doing here? My grandad fought against the likes of you!". He then struck one of the tourists, a 48-year-old man, in the head with his fist and knocked him to the ground, whereby the victim sustained serious bodily injuries in the form of skull fractures.<sup>163</sup>

A Serbian tourist was also attacked on 11 October in Fažana. Three perpetrators approached the 34-year-old Serbian citizen and, with insults and threats, tore the shirt from his back.<sup>164</sup>

Karate competitors from Serbia at the Balkan Karate Championship in Rijeka seem to have narrowly avoided a physical attack. Namely, on 8 November, at a time when groups of supporters were violently disrupting events at the Days of Serbian Culture, a group of masked persons was noticed in front of the Zamet Sports Hall waiting near the Serbian team's bus.<sup>165</sup> The organisers called the police, who identified the assembled persons, establishing that they were minors. The President of the Croatian Karate Federation, Davor Cipek, apologised on behalf of the organisers to the Karate Federation of Serbia.<sup>166</sup> None of the perpetrators were detained — as minors, they were reported to the social welfare service.<sup>167</sup>

Two young men attacked two Serbian nationals on 5 December after hearing them speaking in the Ekavian dialect in a café. They smashed one of the windows on the victims' van and tried to pull them out of the vehicle. The perpetrators were identified and detained, and criminal charges were filed against them for violent behaviour and damage to another person's property in connection with a hate crime.<sup>168</sup>

As a sign of protest against the violent atmosphere in society and the strengthening of right-wing extremism to which, unfortunately, the authorities have not responded adequately, on 30 November protest marches entitled "United Against Fascism" were held in Zagreb, Pula, Rijeka, and Zadar. The marches in Rijeka and Zadar were attacked by violent groups of young men dressed in black and masked with hoods. Alongside the now routine shouting of the Ustasha salute, in Rijeka at least thirty people threw pyrotechnic devices at the protesters before and after the march, injuring one child and one adult. Out of the entire group, only nine were arrested and are charged with misdemeanours against public order and peace.<sup>169</sup>

In Zadar, a group of hooligans attempted to attack the protesters and clashed with the riot police, who had to use irritants. At the beginning of the march masked people threw balloons filled with red paint at the protesters. Saddest of all, once again, were statements by certain organisations and politicians who in their remarks attacked the participants in the non-violent anti-fascist march more than the hooligans who had violently attacked them. The veterans' association HVIDRA (Croatian Disabled Homeland War Veterans' Association) thus condemned the protests and called for a security and intelligence prosecution of the participants. They called on the Government and

the competent state bodies to state whether there were elements of criminal offences involving the glorification of symbols of the former totalitarian communist-fascist state, violations of the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia prohibiting the restoration of any Yugoslav state union, and violations of the Resolution of the European Parliament. Also, given the frequency of these activities, which imply the operation of organised groups, they demand that the Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA), in accordance with its legal powers, collect and analyse all data for the purpose of protecting national security, the constitutional order, and the interests and well-being of Croatian citizens.

In doing so, they particularly warned of the activities of the Serbian minority community “under the guise of cultural events which, through their content and the promotion of the authors of the SANU Memorandum, were actively aimed at provoking Croatian citizens in the sad and reverent month of commemorating Remembrance Day for the Victims of the Homeland War and Remembrance Day for the Victims of Vukovar and Škabrnja”. “We can freely say that the Greater Serbian ideology has metastasised in all directions within the Serbian community in Croatia.”<sup>170</sup>

The protesters were also attacked by the former Mayor of Split and Member of Parliament, Andro Krstulović Opara. Using extremely dehumanising language, he called the protesters “trash” and “vermin”.<sup>171</sup> Condemnations of the protests and hate speech also came from the highest circles of the Government. Commenting on the protests, the Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister, Ivan Anušić, said that the protest was “against Croatia, perhaps even pro-Yugoslav,”<sup>172</sup> and he particularly stigmatised the use of Cyrillic on one of the banners, highlighting the use of Cyrillic as one of the pieces of evidence that the protest was allegedly “anti-Croatian”.<sup>173</sup>

## Conclusion

One of the conclusions that can be drawn from this year's analysis is that part of the iconography associated with the fascist Ustasha movement has increasingly begun to enter the political mainstream. The best example of this is the frequency of use of the Ustasha salute "For Homeland — Ready!". Despite the conclusions of the Council for Dealing with Consequences of the Rule of Non-Democratic Regimes from 2016, which introduced the expression "dual connotation" into public discourse, the salute has increasingly begun to be used in contexts unrelated to nos commemorations. Moreover, whereas in the past members of the Government distanced themselves from, and even condemned, the salute, as in last year's reaction of Prime Minister Andrej Plenković to the Ustasha salute used by the Mayor of Dubrovnik, Mato Franković, this year condemnations — when they occurred at all — were not as strong and as a rule appeared in parallel with criticism of the left-wing opposition. Indeed, the Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister, Ivan Anušić, admitted that at Thompson's concert he greeted people using that salute. This shows that there is an attempt to introduce certain aspects of the Ustasha regime into the public space, to revise their criminal past and to assign them new meaning. Unfortunately, a necessary consequence of this is the placing of Croatian patriotism in continuity with the Ustasha regime, whose crimes were also relativised in Parliament.

Hate speech used against Serbian media, organisations, and individuals came primarily from politicians and right-wing media outlets. Unlike in 2024, when it followed the dynamics of pre-election events, here anti-Serb rhetoric was used almost routinely, with the clear intention of introducing it into the political mainstream. At moments when violent rhetoric was replaced by physical violence, representatives of the authorities condemned the violence, but these condemnations often came together with condemnation of the other side, whom they blamed for provocations and anti-Croatian activity, resorting to typical models of victim blaming. The increase in violent acts against property and persons, ever more open confrontations with the anti-fascist legacy, as well as defamatory attacks on publicly exposed intellectuals from the Serbian community, show that ethnic violence in our society is beginning to be tolerated more and more. To a considerable extent, we can also view this as a reflection of ever stronger political divisions in the world, as well as the strengthening of right-wing tendencies. Indeed, attacks on Serbs most often go hand in hand with sexism, homo-

phobia, transphobia, xenophobic attacks on foreign workers and Roma, and all other manifestations of increasingly present and, unfortunately, increasingly normalised political violence.

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